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Context statement 
 
This thesis has been prepared as a series of papers for publication. The exceptions to this are 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 6, which serve as the introduction and discussion chapters respectively 
and are more similar to the traditional thesis formatting. In Chapter 1, I provide an overview of 
the thesis as a whole, a literature review of the main addressed topics, and a concise explanation 
of the methods employed in each study. Moreover, in Chapter 6, I present my main findings, 
discuss their theoretical and practical implications, as well as the limitations of my studies. 
Also, I make some suggestions for future research and remark the conclusions of my work. 
 
Chapter 2 has been published; therefore, the text within this chapter is the same as that of the 
published paper. Chapters 3 and 4 are in preparation to be submitted to specialized journals, 
while Chapter 5 is in preparation to make it available on an open access pre-print service 
(PsyArXiv). 
 
Each paper’s reference is provided on the title page of each chapter. A single reference list for 
all chapters is provided at the end of the thesis. All figures and tables have been numbered so 
as to be consistent with the chapter numbers. When I refer to a chapter of this thesis within 
another chapter, I cite both the paper’s reference as well as the corresponding chapter in this 
thesis.  
 
Regarding the authorship of the papers included in this thesis, myself and Professor John Drury 
(main academic supervisor) are the authors of Chapters 2, 4, and 5. Chapter 3 was written by 
the authors mentioned above and Dr Matthew Easterbrook (second academic supervisor). It is 
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worth mentioning that Chapter 3 received feedback from anonymous reviewers in the context 
of two submission processes for academic journals.  
 
I am the lead author on all papers included in this thesis. This means that I was responsible for 
data collection, conducted all the analyses, wrote the first and final draft of each chapter, and I 
am the corresponding author of the published paper.  
 
  
12 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
I want to thank Professor John Drury for allowed me to pursue a PhD with him. None of 
the works reported in this thesis would be possible without his tireless and diligent support 
during the whole PhD process. Undoubtedly, I will always be in debt to John for 
continuously helping me to improve my work combining strictness and empathy wisely. 
I really hope that soon I can make a contribution that might pay off all (or at least part of) 
the effort he has invested in my doctoral training.  
  
I also want to thank Dr Matthew Easterbrook, my second supervisor, for his continuous 
support and insightful comments on my research. Moreover, it is worth noting that my 
PhD journey started some years before to come to the University of Sussex. Thus, I would 
like to express my gratitude to Professors Roberto Gonzalez and Jorge Manzi. The 
massive support and training I received while I was working in their lab in Chile were 
fundamental pillars of my PhD project. 
  
Although pursuing a PhD requires a lot of independent (and sometimes isolated) work, 
getting a loyal and supportive group of friends around me was crucial to complete this 
process successfully. Thus, I am very honour of has been a member of Crowds and 
Identities Research Group and had got the opportunity to share a lot of memorable 
experiences with Dr Anne Templeton (a true role model and inspiration to me); Dr Sarah 
Verstegren (who has always been there for me); and Sanjeedah Choudhury (your 
continuous support and hugs were always important to me). I am also grateful to become 
friends with Selin Tekin-Guven (aka the Nightmare). Selin’s enthusiastic (and sometimes 
13 
 
dramatic) support was fundamental during the late stages of my PhD. Indeed, more than 
a colleague, Selin is a friend I really appreciate, especially for sharing my love for East 
Asian food and becoming friends of my own friends. Another Nightmare (sorry, friend) 
very important to me is Dr Khalifah Alfadhli. I truly believe that every research group 
should have a member like him. His sense of humour, the long hours he used to spend 
preparing coffee in the office, and his genuine concern for other human beings are 
luxuries that not every group can afford. 
  
During the first three years of my PhD, I got the privilege of sharing the office with two 
remarkable Greeks, Dr Arabella Kyprianides (aka my favourite Greek person) and Dr 
Evangelos Ntontis (aka Dr Holidays). Apart from being exposed to Evangelos’ endless 
complains about everything in this world, sharing long hours of work, a lot of laughs, and 
fun conversations were some of the most amazing experiences in my life. For sure, I will 
keep those memories forever. 
  
Important friends are also Sümeyra Yalçıntaş; Rebecca Atkinson; Susie Ballentyne; Dr 
Siugmin Lay and Gonzalo Bravo (one day I will pay you back all the food and beers I got 
from you); Dr Daniel Miranda (a friend and also an inspiration); and Dr Paula Guardia 
(her long WhatsApp audios and conversations about life are memorable). I also want to 
thank my flatmates Dr Raúl Vallejos (aka Rulo), Pavel Corilloclla (aka the Traveller), 
and Kejia Yang (aka the Robot) for all the emotional support, fun conversations, beers 
and meals we shared at our home. 
  
14 
 
Certainly, one of the main advantages of coming to Brighton was the opportunity to make 
friends from places very far away from home. Thus, I am very honoured to have met Jodi 
Kwok, a wise and super smart Hongkonger who is the ‘starting point’ of my interest in 
that amazing city. I will always be grateful for all the help Jodi gave me when I visited 
Hong Kong and for her tips to learn a little bit more about her culture. I am also happy to 
count Pauline Chan as a friend. Pauline taught me a lot about her culture, delicious 
Cantonese food, and spared some time to go for a trip to Cheung Chau during the peak of 
dengue fever! (that was really fun!). Undoubtedly, Chua Xin Yi (from Singapore) is one 
of the most valuable people I have ever met. I was always surprised with her superior 
intelligence, ethical behaviour, and sense of humour (yes, I still remember that Cards 
against humanity is your favourite party game). I am so honoured to be Chua Xin Yi’s 
friend and grateful to her for introducing me other valuable, smart and fun friends as 
Christina Cui from Mainland China. 
  
Last but not least, I want to thank my family for their continuous and unconditional 
support during my PhD journey. Even though I was thousands of miles away from home, 
I always felt they were with me all the time. In particular, I want to thank my mother, 
Maria Eliana, for teaching me the values of hard-working, discipline and self-
improvement; my father, Luis, for show me the importance of kindness; my sister, 
Natalia, for being the bravest and the best of us; and my brother, Daniel, for his 
willingness to help me all the time no matter what. 
 
This work was funded by the CONICYT PFCHA/DOCTORADO BECAS CHILE/2015 
- 72160469 
15 
 
University of Sussex 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
Non-participants’ support for protest violence: The role of the perceived political 
context. 
 
Summary 
 
Psychological research on collective action has suggested that protesters may change their 
ideas about the legitimacy of protest violence when police actions are perceived as 
illegitimate and indiscriminate. However, no research has explored yet whether a similar 
process can be experienced by those who do not take an active part in protests, i.e., non-
participants. In this thesis, I argue that non-participants may support protesters’ violence 
against the police as a function of people’s perceptions of the political context where 
protests take place: the restrictions imposed by authorities (the government and the 
police) and the legitimacy public opinion gives to protests. 
 
Combining sociological and psychological theory and research, Chapter 2 describes the 
development and validation of a scale of measurement of people’s perceptions of their 
political context (Subjective Political Openness, SPO-R). Then, in Chapter 3, employing 
SPO-R, I suggest that non-participants may support protesters’ violence against the police 
following a rationale centred on the perceived restrictions imposed on the right to protest, 
and public opinion’s legitimisation of protests. 
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In Chapter 4, I argue that the rationale stated above is based on a dilemma non-protesters 
face when supporting or opposing protest violence: advocating peaceful protest versus 
defending the right to protest against authorities’ restrictions. The dilemma implies that 
non-participants may hold contradictory ideas about protest violence, and that its use can 
be legitimised as self-defence when protesters have to confront authorities who restrict 
the right to protest. Finally, Chapter 5 covers the idea that non-participants’ support for 
self-defence actions may be considered as an act of political solidarity with those who hit 
the streets triggered by authorities’ restrictions, public opinion’s legitimisation of 
protests, and own opinions about the right to protest.    
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Chapter 1 
Overview of research 
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1. Introduction 
 
‘Cuando al pueblo lo atacan con balas, no se va a defender con consignas’ /  
‘When bullets are fired at people, people will not defend themselves chanting 
slogans.’ 
Anonymous Chilean guerrilla commander. 
 
From 1973 to 1990, Chile was under the rule of a brutal military dictatorship (led by 
Augusto Pinochet) that systematically violated human rights and restricted fundamental 
civil rights, such as the right to protest. However, and unlike the reign of terror the military 
junta imposed throughout the country, the transition to a democratic regime started 
peacefully. Thus, in October 1989, in a national referendum that took place after years of 
protests (at that time unlawful) and negotiations between politicians and the junta, 
Chileans refused to be ruled by Pinochet for another eight years.   
 
One of the unintended consequences of the referendum was the emergence of a historical 
myth that persists among Chileans, ‘we defeated Pinochet in a ballot, with a pen and a 
piece of paper’. Although exploring the origin of this myth is beyond this thesis, its 
impacts on Chilean people’s life encouraged me to research the relevance of the perceived 
political context on people’s support for protest violence for two reasons. First, the myth 
assumes that the resistance to the dictatorship, and the subsequent triumph of democratic 
political forces, was mainly based on peaceful protests and a set of political agreements 
with the dictatorship. Even though this assumption has been reinforced by many people, 
19 
 
including politicians from all sides, and many scholars, it is only partially right. Despite 
the fact that since 1983 Chileans organised series of peaceful protests against the 
dictatorship, it is no less true that during the same events, university students clashed with 
the police, built barricades, threw stones and petrol bombs at police officers to fight 
against repression (see Salazar, 2006). In addition, people in the suburbs carried out more 
or less the same actions to confront military police incursions that were aimed at avoiding 
any attempt to organise protests (see Schneider, 1991). Thus, an accurate description of 
the Chilean resistance against the dictatorship should account for both peaceful and 
violent actions (including three revolutionary guerrillas) employed by Chilean people in 
self-defence (as in the opening quotation) and their potential impact on public opinion 
(see Salazar, 2012, for a discussion). 
 
A second reason to be considered is the fact that after democratic authorities took over 
the country (in 1990), the same political leaders that some years before had taken to the 
streets to fight against the dictatorship, they looked down on any protests to maintain an 
organised country centred ‘in the well-functioning of its institutions’. Consequently, 
although lawful, for many years politicians and a large portion of the population, 
considered protests as undesirable activities aimed at disturbing social peace (see 
Cummings, 2015, for a discussion). In line with this, protest violence (mainly carried out 
in the suburbs after commemorative rallies) was systematically depoliticised in news 
coverage and associated with mere criminality. Thus, based on the foundational myth 
about defeating a dictatorship following an institutional procedure (i.e., voting), protests 
in Chile were scarce during the first democratic governments. Protesters were stigmatised 
by both political authorities and public opinion. 
20 
 
 
Fortunately, the situation described above started to change in 2006 after a massive series 
of protests led by high school and university students that demanded structural reforms 
to the national educational system (see Salazar, 2012). In contrast to what happened to 
previous protests, public opinion granted strong support for the 2006 student movement 
and subsequent social movements despite government condemnation and police 
repression (see Grugel & Singh, 2015, for a review). Indeed, although some politicians 
have insisted in stigmatising protesters by using labels such as ‘useless and subversive 
people’ (see “Carlos Larrain: No nos va a doblar la mano”, 2011), or ‘barbarians’ for 
those who joined protest violence (see Basoalto, 2018), currently a large portion of 
Chileans have reconsidered protests as political actions they have the right to carry out. 
Even though the current situation is much better than in the past, those Chileans who take 
part in protests have to face a difficult situation. On the one hand, protests are lawful 
activities with the only restriction being that government officials have to authorise their 
routes. On the other hand, police brutality is a constant that people, both protesters and 
non-participants, have to assume will occur once a protest takes place. In other words, 
while Chilean political authorities show tolerance to protests, police force actions go in 
the opposite direction – as has been already condemned in several international Human 
Rights reports (e.g., Human Right Watch, 2017). 
 
The account presented above is useful to understand the roots of the work reported in this 
thesis on protest violence as self-defence actions, the relevance of the perceived political 
context, and non-participants’ support for protest violence against the police as a function 
of authorities’ restrictions to the right to protest.  
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1.1 Literature Review 
 
1.1.1 Why do research on non-participants’ support for protest violence 
against the police? Before explaining the importance of focusing this research on 
attitudes to protest violence against the police, I want to make clear what should be 
understood as a protest. As protests themselves are a type of collective action, it is crucial 
to define first what collective action is, and then differentiate protests from more complex 
phenomena such as social movements. From a sociological point of view, Snow, Soule, 
and Kriesi (2004) argue that collective action can be defined as “any goal-directed activity 
engaged in jointly by two or more individuals. It entails the pursuit of a common objective 
through joint action” (p.6). Despite the fact that this definition is useful to understand the 
basis of collective action, I agree with Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam (1990), who, 
from a social-psychological perspective, hold that the understanding of collective action 
cannot be reduced to the number of people involved. Therefore, beyond considering joint 
actions as a requirement, individual actions carried out on behalf of specific groups should 
also be considered as collective action.  
 
Although the definition of collective action may include an extensive set of human 
behaviours (e.g., flash mobs) protests are different from other types of collective action 
mainly because they are inherently political and contentious. This means that protests are 
aimed at advocate for changes in specific policies and living conditions at the societal 
level, while they seek to mobilise public opinion or other third-parties in their favour (see 
Lipsky, 1968). 
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Concerning their organisation, protests may be more or less structured, being coordinated 
by diverse political or non-political actors using various channels (e.g., the internet; see 
Kim, 2019), while the existence of formal leaders is not a requirement (e.g., Kim & Kim, 
2009; Lee & Chan, 2018). Whatever the mechanisms of coordination and organisation 
are, protesters typically assembly in a specific point to take to the streets and raise their 
demands. Because of the latter, Della Porta (1999) considers that whatever the actions 
protesters carry out, protests always involve a disruption of public order and in most 
cases, police are involved in managing them. An exception for this definition are those 
new forms of protests that have emerged with the expansion of the internet, ‘online 
protest’ or ‘online activism’ (e.g., Lewis, Gray, & Meierhenrich, 2014; Micó & Casero-
Ripollés, 2014; van den Broek, Langley, & Hornig, 2017). Even though protests that do 
not involve physical interaction among people and take place in virtual spaces instead of 
in the streets are exciting phenomena, I excluded them from my definition of protests 
because their particular dynamics are far beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Regarding the difference between protests and social movements, it is worth noting that 
whereas protests are activities that social movements may organise in a specific time and 
place to reach their goals, social movements are broader phenomena which last longer 
than a single event, may coordinate diverse activities throughout time (e.g., rallies, 
boycotts, road blockades, occupy buildings), and employ varied strategies (i.e., peaceful, 
violent, or a combination of both) (e.g., Seidman, 2015; Snow et al., 2004, for a 
discussion). Furthermore, Rucht (1998) suggests two key characteristics that differentiate 
social movements from protests. First, social movements seek a new societal order instead 
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of being centred in solving specific issues (e.g., a tax increase) as protests do. Second, 
unlike protests, social movements are embedded in an extensive network of groups and 
organisations that may help them to reach the expected social change. However, similar 
to what happens in the study of social movements, there exist multiple voices and views 
concerning goals, expected success, and allowed actions among protesters. Accordingly, 
protests cannot be characterised as uniform entities. Thus, along with peaceful actions, 
protesters may also take part in protest violence (e.g., throwing stones at the police, 
damaging buildings) as a form of collective violence (see Tilly, 2003) that may result of 
either pre-planned strategies or spontaneous reactions to immediate adversities (e.g., 
police brutality).  
 
Another similarity with social movements is that rather than taking place in a vacuum, 
protesters’ actions are contextually and historically situated. Consequently, a proper 
definition of protests should acknowledge that the actions people may carry out and 
legitimate in a protest would depend on the type of regime (e.g., authoritarian or 
democratic), the actions other people carried out in the past, and the interactions between 
people and authorities in a specific time and place (see Koopmans, 2004b, for a 
discussion; Tilly, 2008). 
 
As I have defined protests, a concise overview of how the psychological literature has 
addressed protests and protest violence, in particular, may be useful. At the time of 
writing, a considerable amount of psychological research has focused on protests (see van 
Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013, for an overview). However, concerning the study of 
protest violence, two main social-psychological approaches should be distinguished. The 
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first of these approaches comprises those works whose primary theoretical reference is 
the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA; van Zomeren, 2013; van Zomeren, 
2016; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Those works have concentrated their 
efforts on exploring diverse antecedents for people’s willingness to join or support 
different protesters’ actions, such as group-based anger (e.g., Tausch et al., 2011), implicit 
theories about social change (see Shuman, Cohen-Chen, Hirsch-Hoefler, & Halperin, 
2016), the efficacy of specific actions (see Saab, Spears, Tausch, & Sasse, 2016), and 
attitudes toward protests (see Sweetman, Maio, Spears, Manstead, & Livingstone, 2019). 
Indeed, most of these works shared a characteristic to evaluate people’s actions: the use 
of a binary categorisation, normative (e.g., sign petitions) and non-normative (e.g., 
building barricades). It should be stressed that this categorisation is associated with the 
pervasive idea that to gain legitimacy protests should be (and remain) peaceful (see 
Wright et al., 1990). Consequently, in these works, protest violence (e.g., throwing 
missiles at the police) is considered as a non-normative action though not all the actions 
included in this category involve the use of physical violence or have the police as the 
main target. 
 
With respect to the idea that protests should be peaceful, the right to peaceful protest is 
included in the universal rights of freedom of expression and assembly (see Howie, 2018, 
for a discussion). However, Jarman and Hamilton (2009, for a discussion) have pointed 
out that restricting the right to protest to peaceful actions is problematic because it ignores 
the potential existence of tensions during protests and people’s reasons for taking part in 
violent confrontations. Indeed, from my point of view, this is the main problem of those 
works that include the binary categorisation normative and non-normative to evaluate 
protesters’ actions. Unfortunately, rather than solving the shortcomings related to the 
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normative categorization mentioned above, some scholars have contributed to the 
stigmatisation of those who for whatever reason participate in protest violence by relating 
these actions to ‘extremism’ or ‘radicalization’ processes (e.g., Schumpe, Bélager, 
Giacomantonio, Nisa, & Brizi, 2018; Thomas & Louis, 2014; Thomas, McGarty, & 
Louis, 2014).   
 
The second social-psychological approach relevant to understanding protest violence is 
the elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour (ESIM; Drury & Reicher, 2000; 
Drury & Reicher, 2005; Drury & Reicher, 2018, for a review; Stott & Drury, 2000). 
Unlike SIMCA, ESIM seeks to explain crowd behaviour, including protests, based on 
social identity processes and intergroup dynamics. Thus, according to the ESIM, protest 
violence may be explained by the emergence of new norms of conflict due to changes in 
the relationship between protesters and the police (i.e., non-violence is conditional on the 
contextual situation). The latter means that (some of those) protesters who consider 
protests should be peaceful may change their minds if the police actions are perceived as 
illegitimate (i.e., put the right to protest under threat) and indiscriminate (i.e., non-
selective use of force by police officers). As a result, people may start to see police 
officers as adversaries of the crowd (i.e., ‘us’ vs ‘them’) against whom it is now legitimate 
to use violence as self-defensive action or as collective retaliation.   
 
ESIM’s explanation (see Drury & Reicher, 2018) of the mechanisms through which 
violence may become a legitimate action has helped to dispel the myth that crowds (as 
protests) are inherently violent and irrational (e.g., Le Bon 1895/2002), while it has 
stressed that these conflicts are situated in a historical context where social identity plays 
26 
 
a crucial role. Also, ESIM has suggested that people may carry out different actions 
during protests depending whether they deal with police officers engaged in guaranteeing 
people’s right to protest, or with police officers who carry out unfair procedures on 
protesters. Indeed, recent research has expanded the scope of ESIM by stressing the 
importance of social identity on people’s judgments about the fairness of police 
procedures. In short, Radburn, Stott, Bradford, and Robinson (2018) suggest that people 
are more willing to cooperate with the police, the more that people perceive police 
procedures are fair and the more that people identify with police officers.      
 
Considering the antecedents mentioned above, why study protest violence? In particular, 
why study protest violence against the police? A first tentative answer to this may be that 
even though ESIM has considered the historical context where collective action and 
protest violence takes place, social-psychological research has barely conducted a 
systematic study of both the political context in which protesters are immersed and the 
actors that shape this context (e.g., government officials, the police, and policymakers). 
More importantly, to my knowledge, no psychological research has addressed how either 
the restrictions or tolerance of the political context concerning protests may help protest 
violence gain legitimacy among non-participants. To put it differently, few psychological 
studies have considered protests (e.g., Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Subašić, Reynolds, 
& Turner, 2008) and protest violence (see Drury, Ball, Neville, Reicher, & Stott, in press), 
as something more than a mere clash between two groups in conflict (e.g., advantaged 
and disadvantaged groups; protesters and the police) or have considered the measures 
imposed by political authorities on protests in their analyses protest violence. Moreover, 
why do research on violence against the police? The main reason for this is that police 
officers are usually the main representative of political authorities during protests (see 
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Lipsky, 1980, for a discussion), according to the specific arrangements (e.g., police 
autonomy) that exist between these actors in each country. 
 
A second tentative answer to the question of why conducting research on protest violence 
against the police is necessary is related to the diverse interpretations people may give to 
the use of violence. On the one hand, some works have stressed that protesters may 
legitimise protest violence according to the actions the police carry out during a 
mobilisation process (see Drury & Reicher, 2018, for a review). On the other hand, social-
psychological research has also suggested that police officers may interpret diverse 
protesters’ actions as protest violence no matter whether those actions involve physical 
violence (e.g., throwing stones at the police) or not (e.g., disobeying police orders) (see 
Soares, Barbosa, & Matos, 2018; Soares, Barbosa, Matos, & Mendes, 2018). Despite the 
fact that the works mentioned above offer valuable contributions to the study of protest 
violence, it worth noting that only a few studies have addressed non-participants’ 
perceptions of this phenomenon (e.g., Feinberg, Willer, & Kovacheff, 2017; Stuart, 
Thomas, & Donaghue, 2018; Wouters, 2018). Notwithstanding the foregoing, none of 
those studies have considered non-participants as active readers of collective action 
capable of evaluating the specific dynamic between protesters and the police, the political 
setting under which protests are carried out, and the opinion of others like them (e.g., 
public opinion). Indeed, that is the main objective of the studies reported in this thesis. 
However, before presenting the empirical works that tackle these issues, a brief 
explanation about the relevance of the political context and the role of non-participants in 
the interpretation and support for protesters’ violence against the police is necessary. 
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1.1.2 Why is political context important? As it was stated above, protests do not 
happen in a vacuum, rather they take place in specific societal and historical settings. 
Thus, Tilly (2008) has suggested that the occurrence of mobilisation processes and the 
type of actions people can carry out, and legitimate, cannot be understood without 
studying the political conditions under which people are living. Specifically, Tilly argues 
that it is not only the immediate political context that surrounds any mobilisation process 
that scholars should look at but also the interactions people and authorities have had 
throughout time regarding particular claims and demands. Thus, performances (e.g., 
peaceful protests) that take place between a claimant (e.g., workers) and a target of the 
claims (e.g., government officials) are shaped by the relationship those actors had 
maintained in the past. Furthermore, the specific actions people might carry out during a 
performance (e.g., protest violence) are historically learned but also limited for these 
historical interactions. The latter means that within a particular society, protests may be 
permitted activities through which people could freely complain against the government. 
However, what is acceptable to do during protests is restricted by law, group norms (e.g., 
people can march peacefully but throwing missiles at the police is not acceptable), and a 
set of actions people have learned in a specific setting. 
 
From a different approach, Piven and Cloward (1977) have also argued in favour of 
considering the political context for the study of social movements. According to the 
authors, working-class movements are constrained by the historically shaped features of 
the political system in which they are immersed. Thus, the reasons people have to 
mobilise, the specific actions they carry out (e.g., strikes), and the opportunities they have 
to reach their goals depend on the changes in the political structures people have to 
confront (e.g., electoral system, economy). Indeed, Piven and Cloward highlight three 
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interesting points regarding the influence of political structures in the development of 
working-class social movements. First, structures restrict people’s actions. This means 
that instead of being purely random, poor people’s actions would take place during 
periods of rapid and large-scale structural changes, allowing people from the periphery 
of the establishment to challenge the authorities. Also, authorities may impose 
restrictions, like repression, on those actions that might become highly disruptive for the 
system, while those less disruptive can stay unpunished. Second, political structures may 
deactivate protests forcing or negotiating with poor people the use of those traditional 
institutional channels that, unlike protests, are not usually available for them to change 
the system. Third, and more importantly, rather than significant revolutions or astonishing 
social changes, poor people’s movements’ achievements are limited by historical and 
social circumstances, as Piven and Cloward (1977) state: 
 
When people are finally roused to protest against great odds, they take the only 
options available to them within the limits imposed by their social circumstances. 
Those who refuse to recognize these limits not only blindly consign lower-class 
protests to the realm of semirational but also blindly continue to pretend that other, 
more regular options for political influence are widely available in the American 
political system. (p. 58) 
 
A more comprehensive approach aims to study the influence of the political context on 
the appearance and development of social movements is political opportunities (see 
Meyer & Minkoff, 2004, for an overview). Along with resource mobilization theory (see 
Edwards & Kane, 2014, for a review; Edwards & McCarthy, 2004; Jenkins, 1983; 
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McCarthy & Zald, 1977) and framing processes (see Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow, 2004; 
Snow & Benford, 1988), political opportunities has been one of the most important 
approaches in the sociological study of social movements. The first developments of 
political opportunities were carried out separately by Eisinger and Tilly (see Meyer, 2004, 
for a review). In short, Eisinger (1973) suggests that the relation between the tolerance of 
the institutional system and the presence of protests would not be linear, but curvilinear. 
In other words, Eisinger holds that protests were less likely to occur in either extremely 
closed or highly open political systems, whereas their occurrence would be more frequent 
in cities where the authorities had some degree of responsiveness to people’s complaints, 
and the political institutions show a combination of open and closed features concerning 
protests. Subsequently, Tilly (1978, 2008) systematically studied how both the features 
of the political system and repression may help to explain no only the occurrence of 
collective action, but also (as mentioned at the beginning of this section) the specific set 
of actions that people could employ in a particular political context (see Giugni, 2009, for 
a review). 
 
Apart from the authors mentioned above, the works of McAdam (1982) and Tarrow 
(1994; Meyer & Tarrow, 1998) are crucial for the development of political opportunities. 
Indeed, Tarrow defines political opportunities as “those dimensions of the political 
environment which either encourage or discourage people from using collective action” 
(1994, p.18). Thus, the first dimension Tarrow considers, political openness, refers to the 
extent that political institutions allow the development of social movements in a specific 
place and time. Concretely, political openness implies that people can manifest their 
concerns and criticisms freely in the streets without fear of being repressed or persecuted 
for it, while authorities are willing to listen to them. In opposition to Eisinger’s ideas, 
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Tarrow suggests that protests are more likely to occur the more tolerance a political 
system shows towards social mobilisation processes, whereas a constrained context 
would make the task more difficult for protesters. 
 
Moreover, Tarrow’s second dimension, the stability of political alignments, is focused on 
the stability of alliances among political parties at a specific time. In particular, weak or 
unstable alliances among the institutional actors of the political system might create new 
opportunities for the appearance of new voices from the street. As a third dimension, 
Tarrow argues that the presence or absence of elite allies might also play a critical role in 
setting the political context. In short, the latter means that to mobilise and to be successful, 
social movements may need help from allies/third parties (other collective subjects) to 
form a network of relations able to challenge the establishment. Furthermore, the same 
author suggests that the fourth dimension, division within allies, sheds light on the fact 
that within the alliances established among political actors, some disagreements can take 
place. Then, these disagreements may bring on the emergence of factions or new political 
orders that people may assume as a signal to start a mobilisation process and push the 
establishment for social changes. 
 
Along with the dimensions mentioned above, another significant aspect that scholars have 
proposed to assess political opportunities is the presence of repression (Davenport, 1995, 
2004; Della Porta, 1995; McAdam, 1996). Indeed, Della Porta (1996) argues that 
repression can be considered as a barometer of political opportunity by taking into 
account its direct and visible impact on social movements, and in particular, on a 
movement’s behaviour. To understand what repression is in a broader sense, Tilly 
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provides a useful definition for it as “the cost of collective action to the contender 
resulting from interaction with other groups; as a process, any action by another group 
which raises the contender’s cost of collective actions...” (1978, p. 55). Regarding the 
implementation of repression, Tilly considers that governments could undermine 
collective action by carrying out standard repressive measures aimed at getting an indirect 
(e.g., mobilising influence or counter-protesters), or direct impact on protesters’ activities 
such as controlling crowds through the police (i.e., policing protest), spies, or informers 
for infiltration. Because of this, repression always entails costs and adverse effects on 
protesters, therefore, it should be considered as inherently aversive (Opp & Roehl, 1990).  
 
Whereas the main perpetrator of repression against protesters is not difficult to identify – 
the police – the effects of repression on social mobilisation processes are not. Thus, 
depending on the political circumstances under which repression is implemented, its 
effectiveness (see Davenport 2004, for a discussion), and the style of policing protests 
developed in each country (see Della Porta & Reiter, 1998, for a review), in some 
scenarios repression can restrict the participation of people in protests (Koopmans, 1997). 
However, in other political contexts, repression might encourage the engagement of 
citizens in public activities against the establishment (see Brockett, 1991; De Nardo, 
1985, as cited in Opp & Roehl, 1990; Francisco, 1995; Opp & Roehl, 1990). To put it 
differently, the effects of repression on mobilisation processes are diverse according to 
the political scenario, while those who carry out repression are mostly the same almost 
everywhere (i.e., the police, spies). 
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The concise overview presented above explains the importance that the political context 
has for the emergence and behaviour of social movements from a sociological 
perspective. It is worth noting that the features considered as part of the political context 
are visible to different extents for the general audience. For this reason, it is useful to 
introduce here the general framework of the political process approach developed by 
Kriesi (2004). This framework (see Figure 1.1) is useful to understand that political 
opportunities work at different levels. Thus, macro-level structures comprise components 
more or less stable throughout time such as the international context, the legal and 
territorial arrangements among the institutional political actors within a country (e.g., 
political institutions), how society interacts with those who seek a social change (i.e., 
cultural models), and the conflicts among influential political actors (e.g., the church and 
civil society) within a context (i.e., cleavage structures).  
 
Moreover, Kriesi places the relationship among different political actors (e.g., political 
parties), their conflicts and alliances in the second level of analysis (configuration of 
political actors). Indeed, three of the dimensions mentioned by Tarrow (i.e., the stability 
of political alignments, presence or absence of elite allies, and division within allies) can 
be referred to in this second level of analysis.  
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Figure 1.1. The general framework of the political process approach (Kriesi, 2004, p. 70). 
 
Kriesi’s third level of analysis, interaction context, could be considered as the main focus 
of this thesis. The interaction context concerns authorities’ strategies to set up the political 
context where social movements take place, the opportunities and constraints those 
strategies impose on participants in social movements, and their effect on social 
movements’ behaviour. In this level of analysis, it is possible to find dimensions 
mentioned above as the political openness (Tarrow, 1994), and the existence of repression 
in a particular context.  
 
Although political opportunities may be useful to explain the emergence of social 
movements and people’s willingness to participate in them, one of the main shortcomings 
of this approach is the lack of explanation for how people can perceive the structural 
opportunities that might encourage them to take part in collective action. Indeed, the issue 
is not just about how people can identify the conditions that make collective action 
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possible, but also how contextual ‘hints’ might be interpreted wrongly or even ignored 
by social movements’ participants. In other words, even though Meyer and Tarrow (1998) 
have suggested that people may create opportunities through their actions or the actions 
of previous social movements, political opportunities do not explain how people may 
develop a ‘subjective’ understanding of the ‘objective’ political conditions that make 
collective action possible.  
 
To address the issue mentioned above, scholars have developed ideas such as ‘cognitive 
liberation’ (see McAdam, 1982) and cultural framings (see Gamson & Meyer, 1996). 
Whereas the former approach proposes that participants in a social movement might 
identify vulnerabilities in the political system according to the ‘clues’ they can get from 
the responses that authorities give to other challengers, the latter is an attempt to include 
cultural elements by framing processes as subjective mediators of the ‘objective’ political 
conditions (e.g., Suh, 2001; Zdravomyslova, 1996). Apart from the theoretical criticism 
each of these approaches has received (e.g., Goodwin, Jasper, & Khattra, 1999), it must 
be pointed out that to date there is no systematic measure or strategy aimed at evaluating 
‘subjective’ understanding of political opportunities. Nevertheless, Honari (2018b) has 
carried out in-depth interviews to develop a systematic study of the subjective views of 
what Della Porta identified as the main barometer of political opportunities, repression. 
More importantly, following Earl’s (2011) arguments regarding the need to focus 
sociological research on micro-level (i.e., subjective views), Honari (2017, 2018a) has 
suggested turning the study of the mere presence of repression as a structural factor into 
the examination of people’s perceptions of repression and the strategies people employ 
to cope with it. 
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Despite the fact that there is much sociological research aimed at exploring the 
importance of the features of political context for the emergence and development of 
social movements, psychological research has barely tackled the influence that political 
context might have on collective action and the legitimisation of protest violence. As 
mentioned above, notable exceptions for the absence of contextual features from the 
social-psychological literature are the works drawing upon ESIM as well as Subašić and 
collaborators’ work on political solidarity. Nevertheless, at the time of writing, there is 
no approach aimed at incorporating people’s perceptions of political opportunities and 
the presence of repression in the social-psychological analysis of protests. 
 
1.1.3 Why should psychological research focus on non-participants? Similarly 
to what has been described regarding the study of features of the political context, 
sociologists (e.g., Gamson, 2004; McCarthy, Smith, & Zald, 1996; Neidhard & Rucht, 
1991; Oegema & Klandermans, 1994) have conducted extensive research aimed at 
exploring the role of those who do not take part in collective action (i.e., non-participants), 
while social-psychological research has paid little attention to this topic (cf. Orazani & 
Leidner, 2019b; Stuart et al., 2018; Thomas & Louis, 2014). Even though psychological 
research has explored the effect of collective action on encouraging people’s future 
participation as well as on behavioural and attitudinal changes at individual level (see 
Vestergren, Drury, & Chiriac, 2018), evidence about what Neville and Reicher (2018) 
have called the ‘impact of crowds beyond the crowd’ is rather scarce. Fortunately, this 
situation has started to change thanks to some works that have explored the impact of 
protests on both those non-participants that share the same proximal physical space with 
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protesters as a university campus (see Selvanathan & Lickel, 2019a) and also on those 
who do not participate but may follow protests through mass media (e.g., Hou et al., 
2018). In an interesting contribution, Selvanathan and Lickel (2019b) have suggested that 
non-participants can experience feelings of empowerment or threat in response to mass 
protests that may affect their identification with and support for a specific social 
movement. This means that rather than being passive receivers of information regarding 
protests, non-participants might actively ‘read’ and ‘interpret’ what it is going on in the 
streets. Accordingly, non-participants may play a crucial role in the success of protests 
by becoming protesters (see Simon & Klandermans, 2001, for a discussion); providing 
practical support for those who take to streets through financial aid, preparing meals, or 
elaborating informative materials about protests (e.g., “We die together”, 2019); giving 
support for specific protesters’ actions (e.g., “Public increasingly backing radical”, 2019); 
or becoming sympathizers who might help protesters to gain public opinion support by 
participating in discussions within their communities and local politicians (e.g., 
Lieberfeld, 2009). 
 
Although valuable, I have detected some limitations in current works on non-participants 
and the impact of protests on them that make conducting more research on this topic 
imperative. First, at the time of writing, no work has tackled non-participants’ evaluations 
of their political context regarding the presence of protests. Despite the fact that Thomas 
and Louis (2014) have suggested that non-participants may endorse protest violence 
according to the presence/absence of corruption in a specific institution, neither this nor 
other social-psychological research has addressed non-participants’ perceptions of those 
political actors directly involved in protest policing (e.g., the government and the police) 
and their impact on non-participants’ support for protesters’ claims and actions.  
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A second limitation is to confound people’s support for a social movement with the 
support for specific strategies or protesters’ actions (e.g., Orazani & Leidner, 2019a, 
2019b). Indeed, what is actually missing in collective action research is a psychological 
analysis of non-participants’ support for specific protesters’ actions (i.e., protest violence) 
without involving the support people may grant to an entire movement or protest (cf. Lee, 
2018). To put it differently, while some literature has put together support for actions and 
the entire protest (or social movement) at the same level of analysis, I suggest these two 
factors should be analysed separately considering that protesters may carry out multiple 
actions within a single event. More importantly, researchers should keep in mind that 
non-participants’ disagreement with specific actions carried out by protesters (e.g., 
throwing stones at the police) is not necessarily correlated with either people’s support 
for protesters’ claims or with the legitimacy granted to a protest itself. An excellent 
example of the latter point is the 2011 student movement in Chile. After months of 
continuous protests, some public opinion polls suggested that around 76% Chileans 
supported the student movement. However, only 49% of people supported protesters’ 
actions, which usually included clashes with the police (see “Adimark: Apoyo al 
movimiento estudiantil”, 2011). This example illustrates that people’s support for 
protesters’ claims do not necessarily correlate to the same extent with the support for 
specific protesters’ actions. 
 
In line with the idea of keeping separate the analysis of protesters’ actions from the 
support for an entire social movement or protest, there is a need to explore non-
participants’ reasons to support or not support protesters’ violence against the police 
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beyond the supposed social norm that protests should be peaceful to gain legitimacy from 
public opinion. The latter implies that researchers should challenge the notion that people 
are necessarily aligned with social norms against the use of violence, and also that 
people’s thoughts on violence are consistent regardless of the political conditions 
themselves or others need to confront. In other words, what psychological research should 
address is whether non-participants’ support for protest violence against the police is 
conditional upon those situations (e.g., government restrictions and police repression) 
under which other people like them (i.e., protesters) mobilise to achieve social change. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that many non-participants do not have the opportunity to see 
first-hand either the impact of the measures taken by authorities regarding protests or 
protesters’ actions. Therefore, in most cases, non-participants’ evaluations of these 
measures are via mass media (see Koopmans, 2004a, for a discussion). As media and 
communication research has demonstrated, mass media can implement deliberated biases 
in favour or against certain types of protests that may distort the idea non-participants get 
of protesters’ actions (see Chan & Lee, 1984; McLeod & Hertog, 1992). Indeed, 
according to McLeod (2007), mass media tends to depict negatively those events in which 
protesters cause damage to buildings or use violence against either the police or counter-
protesters. Consequently, the study of non-participants in collective action is deeply 
related to how authorities and protesters are portrayed in the mass media, and people’s 
reactions to these depictions (see Cammaerts, 2012; Tang, 2015).  
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1.2 Methods and measures 
In this thesis, I combined both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies to 
explore the influence of the perceived political context on non-participants’ support for 
protest violence against the police. In this section, I will provide an overview of the 
methodology used in previous research on political opportunities and non-participants’ 
perceptions of social movements and protests. In addition, I will provide a description of 
the criteria used to choose a specific research tool for the studies included in each chapter. 
 
1.2.1 Research methods employed to study political opportunities. To study 
social movements and political opportunities, sociologists have mostly employed 
retrospective case studies based on the analysis of newspapers (e.g., Eisinger, 1973; 
McAdam, 1982, 1996) or comparative historical accounts (e.g., Brocket, 1991; Kitschelt, 
1986; Rucht, 1998; Tarrow, 1994; Tilly, 2008). Although mainly based on secondary 
data, these approaches have been shown to be valuable for the analysis of those structural 
‘objective’ political conditions that challengers to the status quo must confront to achieve 
their goals. Other advantages of these studies are the acknowledgement of the historical 
context where the social movements carried out their actions, the analysis of those 
dimensions of the political structures which are not directly visible for most people (e.g., 
political alliances), as well the comparison of the political structures among countries.  
 
An exception to the analysis of the ‘objective’ political context regarding social 
movements from a political opportunities approach is Crozat’s work (1998). In short, 
using secondary data from a large transnational survey, Crozat demonstrated that people 
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from Europeans countries had diverse levels of tolerance to protests. Although this work 
represents an advance in the incorporation of subjective views into the study of protests, 
its scope is minimal considering the employed questionnaire items were not explicitly 
designed (i.e., they were proxies) to measure either people’s attitudes to the presence of 
protests or the subjective views of the political conditions under which protests may take 
place.  
 
As previously mentioned in this chapter, one of the main criticisms to the political 
opportunities approach is its failure to explain people’s awareness of the opportunities 
that may allow or impede the activation of mobilisation processes (e.g., social movements 
and protests) (see Gamson & Meyer, 1996, for a discussion). With the development of 
cultural frames, along with retrospective case studies (e.g., Diani, 1996), some scholars 
started to use in-depth interviews to explore people’s interpretations of the political 
opportunities related to specific social movements and to include cultural elements in 
these interpretations (e.g., Suh, 2001). However, at the time of writing, the use of 
interviews to explore participants’ or non-participants’ interpretations of the opportunities 
has been scarce and represents an exception rather than a general turn of the sociological 
study on social movements and their political environment. Notwithstanding this, 
Koopmans and Statham (1999) developed an alternative approach to cultural frames, 
discourse opportunities (see Koopmans, 2004a, for a review), the main aim of which is 
to explore people’s framing of political opportunities through mass media. Although 
attractive in its conceptualisation, this latter approach does not innovate in the research 
methods proposed to tackle the topic of interest. Indeed, most works that draw upon 
Koopmans’s ideas have continued analysing data produced by third parties such as 
newspapers and official documents rather than exploring people’s perceptions of political 
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opportunities first-hand (e.g., Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). Hence, it can be argued that 
even though different scholars have deployed considerable efforts to address people’s 
interpretation of their political context, it seems none of them has developed a method or 
a tool that is able to capture peoples’ perceptions of the contextual conditions. 
 
Regarding the specific study of repression, the situation is slightly different. On the one 
hand, sociologists and political scientists have mainly used historical accounts (e.g., Della 
Porta, 1995; Della Porta, Fillieule, & Reiter, 1998; Reiner, 1998) and the quantification 
of ‘objective’ features of the political context where protests take place (e.g., economic 
indices; Davenport, 2007; Francisco, 2004; Zwerman & Steinhoff, 2004) to explain the 
presence or absence of repression against challengers of the status quo. On the other hand, 
scholars have started to criticize the excessive emphasis of sociological research on the 
macro-level (i.e., effect of repression on the existence of social movements) and meso-
level (i.e., strategies carried out by social movements), claiming that new efforts to 
understand repression should be focused on people’s perceptions of repressive measures 
carried out by state agents (Earl, 2011; Honari, 2017, 2018a). In line with this idea, Honari 
(2018b) has recently used in-depth interviews to explore how people perceive repression 
and its impact on people’s future actions. Although this approach is particularly valuable 
because it sheds light on the importance that repressive measures have for people, the 
relevance of these interviews is restricted to the particular case of the studied Iranian 
movement and cannot be generalised to other political contexts. 
 
Regarding the study of political opportunities from a social-psychological perspective, 
some cross-sectional studies have used measures for political cynicism, external efficacy, 
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and trust in the political institutions (e.g., Lee 2010; Lee & Chan, 2018; Sabucedo, 
Gómez-Román, Alzate, van Stekelenburg, & Klandermans, 2017; van Stekelenburg & 
Klandermans, 2018) as proxies to evaluate the political context where protests take place. 
Even though these works have included some features of the political context in the 
analysis of protests, they are not directly related to either the presence of protests in the 
streets nor the measures that authorities implement regarding these activities. In addition, 
the items used to measure the constructs mentioned above were elaborated ad hoc for 
each study and are not validated.  
 
Concerning repression, or more specifically protest policing, studies based on the ESIM 
(see Drury & Reicher, 2000; Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 2012; Stott & Drury, 2000) have 
employed participant observation as the most suitable technique to study the dynamic of 
protests in vivo (see Drury and Stott, 2001, for a discussion). In particular, these works 
have explored how people’s perceptions regarding the (il)legitimacy of police actions can 
modify the context where the interaction between protesters and the police takes place. 
Although ESIM has demonstrated that participant observation is an appropriate technique 
to capture the dynamic of crowds, a tool designed to address questions such as the extent 
to which perceptions of repressive policing vary quantitatively across different contexts 
is still absent from the literature. Even though Radburn and Stott (2019) have argued for 
the need to combine studies based on trust in procedural justice and police legitimacy 
with ESIM, the experiments designed to address this topic (see Radburn et al., 2018) 
included ad hoc adaptations of pre-existing scales aimed at evaluating only general 
attitudes to the police. 
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Considering the lack of a standardized tool to account for the perceived features of the 
political context (e.g., police repression) in the works mentioned above, the use of 
questionnaires becomes very useful for the development and validation of a scale of 
measurement aimed at evaluating subjective views of the political context where protests 
take place (SPO-R, Subjective Political Openness Repression scale). One of the main 
advantages of developing a tool to quantify the perceived political conditions regarding 
protests (restrictions in the case of SPO-R) is that it allows the comparison of diverse 
scenarios. Besides, researchers worldwide may use SPO-R scale to incorporate the 
perceived political context into the psychological analysis of collective action without 
having to create new items. 
 
1.2.2 Research methods employed to study non-participants’ perceptions of 
protests. For the study of non-participants, social-psychological research has employed 
diverse methods to explore their importance for protests and social movements. Thus, 
correlational survey studies have been conducted to explore non-activist reasons to 
legitimate (see Jiménez-Moya, Miranda, Drury, Saavedra, & González, 2019) and 
support various social movements (Orazani & Leidner, 2019b). In terms of non-
participants’ support for specific actions carried out during protests, Gerber and 
collaborators (2018) have explored people’s support for violence carried out by both the 
police and indigenous protesters in Chile. Taking advantage of the fact that cross-
sectional studies enable us to explore simple relations among diverse variables and that 
perceived features of the political context regarding protests had not been tested before, 
in Chapter 3, I conducted a cross-sectional questionnaire survey study using structural 
equation modeling (SEM) to make inferences employing SPO-R scale. This study 
included samples from the UK and Chile, making possible the comparison of the same 
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predictive model across samples and weighting the relevance of each SPO component to 
explain non-participants’ support for protesters’ violence against the police.  
 
Considering that protests take place in the real world, research on non-participants’ 
perceptions should include people’s exposure to actual protests (e.g. Schwartz, 2016; 
Selvanathan and Lickel, 2019a). However, the main difficulty of incorporating exposure 
to a real protest in the study design is the availability of a protest that can be used as a 
reference to the potential participants of the study. Indeed, even when a protest is 
available, people’s direct exposure to this event is difficult to coordinate. Time and 
monetary restrictions, as well as the spontaneity and unpredictability of protests, are 
difficulties that researchers might struggle to address.  
 
To solve the issues mentioned above, researchers may use vignettes in their experimental 
designs to simulate protest events and explore people’s reactions to diverse situations (see 
Hughes & Huby, 2004, for a discussion). Indeed, vignettes may be especially useful for 
the study of non-participants’ perceptions of protests by taking into account that because 
most people do not have the opportunity to experience protests first-hand, both 
authorities’ measures regarding protests and what happens with protesters in the streets 
are necessarily shaped by mass media representations (see Cammaerts, 2012, for a 
discussion). Thus, in Study 2 reported in Chapter 3, the use of vignettes allowed me to 
explore whether people perceive the features of political context differently according to 
the ‘objective’ political settings they were exposed in comparison to a neutral scenario 
(i.e., control condition). 
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In Chapter 5, I decided to use vignettes again in two experiments. However, instead of 
describing diverse political contexts regarding authorities’ tolerance to protests, this time 
the vignettes were employed to portray public opinion’s legitimisation of protests both in 
the UK (Study 1) and in Catalonia (Study 2). For this type of experiment, vignettes 
became a useful resource to provide information similar to an actual news article. Indeed, 
in addition to including an informative text about the protests mentioned above, each 
vignette incorporated two different characterisations of public opinion concerning 
mobilization processes to improve their realism: quotations of bogus interviews from 
ordinary people, and a pie chart accounting for the results of an opinion poll on people’s 
legitimisation of protests (see McLeod & Hertog, 1992, for discussion). Moreover, along 
with the vignette, and following Radburn and collaborators’ (2018) idea to evaluate police 
procedures during protests, I incorporated footage showing police brutality against 
peaceful protesters for two reasons. First, to improve the realism of the scenario depicted 
in the vignette by supplementing this information with a visual stimulus displaying what 
has happened to protesters in the streets. Second, to go beyond the ‘the static’ elements 
described in the vignette by incorporating a resource capable of showing the ‘dynamic’ 
of protest and the changes in the interaction between protesters and the police. 
 
Despite the advantages of survey and experimental designs in the study of non-
participants’ perceptions of protests, there are two main limitations. First, because the 
items included in these studies are aimed at measuring specific dimensions, it is 
not possible to explore in-depth what people think about protests, the political conditions 
under which protests occur, or protesters’ actions. Second, both surveys and experiments 
are tools designed to eliminate individuals’ inconsistencies – making researchers assume 
that people have unique and fixed opinions about social phenomena, whereas people may 
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actually have multiple and contradictory thoughts concerning them (see Stimson, 1995, 
for an overview; Zaller, 1992, for a discussion). Indeed, Billig and collaborators (1988) 
have suggested that one of the main shortcomings of extensive opinion polls is that in 
those studies people do not have the chance to experience or at least imagine scenarios 
that might represent a challenge for dominant ideologies. Moreover, I suggest that due to 
their focus on testing change using the same restricted measures as used in cross-section 
designs, even quantitative longitudinal designs cannot account for people’s contradictory 
ideas about specific topics.    
  
Recently, Stuart and collaborators (2018) have employed interviews and thematic 
analysis to explore non-participants’ perceptions of protests and their identification with 
various types of protesters. Similarly, in Chapter 5, I employed interviews and thematic 
analysis as an analytic strategy to explore non-participants’ reasons to support protesters’ 
violence against the police. Although the study reported in Chapter 5 was not aimed at 
analysing discourse styles, the linguistic expressions (e.g., Condor & Gibson, 2007), or 
delve in the discursive rhetoric deployed by the interviewees (e.g., Billig, 1991; Condor, 
2011), I decided to combine thematic analysis with the ideological dilemma approach 
(see Billig et al., 1988) to explore people’s sometimes contradictory views regarding 
protest violence. Thus, the ideological dilemmas approach became useful to explore how 
societal ‘maxims’ (e.g., ‘protests should be peaceful’) may collide with other such beliefs 
(e.g., the need to defend the right to protest) under specific circumstances (see Gibson, 
2011, and Towns & Adams, 2009, for discussions). To put it differently, the incorporation 
of the ideological dilemmas approach allowed me to go beyond the de-contextualised 
individual decisions between supporting or not supporting protest violence against the 
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police to focus on the contradictions people may hold regarding protesters’ actions within 
a particular political context. 
 
1.3 Overview of the chapters 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I report the development and validation of a measurement scale 
for a novel psychological construct, subjective political openness (SPO). This construct 
was developed to include features of social structure into the analysis of collective action 
drawing upon sociological research on social movements (see van Zomeren, 2016, for a 
discussion). Specifically, this chapter describes how SPO is conceptualised as a 
psychological parallel of three structural factors previously addressed in the sociological 
literature as critical in setting up the political context for the development of social 
movements: political openness (see Tarrow, 1994), presence of repression (Davenport, 
1995; Della Porta, 1995), and public opinion (see Neidhardt & Rucht, 1991; Rucht, 2004). 
Thus, SPO initially sought to understand people’s perceptions of the political context 
where protests take place focused on the actions of the government (government 
openness), the police (perceived repression), and public opinion (perceived legitimisation 
of protests) regarding these activities. 
 
Through two studies, including samples from the UK and Chile, I establish SPO as a 
bifactor model comprising two out of three proposed dimensions (government openness 
and perceived repression). In Chapter 2, I also explain the reasons to rename SPO scale 
as SPO-Repression (SPO-R), test the measurement invariance of the full scale and its 
components using multi-group analyses and stablish its convergent validity using the 
Trust in Police Procedural Justice scale (see Jackson, Huq, Bradford, & Tyler, 2013) as 
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the main criterion. Furthermore, I discuss the current limitations of SPO-R and provide 
some practical guidelines that may help researchers to employ the scale in future studies. 
 
In Chapter 3, I employ SPO-R to make statistical inferences using both a cross-sectional 
study and an experiment. In the first of these studies, which includes samples from the 
UK and Chile, I explore whether in both countries the features of the perceived political 
context regarding protest (SPO-R) can predict non-participants’ support for protesters’ 
violence against the police. Taking advantage of structural equation modeling (SEM) and 
the configuration of SPO-R as a bifactor model, I also test whether the obtained effects 
are comparable between countries and if there are differences in the importance that 
British and Chilean people give to the actions of the government and the police. 
Furthermore, in the cross-sectional study, I explore the role of the perceived public 
opinion’s legitimisation of protest as a mediator for the relationship mentioned above.  
 
In Chapter 3, I report an experiment aimed at testing similar hypotheses to those tested in 
the study described above but comparing people’s exposure to diverse political scenarios. 
Thus, I tested how the support for protest violence against the police may vary depending 
on authorities’ measures regarding protests. In addition, I check the effects of these 
simulated contextual conditions on both the subjective restrictions to the right to protest 
(SPO-R) and the perceived legitimacy public opinion may grant to protests.  
 
Having found evidence about the importance of the perceived political context and the 
legitimisation given by public opinion to protests, I tried to delve into non-participants’ 
reasons to support protesters’ violence against the police by going beyond the limitations 
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of quantitative methods. Thus, in Chapter 4, through a set of interviews to non-
participants with diverse previous experience in protests, I explore people’s support for 
protest violence when the well-known maxim ‘protests should be peaceful’ clashes with 
the need to defend the right to protest in the face of authorities’ restrictions against 
protesters’ actions. After conducting my analyses, I suggest that rather than a de-
contextualised individual choice, non-participants’ support for protesters’ violence 
against the police reflects an ideological dilemma people have to face considering the 
political conditions under which protests take place: protests should be peaceful versus 
defend the right to protest. The latter implies that, notwithstanding the existence of the 
pervasive societal norm that states that protests should remain peaceful, similar to what 
happens to actual protesters (see Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2005) non-participants may hold 
contradictory ideas about the use of violence in protests, and therefore, support protesters’ 
violence against the police as self-defence actions when authorities undermine the right 
to protest. 
 
Besides the ideological dilemma non-protesters may have to confront regarding protest 
violence, Chapter 4 also sheds light on the importance that non-participants have for the 
psychological study of collective action as active readers of protests. Thus, I suggest that 
even though non-participants are far away from where a protest takes place and receive 
fragmented information through mass media, they would still be able to find out the 
rationale behind protesters’ actions against the police. In other words, non-participants 
may evaluate government measures, and police actions during protests to support (or not 
support) protest violence instead of attributing it to the alleged ‘irrationality’ of protesters 
as some scholars have suggested (e.g., Simpson, Willer, & Feinberg, 2018). Moreover, in 
the light of my analysis, at the end of the chapter, I criticize the use of the dichotomy 
51 
 
‘normative’ vs ‘non-normative actions’ (e.g., Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et al., 
2011) to judge protesters’ actions and the alleged superiority of peaceful methods to reach 
social change present in the mainstream psychological literature on collective action (e.g., 
Orazani & Leidner, 2019a, 2019b; Schumpe et. al., 2018; Thomas & Louis, 2014).   
 
In Chapter 5, I report two experiments aimed at expanding the scope of my previous 
studies on non-participants’ support for protest violence against the police by 
manipulating the legitimacy that public opinion grants to protests in political scenarios 
(the UK and Catalonia) where authorities implement harsh restrictions to the right to 
protest.  
 
In these experiments, I explore the role of solidarity with protesters as a mechanism that 
mediates the relation between public opinion’s legitimisation of protests and non-
participants’ support for protest violence. In particular, the experiments examine whether 
different extents of public opinion’s legitimisation of protest may differently affect the 
feelings of solidary that British adults may show towards those protesters with who do 
not share precisely the same social category, namely British students and Catalonian 
protesters. Moreover, in this Chapter, I argue that to explain non-participants’ support for 
protest violence against the police, scholars should consider people’s own opinions about 
the right to protest and their interactions with the perceived political context (i.e., 
authorities’ restrictions and public opinion’s legitimisation of protests). 
 
Finally, in Chapter 6, I present an overview of the main findings reported in this thesis, 
while their theoretical and practical implications are discussed. I also explain the main 
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limitations of the studies reported in each chapter, provide guidelines for future research, 
and list the main conclusions for this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
Including political context in the psychological analysis of collective action: 
Development and validation of a measurement scale for Subjective Political 
Openness 
 
 
Cite as: 
Saavedra, P., & Drury, J. (2019). Including political context in the psychological analysis 
of collective action: Development and validation of a measurement scale for Subjective 
Political Openness. Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 7(2), 665-694. 
doi:10.5964/jspp.v7i2.1030 
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2.1 Abstract 
 
Sociological and Political Science research has argued that political conditions affect both 
the occurrence of protests and the actions protesters choose. However, an approach that 
considers people’s perceptions on these conditions is still absent in the social 
psychological literature. Subjective political openness (SPO) is a new construct which 
fills this gap by incorporating features of political context into the psychological analysis 
of protests. We propose that SPO comprises perceptions relating to three dimensions: 
government actions to allow/restrict protests, police measures to actively prevent them, 
and the extent that public opinion legitimizes protests. We conducted two studies in the 
UK and Chile to validate scales created for each proposed dimension, test their 
measurement invariance, establish SPO’s configuration, and demonstrate its convergent 
validity. Participants in Study 1 were university students (n UK = 203; n Chile = 237), 
whereas in Study 2 a general population sample from both countries was included (n UK 
= 377; n Chile = 309) with the purpose of generalizing the results. Both studies consistently 
showed that SPO is a multidimensional construct configured as a bifactor model 
comprising the dimensions associated with perceptions of the government and police 
actions to confront protests. Although we tested two different measurement scales for the 
perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests, results demonstrated this 
dimension is not part of SPO. The SPO configuration has implications for both our 
understanding of collective action and how we study it.  
Acknowledgements & funding information. We want to thank Roberto González, Gloria 
Jiménez-Moya, Alejandra Vega, Rebecca Atkinson, and Anne Templeton for their valuable 
support during different stages of this project. This study was supported by CONICYT (National 
Commission for Scientific and Technological Research) “Becas Chile” Doctoral Fellowship 
program; Grant No. 72160469. 
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2.2 Introduction 
 
In this paper, we describe the development of SPO (subjective political openness), a new 
construct aimed to incorporate subjective views about political conditions for protests 
into the study of collective action. SPO draws on three main ideas. First, political 
conditions affect the development of collective action. Second, the psychological 
literature has barely included analysis of political conditions in the study of collective 
action. Third, people actively build and interpret these conditions according to the 
interactions they have had with the authorities in relation to protests (Drury & Reicher, 
2000; Reicher, 1996b).  
 
Political conditions that make collective action possible (e.g., through the use of 
repression against protesters) have been widely studied in sociology and political science, 
either through case studies (e.g., Brockett, 1991; Della Porta, 1995; Kurzman, 1996) or 
quantitative analyses based on macro-level measures (e.g., Davenport, 1995; Regan & 
Henderson, 2002; Shadmehr, 2014), under the umbrella of Political Opportunity 
Structures (e.g., Brockett, 1991; Kriesi, 2004; Kurzman, 1996; Meyer, 2004; Tilly, 1978). 
The Political Opportunity Structures approach suggests that the conditions of a particular 
political context influence the emergence and development of social movements (Meyer 
& Minkoff, 2004; Shadmehr, 2014). One of the key dimensions identified under this 
framework is political openness (Tarrow, 1994). Political openness refers to the extent to 
which political institutions set up the political context to allow protesters to express their 
concerns and criticisms without fear of being repressed or persecuted (Dalton, Van Sickle, 
& Weldon, 2009). According to Tarrow (1994), an open political system is correlated 
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with a higher presence of protests in the streets, whereas the opposite situation would 
make the task more difficult for protesters.  
 
Along with political openness, scholars have argued that the presence of repression is 
another significant aspect that should be considered when assessing political 
opportunities (see Della Porta, 1995; Earl, 2011; McAdam, 1996; Tilly, 1978). 
Specifically, repression can be considered as “the cost of collective action to the 
contender resulting from interaction with other groups; as a process, any action by another 
group which raises the contender’s cost of collective action...” (Tilly, 1978, p. 55). 
Following this definition, we can recognize two main characteristics of repression. First, 
repression is inherently aversive to protesters because it entails costs and negative effects 
for them (Opp & Roehl, 1990). Second, governments might threaten collective action 
through the mobilization of different groups (e.g., counter-protesters, riot police, or 
informers for infiltration) which can act directly or indirectly on protesters (Tilly, 1978). 
However, despite the fact that a large body of literature in sociology and political science 
has addressed the presence of repression, most of this work has analysed it at a macro-
level (e.g., by country) and only a few studies have considered how repression might 
affect individuals (micro-level) (Earl, 2011). This is important because objective 
repression carried out by state agents (at the macro-level) might not necessarily match 
with people’s evaluations of repression, and they can even be unrelated (Kurzman, 1996). 
In line with this, Honari (2017, 2018a) has argued that social movement research should 
consider a subjective approach to explore people’s responses to repression, whilst it is 
also necessary to distinguish between the actual experience of repression (experienced 
repression), and how state agents are perceived as threats or obstacles for political 
participation (perceived repression). 
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Although political opportunities approach goes further than a mere bipolar 
conceptualization of social movements (mobilized people vs the state), the role that other 
actors within a society can play in social movements’ dynamics has been neglected by 
the sociological literature (cf. Gamson, 2004; Jenkins & Perrow, 2015; Neidhardt & 
Rucht, 1991; Rucht, 2004). One exception is the work of Rucht (2004) which has 
considered the public (i.e., sympathizers, bystanders, and counter movements), control 
agencies, interest groups, and mass media as reference groups (in the political context) 
from which social movements can gain support and legitimacy, as well as opposition to 
their aims, activities, and goals. However, despite the important inputs provided by all 
these accounts, the literature has barely included an analysis of either people’s 
perceptions of those political conditions under which social movements take place (i.e., 
political openness and repression) (see Honari, 2018a; Kurzman, 1996) or the legitimacy 
public opinion can give to protests.  
 
With respect to the analysis of political conditions of protest in the psychological 
literature, two approaches should be mentioned: social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979) and the elaborated social identity model (ESIM; Drury & Reicher, 2000; 
Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2012, for a review). The first has addressed the influence of 
certain key social structural variables that shape intergroup relations: permeability of 
group boundaries, status (il)legitimacy, and status stability on the occurrence of collective 
action (see Ellemers, 2001; Turner & Brown, 1978). Moreover, ESIM proposes that 
people interpret their own context (including the extent to which protest is possible and 
legitimate) based on previous interactions with other groups (e.g., the police). However, 
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neither of these approaches have addressed the impact that the broader political context 
or other groups beyond those groups directly in conflict (e.g., political authorities, public 
opinion, and laws) might have on protests. Therefore, despite the conditions described in 
SIT as optimal for collective action being met (illegitimate and unstable intergroup status 
differential) and the important inputs ESIM gives us in understanding the intergroup 
dynamics during protests, we think the analysis might be incomplete if we exclude the 
reactions the political authorities and public opinion might have regarding the occurrence 
of protests. This argument is in line with the need to consider advances in the analysis of 
social movements carried out in other social sciences (e.g., sociology and political 
science) in the psychological study of collective action (see van Zomeren, 2016).  
 
With the aim of developing a measure able to capture people’s insights into the reactions 
from the government, the police, and public opinion regarding protests, we created and 
validated a scale for subjective political openness (SPO) in two studies carried out in the 
UK and Chile. In Study 1 a set of items was used to measure each proposed dimension, 
test their measurement invariance, and establish SPO as a multidimensional construct 
(using a bifactor configuration) in a sample of students. In Study 2 we aimed to increase 
the generalisability of our results using a sample from the general population of each 
country, while a set of new items was introduced to improve the configuration of the SPO 
scale. Moreover, in both studies we established the convergent validity of SPO with a 
pre-existing scale associated with the evaluation of the police behaviour, trust in police 
procedural justice.   
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Before describing the studies and their implications, it is necessarily to clarify three 
aspects. First, how public opinion can grant legitimacy to protests. Second, the theoretical 
definition of SPO and its dimensions. Third, the relevance of construct validity and 
measurement invariance in the development of SPO. Fourth, what a bifactor model 
means. Fifth, the conceptualization of trust in police procedural justice and its relationship 
to SPO. 
 
2.2.1 Legitimacy of protest  
Public opinion is one of the actors able to give legitimacy to social movements (Neidhardt 
& Rucht, 1991). This might be especially relevant in advanced democracies where 
different forms of protest have been routinized and accepted as a permanent element of 
modern life (Tarrow, 1994; Meyer & Tarrow, 1998). Within public opinion, sympathizers 
have received a lot of attention in the psychological literature mainly through the study 
of the role of sympathizers in collective action (see Blackwood, Terry, & Duck, 2015; 
Chayinska, Minescu, & McGarty, 2017; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Subašić et al., 
2008; Thomas & Louis, 2014; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). However, both 
the sociological and psychological literature have barely explored the role of public 
opinion in the legitimization of protests as valued activities (cf. Crozat, 1998; Jiménez-
Moya et al., 2019). 
But what is legitimacy? From common sense, legitimacy can be defined simply as ‘what 
is right’ in term of actions (e.g., protesting or beliefs within a specific context). In line 
with this, it is necessary to stress that the (de)legitimization of specific social norms (e.g., 
the use of violence to bring about social change) is a dynamic process through which a 
community might accept certain actions previously considered illegitimate. Therefore, 
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we agree with Kelman (2001) in relation to the argument that social norms and legitimacy 
should not be confounded in the analysis of social psychological processes. In addition, 
it is necessary to point out that people, organizations, policies, and entire social systems 
can also be invested with legitimacy that is supported by legal systems, conventions, and 
other people’s behaviour (Tyler, 2001; Weber, 1918/1968). 
 
In relation to who invests people, norms, or actions like protests with legitimacy, we 
suggest that recent psychological research on collective action has confounded the 
legitimacy given to protests by society with the legitimacy individuals might grant to 
these activities (e.g., Chayinska et al., 2017). Here, we want to make the case that these 
two levels of legitimacy (collective and individual) are different, taking into account that 
some aspects of social behaviour are collectively determined by rights and obligations 
rather than by personal preferences (Kelman, 2001). This is in line with Weber’s 
multilevel approach to legitimacy, where the legitimacy of a social order (‘validity’) is 
given by convention or by law (thus at a collective level) through a process independent 
of personal acts and beliefs (individual level) (Weber, 1918/1968). In practice, this means 
that, at least, in democratic societies the right to protest exists and guides people’s 
behaviour independently of individual personal agreement with specific protests. A 
psychological parallel for this multilevel approach to legitimacy can be found in the 
theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), where people’s attitude (individual level) and 
subjective norms (collective level) to a specific behaviour (e.g., protesting) are considered 
as two independent inputs people process to evaluate and carrying out that behaviour. 
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2.2.2 Subjective political openness (SPO)  
SPO is proposed as a novel construct for measuring individual evaluations of the 
(in)tolerance levels shown by the political system and public opinion towards protests, 
based on the notions of political openness, perceived repression, and the multilevel 
approach to the legitimacy given to protests. Thereby, SPO encompasses three 
dimensions related to different political actors: the government (government openness), 
the police (perceived repression), and public opinion (legitimacy of protests). The first of 
these, government openness, indicates the perceived extent to which the government 
allows the occurrence of protests. Low scores on this measure mean that people perceive 
more reluctance from the political authorities to accept protests, whereas higher scores 
imply people think the government accepts protests. The second dimension, perceived 
repression, is in line with Honari’s (2017) conceptualization of the same construct, but it 
is limited to protests as a specific form of collective action and is focused on police 
actions. Despite Honari’s original definition of this construct considering ‘the state’ as a 
general agent of repression, we decided to delimit our understanding of repression to 
police actions. We take into account that the level of dependency and accountability 
between different agents of the state (e.g., the police and government officers) might 
change by country. Thus, from our perspective, perceived repression is defined by police 
transgressions (e.g., excessive use of force) that civilians perceive as existing in their 
immediate political setting in relation to protests. Here, the term ‘repression’ is focused 
on the perceived frequency that police officers act against people, rather than their 
capability in terms of equipment (see Brockett, 1991). Higher scores on this scale suggest 
that people perceive a more frequent use of indiscriminate force against protesters by the 
police. The third component of SPO, legitimacy of protests, incorporates the role of public 
opinion as a source of legitimacy and support for protests. Accordingly, this dimension 
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indicates the extent to which people perceive that public opinion validates protests 
(legitimacy at a collective level) rather than referring to their personal preferences 
(legitimacy at an individual level) (cf. Chayinsca et al., 2017; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2019). 
Higher scores here indicate that people think that public opinion legitimizes protest. 
 
2.2.3 Measurement invariance  
Measurement invariance is an important property of psychological instruments, checking 
that a proposed configuration of indicators associated with a construct and their meaning 
are invariant throughout time, groups, culture, or tasks (see Messick, 1989, cited in 
Dimitrov, 2010). Thus, measurement invariance can be tested at successive levels of 
complexity: configural, weak, strong, and strict (Brown, 2015; Dimitrov, 2010). The 
configural level can be established if a construct maintains the same factorial structure 
(numbers of factors and pattern of indicators) across groups or conditions, while the 
equality of factor loadings implies reaching the next level of invariance (weak). 
Moreover, strict level of invariance can be assumed if both the intercepts (strong level) 
and the residual variance demonstrate to be equal.  
 
2.2.4 Bifactor model 
In recent years, bifactor models have been rediscovered by researchers to test 
multidimensional constructs where a general factor and a set of specific subdomains 
coexist under some basic rules: (1) each indicator shares variance with a general factor 
and with only one subscale at the same time; (2) the subscales are orthogonal; and (3) a 
zero correlation exists between the general factor and each subdomain (Chen, West, & 
Sousa, 2006; Reise, 2012). One of the main advantages of this type of model is the 
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capacity to distinguish between the variance indicators share with a common factor, and 
the amount they share with a specific subscale (Reise, Morizot, & Hays, 2007). On the 
one hand, this capacity allows researchers to get less ambiguous interpretations of the 
results and scores of their constructs. On the other hand, the effects of a bifactor model 
on an outcome variable can be disaggregated and considered as a consequence of either 
the general factor or one specific subscale (Chen, Hayes, Carver, Laurenceau, & Zhang, 
2012). Despite these advantages, bifactor models are not very well established in 
psychology for two reasons. First, their use has been almost exclusively associated with 
research on intelligence. Second, researchers have preferred higher-order models to test 
constructs that include a general factor in their structure (Chen et al., 2012; Reeve & 
Blacksmith, 2009).  
 
2.2.5 Trust in police procedural justice 
According to the literature, the legitimacy of authorities can be focused on outcomes (e.g., 
effectiveness to prevent crime) or on procedures (e.g., fair treatment by police officers). 
In line with the latter, Jackson and collaborators (2013) developed the trust in police 
procedural justice scale to evaluate if police treatment and decision-making are perceived 
as fair, impartial, and adjusted to the law (see Gau, 2014, for a review). Subsequent 
research has demonstrated that higher levels of trust in the procedures carried out by the 
police are positively associated with the legitimacy given to them (Gau, 2014; Hough, 
Jackson, Bradford, Myhill, & Quinton, 2010; Jackson et al., 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 
2003), compliance with authorities (Bradford, Hohl, Jackson, & MacQueen, 2015), and 
the support for the use of violence by the police in a context of intergroup conflict (Gerber 
et al., 2018).  
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Although procedural justice theory has inspired a substantial amount of research in 
different fields and scenarios, its applicability to policing of protest is still undeveloped 
(cf. Radburn et al., 2018). Since there are no other validated scales to assess the perceived 
(in)tolerance of the political context in relation to protests, we adapted some of the items 
created by Jackson and collaborators (2013) to measure trust in police procedural justice 
during protests as a proxy for people’s perceptions of the police behaviour before 
demonstrations. Therefore, we expect these adapted items to maintain at least a medium 
correlation with SPO as a general construct as well as with perceived repression as a 
dimension specifically oriented to assess police conduct during protests. 
 
2.3 Overview of Studies 
 
With the aim of creating and validating the SPO scale, we carried out two studies using 
different samples from the UK and Chile. These countries were chosen mainly because 
of their history; both have experienced massive protests where their political context 
played a crucial role in the development of the events. Thus, in the last decade the UK 
has seen events such as 2010 student protests (Lewis, Vasagar, Williams, & Taylor, 2010) 
where police actions against protesters were associated with the legitimation of violent 
tactics by protesters. However, most protests in the UK are not violent. Chile faced a 
harsh and violent dictatorship, leading people to use violence during some protests to 
confront the military junta (Salazar, 2006). The protesters experienced a demobilisation 
process in which people were forced by political elites to put aside their rights to protest 
on behalf of maintaining a weak democracy based on technocracy and the negotiations 
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between political parties and armed forces (see Cummings, 2015; Hipsher, 1998; Mayol, 
2012). However, since the early 2000s Chileans returned to the streets to claim their rights 
and demonstrate their discontent with the political elites (see Salazar, 2012; Somma & 
Medel, 2017). Thus, Chileans have transformed protests and demonstrations into routine 
political acts throughout the country to complain about diverse issues (e.g., quality of 
education, reforms to the political system, indigenous people’s rights) using different 
tactics (e.g., peaceful or violent) (Garretón, Joignat, Somma, & Campos, 2017). 
 
It is worth noting that despite the UK and Chile being democratic countries with similar 
legal contexts, restraints, and planning procedures in relation to protests (e.g., protesters 
need to give notice in advance including details about the time and route of the protest), 
they present substantive differences regarding policing protest. British police are well-
known by their ‘friendly’ approach to protests management mainly based on cooperation 
and communication with protesters (see Della Porta et al., 1998), restrictions on the 
number of police officers authorized to carry firearms, and the rare use of tear gas during 
protests. Conversely, the approach of the Chilean police (Carabineros) is guided by an 
intimidation strategy. Thus, Carabineros have become notorious for deploying riot police 
during peaceful protests, their indiscriminate use of water cannons, tear gas, and excessive 
force against protesters. Because of this, human rights organizations have condemned 
police brutality in Chile in successive years (Amnesty International, 2016; Human Right 
Watch, 2017). 
 
Another comparison between the UK and Chile is how police forces are organised and 
the status of their relationships with political authorities. While Carabineros are a national 
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force with a centralized chain of command whose lead authority (General Director) is 
directly answerable to a government minister (Minister of the Interior), British police are 
organized in autonomous regional police services and keep some independence from the 
Home Office.    
 
Bearing these antecedents in mind, we designed two cross-sectional studies to elaborate 
and validate a scale of measurement for SPO considering the main three components or 
phases (substantive, structural, and external) identified by Loevinger (1957) and then 
updated by Flake, Pek, and Hehman (2017) in relation to construct validation. Thus, Study 
1 was conceived to carry out a literature review, elaborate a theoretical definition for SPO, 
government openness, perceived repression, and legitimacy of protests at a collective 
level, as well as to create a set of items for each of these dimensions (substantive phase). 
In Study 1, we also analysed the designed items, tested the configuration of each proposed 
dimension, tested their measurement invariance, and established the structural 
configuration of SPO as a bifactor model (structural phase). Moreover, Study 2 aimed to 
replicate and generalize the results from the first study (structural phase) using samples 
from the general population of the UK and Chile. Furthermore, this study sought to 
confirm the convergent validity between SPO and trust in police procedural justice scale 
(External phase) and to compare those items created to measure legitimacy of protests in 
Study 1 with a new set of items using different wording. 
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2.4 Study 1 
 
2.4.1 Method 
Participants. Two different samples of undergraduate students from the UK and 
Chile participated in the study. The sample size was based on the rule of thumb of getting 
at least 200 observations to run a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). In addition, a Monte 
Carlo simulation determined 200 as the minimum sample size to get a statistical power 
of .80 and unbiased parameters in a bifactor model with three dimensions assuming non-
missing data, a normal distribution of the variables, and factor loadings equal to .65 for 
the general factor and .45 in each sub dimension (see Muthén & Muthén, 2009; Wolf, 
Harrington, Clark, & Miller, 2015).  
 
From the total of participants recruited, 39 cases were removed because they completed 
less than 50% of the survey. Thus, the final samples size were 247 British students (68% 
Female; Age: M = 19.81, SD = 3.30), and 219 Chilean students (73% Female; Age: M = 
19.00, SD = 2.85). Regarding previous participation in protests, only a few participants 
(UK = 15%; Chile = 30%) reported having taken part in any protest during the 12 months 
prior to the date they filled in the questionnaire. 
 
Procedure. First, sets of at least eight items were created to measure each of these 
dimensions. Afterwards, the match between the theoretical definitions and the items were 
assessed by a panel of experts comprised of our Chilean collaborators (named in the 
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acknowledgements). Once we received the feedback from the panel, we assembled a 
questionnaire including all the items for SPO dimensions, an adapted version of the trust 
in police procedural justice scale (see Jackson et al., 2013), and a set of items to measure 
general political attitudes and demographics from the participants. All the mentioned 
items were in English (see all the items in Appendix 1), so a back-translation process 
(English-Spanish-English) was carried out by native speakers to check out possible 
divergence and get a Spanish version of our instrument (see all the items in Appendix 2). 
As a result, we obtained two comparable questionnaires.  
 
With respect to the data collection process, in both countries the participants filled in an 
online version of the questionnaire after being invited during classes. A small portion of 
British students opted to use a paper and pencil version of the questionnaire.  
 
Measures. Participants responded on Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) for the 12 items measuring perceived government 
openness (e.g., ‘this government hinders participation in marches and protests’). For the 
eight items measuring perceived repression (e.g., ‘in this country, the protests are 
dispersed using violent methods’) a frequency scale was utilized (1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 
= sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = always). The 10 items for legitimacy of protests at a collective 
level (e.g., ‘people of my country think that participating in protests is a valid political 
action’) were evaluated using a scale of typicality from 1 (very untypical) to 5 (very 
typical).  
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In addition, we adapted three items from the trust in police procedural justice scale 
(Jackson et al., 2013) to a scenario of protest. For this, we included the phrases ‘in a 
protest’ or ‘during a protest’ before each original item of the scale mentioned above (e.g., 
‘In a protest the police always use procedures that are fair for everyone’). These items 
were assessed using a Likert-type ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) 
(see all items in English in Appendix 1 and in Spanish in Appendix 2). 
 
2.4.2 Analysis 
We carried out CFA in MPLUS 7 using Maximum Likelihood Robust (MLR) as the 
estimator to select the best indicators for each dimension and estimate the structure of 
SPO by country. The internal consistency and reliability of each dimension was 
calculated using the Omega coefficient (ω), an indicator recommended by the specialist 
literature on latent variables when the main assumptions of traditional Cronbach’s alpha 
(unidimensionality and tau-equivalence) cannot be adopted (Dunn, Baguley, & Brunsden, 
2014; Gignac, 2014; Widhiarso, & Ravand, 2014).  
 
In a subsequent step, we evaluated the configuration of each SPO dimension in both 
countries (measurement invariance) following the guidelines of Dimitrov (2010) and 
Hoffman (2014). Thus, the resultant models were contrasted against nested models using 
a chi-squared difference test to specify their corresponding levels of invariance. After 
finishing the analyses by dimension, we assessed if SPO actually was a multidimensional 
construct by including a first-order general factor (SPO) and three orthogonal dimensions: 
government openness, perceived repression, and legitimacy of protests at a collective 
level (see Figure 2.1).  
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Figure 2.1. Original bifactor model (1 general factor + 3 subscales). 
 
Finally, to assess the convergent validity of SPO and its dimensions, we correlated the 
adapted version of the trust in police procedural justice scale with both the SPO as a 
general factor and the perceived repression as a specific dimension aimed to evaluate 
perceptions of police suppression of protests.  
 
2.4.3 Results  
The CFA demonstrated that each proposed dimension for SPO was formed by four items 
(the rest were not considered further due to their low factor loadings). The items for each 
dimension, their respective descriptive statistics and standardised factor loadings by 
country are reported in Table 2.1. The internal consistency reliability and fit indices 
obtained for the dimensions in each country are detailed in Table 2.2.  
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Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics and standardised factor loadings of items per scale. 
  
Dimension 
 
Code 
  
Items 
UK (n = 247) Chile (n = 219) 
M  
(SD) 
Factor 
Loadings 
M  
(SD) 
Factor 
Loadings 
Government 
openness 
Go1 The government restricts political 
expressions involving participation in 
protests  
3.06 
 (0.97) 
.71 3.14 
(1.12) 
.73 
Go2 This government hinders participation 
in marches and protests 
3.14 
(0.96) 
.80 3.28 
(1.15) 
.84 
Go3 The government is against people 
expressing their discontent by 
participating in protests  
3.18 
(1.04) 
.62 2.79 
(1.16) 
.70 
Go4 Those who participate in protests are 
labelled as criminals by this 
government  
2.60  
(1.12) 
.58 3.26 
(1.24) 
.56 
Perceived 
repression 
Rep1 In this country, the protests are 
dispersed using violent methods 
2.72 
(0.80) 
.64 3.74 
(0.81) 
.77 
Rep2 The police use an indiscriminate 
violence against the protesters  
2.82 
(0.90) 
.76 3.45 
(1.05) 
.90 
Rep3 Carrying out protests in this country is 
difficult because these are immediately 
attacked by the police 
2.66 
(1.04) 
.61 3.05 
(1.02) 
.73 
Rep4 In my country, those who participate in 
protests may end up injured by the 
disproportionate violence used by the 
police 
2.75 
(1.06) 
.66 3.51 
(0.97) 
.80 
Legitimacy of 
protests 
Leg1 People of my country think that 
participating in protests is a valid 
political action 
3.61 
(0.87) 
.76 3.52 
(0.89) 
.63 
Leg2 Citizens are of the opinion that carrying 
out protests is fine even when not 
sharing the protesters’ concerns 
3.23 
(0.98) 
.63 3.13 
(1.02) 
.78 
Leg3 People think that taking part in protests 
is legitimate in spite of the fact these 
can be inconvenient 
3.48 
(0.92) 
.74 2.75 
(1.10) 
.65 
Leg4 The people of my country think that 
demonstrations are an important 
activity in a democratic system 
3.47 
(0.88) 
.62 2.95 
(0.97) 
.53 
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The results showed that in both samples all the scales achieved an acceptable level of 
internal consistency reliability (ω > .70) and reached a good fit with the data according 
to Brown’s (2015) recommendations. In terms of the scales’ content, we need to highlight 
that the government openness scale comprises only reversed items. This means the 
selected items capture the extent to which people perceived the government try to hinder 
protests. Thus, as perceived repression, those items associated with government openness 
are reporting negative attitudes and actions from the political authorities towards protests. 
 
Table 2.2. Internal consistency reliability indices and model fit statistics for each subscale by 
country. 
 UK 
Subscale ω χ2 df CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA 90% CI for 
RMSEA 
 LL UL 
Government openness .77 1.80 2 1.00 1.00 .01 .00 .00 .12 
Perceived repression .76 1.71 2 1.00 1.00 .01 .00 .00 .12 
Legitimacy of protests .78 3.94 2 .99 .96 .01 .06 .00 .15 
 CHILE 
Subscale ω χ 2 df CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA 90% CI for 
RMSEA 
 LL UL 
Government openness .80 2.48 2 .99  .99 .01 .00 .00 .14 
Perceived repression .84 4.60 2 .99 .97 .01 .07 .00 .17 
Legitimacy of protests .75 0.70 2 1.00 1.00 .01 .00 .00 .09 
 
Once the structure of each subscale was established, we tested their measurement 
invariance at successive levels of complexity (the results in detail can be found in 
Appendix 3). Thus, the government openness scale obtained total weak invariance (equal 
factor loadings). However, because equality between all indicators means (intercepts) 
could not be assumed, an alternative model where the intercepts of items ‘go3’ (‘the 
government is against people expressing their discontent by participating in protests’) and 
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‘go4’ (‘those who participate in protests are labelled as criminals by this government’) 
were calculated as free parameters. This alternative model fitted well to the data, reaching 
partial strong invariance, and, in a subsequent step, the partial strict invariance for this 
subscale. Moreover, we carried out the same procedures to test partial strong and partial 
strict invariance in the scale for perceived repression where only the factor loadings were 
equal across countries (weak level of invariance).  
 
Regarding legitimacy of protests at a collective level, it reached total weak invariance. 
Although the equality of the factors loadings across samples was demonstrated, the fit of 
the model diminished when we tried to constrain all the intercepts simultaneously. An 
alternative model where the intercepts of items ‘leg3’ (‘people think that taking part in 
protests is legitimate in spite of the fact these can be inconvenient’) and ‘leg4’ (‘the people 
of my country think that demonstrations are an important activity in a democratic system’) 
were calculated as free parameters demonstrated partial strong invariance. Subsequently, 
a set of new models showed partial strict invariance, and partial structural invariance 
equalizing the latent factor variances and means of this dimension respectively. 
 
Once the measuring invariance was tested for each proposed SPO dimension, the next 
task was to determine the relation between the three proposed dimensions and SPO as a 
general factor. For this, we tested four possible configurations: three independent first 
order factors; a hierarchical model with three dimensions and SPO as a second order 
factor; a bifactor model with three dimensions (the original bifactor model); and a bifactor 
model with two dimensions (alternative bifactor model). Apart from the hierarchical 
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model which did not converge in any sample, a summary of the fit indices obtained for 
each configuration is reported in Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3. Model fit statistics and close-fit indices associated with CFA models by country. 
UK 
              90% CI for 
RMSEA 
Model χ2 Df CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA LL UL 
Three first order factors. 96.28 51 .93 .91 .05 .06 .04 .07 
Original bifactor model. 65.27 43 .96 .95 .04 .04 .02 .06 
Alternative bifactor model. 19.21 13 .98 .97 .03 .04   .00 .08 
CHILE 
              90% CI for 
RMSEA 
Model χ2 df CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA LL UL 
Three first order factors 70.03 51 .97 .97 .05 .04 .01 .06 
Original bifactor model. 40.20 43 1.00 1.00 .03 .00 .00 .04 
Alternative bifactor model. 17.81 13 .99 .98 
 
.01 .02 .00 .08 
 
The results demonstrated that the original bifactor model fitted the data better than the 
three first order factors in both countries. However, despite its good global fit indices, the 
main issue with the former model was that the items for legitimacy of protests did not 
load onto the general factor (SPO). The latter involves breaking a basic assumption of 
bifactor models, that indicators must share variance with a general factor and with only 
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one subscale, as well indicating that the legitimacy of protests scale might not be part of 
SPO. This problem was also reflected in two issues regarding the reliability coefficients 
obtained for the original bifactor model. 
 
First, despite the consistency of the SPO scale considering all the sources of variance 
were acceptable in both samples (UK: ωt = .77, 95% CI [0.70, 0.81]; Chile: ωt = .88, 95% 
CI [0.84, 0.90]), the internal consistency for SPO as a general factor was low (UK: ωh = 
.51, 95% CI [0.41, 0.59]; Chile: ωh = .65, 95% CI [0.57, 0.71]). Second, the high 
proportion of unique internal consistency associated with legitimacy of protests (but not 
with SPO) in both the UK (ωs = .77, 95% CI [0.69, 0.82]) and the Chilean sample (ωs = 
.71, 95% CI [0.64, 0.77]), while government openness (UK: ωs = .19, 95% CI [0.09, 0.30]; 
Chile: ωs = .14, 95% CI [0.07, 0.24]), and perceived repression (UK: ωs = .48, 95% CI 
[0.36, 0.61]; Chile: ωs = .39, 95% CI [0.22, 0.53]) shared their loadings and most of their 
variance with the general factor (SPO).  
 
Considering the results described above, the alternative bifactor model (see Figure 2.2) 
was tested excluding the items for legitimacy of protests. In addition, since the item ‘go4’ 
(‘those who participate in protests are labelled as criminals by this government’) only 
loaded on the general factor in both samples, we set it as a SPO indicator without being 
associated with any specific subscale. 
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Figure 2.2. Alternative bifactor model (1 general factor + 2 subscales). 
 
The analyses demonstrated that in both countries the alternative bifactor model fitted 
better in comparison to other alternative models (see Table 2.3). Moreover, it is important 
to stress that multi-group analyses were conducted to test measurement invariance across 
samples using the alternative bifactor model. These analyses compared the model without 
restrictions as a baseline (χ2 (26) = 36.984; p = .075; CFI = .99; TLI = .98; RMSEA = .04; 
SRMR = .02) against successive constraints. The obtained results suggested that only 
equal factor loadings of the indicators over the general factor and on their respective 
subscales (weak level of invariance) can be assumed when SPO is used in the UK and 
Chile. 
 
In terms of the interpretation of SPO, it is worth noting again that the items selected for 
government openness are reversed and indicate the extent that the political authorities are 
perceived as hindering protests instead of supporting or facilitating these activities. Thus, 
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the original valence of this construct is similar to perceived repression. Therefore, to 
correctly interpret the scores of these dimensions and SPO as general factor we want to 
introduce two practical suggestions. First, to ensure that the scores are coherent all the 
items should be reversed. This means that higher scores in SPO would be associated with 
more perceived openness to protests, understanding openness as the absence of repression 
against protests. Second, the current version of SPO should be named SPO-R (i.e., SPO-
Repression version) to take into account that the proposed items refer to measures the 
government and the police can take to repress protests. 
 
Finally, we found that trust in police procedural justice during protests maintained a 
positive medium correlation with SPO-R as a general factor in both countries (UK: r = 
.26, p = .008; Chile: r = .54, p < .001), as well as negative medium-high correlation with 
perceived repression (UK: r = -.34, p = .001; Chile: r = -.59, p < .001). Although the 
direction of the correlations is a factor should be taken into account when we test construct 
validity (Swank & Mullen, 2017), we expected a negative relationship between trust in 
police procedural justice and perceived repression considering the valence of the wording 
used for each of them (positive for the former and negative for the latter).  
 
2.4.4 Discussion 
Study 1 demonstrated evidence for the substantive and structural phases of construct 
validation (see Flake et al., 2017). Thus, we created theoretical definitions for SPO, 
government openness, perceived repression, and legitimacy of protests at collective level. 
Then, a panel of experts assessed these conceptualizations and the items developed to 
measure each proposed dimension. In a subsequent step, we carried out quantitative 
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analyses to explore the psychometric properties of each dimension (factor structure, 
internal consistency, and measurement invariance) as well as the configuration of SPO as 
a bifactor model comprising only two dimensions, government openness and perceived 
repression. Moreover, we suggested that considering the valence and the content of the 
items related to these two dimensions (absence of repression), henceforth, this version of 
the construct should be called SPO-R (i.e., SPO-Repression).   
 
Trust in police procedural justice during protests correlated with both SPO-R and 
perceived repression (external phase). However, an unresolved issue is the relation 
between SPO-R and legitimacy of protests. For this, two different hypotheses should be 
considered. First, the items’ wording (i.e., length and redundancy of information between 
the anchors and the items) for legitimacy of protests at collective level might affect the 
results for this scale and its relationship with SPO-R. Second, SPO-R and legitimacy of 
protests might be unrelated because people might consider what public opinion has to say 
about protests and the behaviour of political authorities at different levels of analysis. We 
tested both hypotheses in Study 2. 
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2.5 Study 2 
 
2.5.1 Method 
Participants. We recruited general population samples from the UK and Chile. 
Two Monte Carlo simulation studies based on the results of Study 1 (assuming normal 
distribution of the variables and the same pattern of missing values) determined that 300 
observations was the optimal sample size to replicate the bifactor model with two 
dimensions, or to calculate the original factor model with three dimensions if the 
legitimacy of protests indicators had factor loadings equal or greater than .60 for the 
general factor (SPO-R), and equal or greater than .45 for the specific dimension. A total 
of 377 British (59.69% Female; Age: M = 34.82, SD = 11.89), and 309 Chilean (64.72% 
Female; Age: M = 27.33, SD = 11.06) adults comprised the final sample of this replication 
study. Unlike in Study 1, most Chilean participants (54%) reported having participated in 
protests during the twelve months previous to the data collection, although the percentage 
of British adults that had taken part in protests (11%) remained more or less the same as 
those in the first study. 
 
Procedure. Participants completed a modified version of the questionnaire used 
in Study 1. This instrument included wording amendments to some items, a set of new 
items aimed to increase the number of indicators available for each SPO-R dimension, as 
well as a simplified version of the scale created for legitimacy of protests at a collective 
level in Study 1 (see all the items in English in Appendix 4 and in Spanish in Appendix 
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5). Furthermore, to make the new items comparable between samples, we carried out a 
back-translation process following the same procedures as in Study 1. 
 
We used different methods in each country for data collection. All UK participants 
completed a version of the questionnaire hosted on Prolific (a paid online platform). In 
Chile, data gathering followed quota requirements based on the economic structure and 
gender composition of Santiago de Chile. There, participants were recruited through 
social media (Facebook and Twitter) or by a research assistant. In both cases, Chilean 
participants could choose between filling in the paper-and-pencil or the online version of 
the questionnaire. However, no statistical control was carried out to compare both 
versions due to the fact that only 15 participants completed the paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire.  
 
Measures. As in Study 1, participants responded on a Likert-type scale (1 = 
strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) for the 10 items (five used in Study 1 and five 
new) associated with government openness (e.g., ‘the government is against people 
expressing their discontent by participating in protests’); on a frequency scale (1 = never, 
2 = rarely, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = always) for those items (seven items; five used 
in Study 1 and 2 new items) which measured perceived repression (e.g., ‘one of the 
primary objectives of the police is to prevent the development of any political 
demonstrations’); and on a typicality scale (1 = very untypical to 5 = very typical) for the 
seven items for legitimacy of protests at a collective level (e.g., ‘citizens are of the opinion 
that carrying out protests is fine even when not sharing the protesters’ concerns’). A 
typicality scale was also used to evaluate the six statements included in the simplified 
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version of the scale to measure legitimacy of protests at a collective level (e.g., ‘protests 
are a valid action’). Moreover, we included the same three items we adapted from the 
trust in police procedural justice scale in Study 1. 
 
2.5.2 Analysis 
After testing the factor configurations obtained in Study 1, alternative models including 
previous and new items proposed for each dimension were compared. In addition, CFAs 
using Maximum Likelihood Robust (MLR) were carried out to estimate the configuration 
of the simplified version of the legitimacy of protests scale and test its relationship with 
SPO-R.  
 
Once the previous and new scales were configured, we calculated their internal reliability 
using Omega coefficients and tested their levels of measurement invariance using multi-
group analyses. Then, as in Study 1, we compared four types of models to confirm the 
SPO-R configuration (SPO-R dimensions as independent first-order factors; SPO-R as a 
second order factor; SPO-R as a bifactor model with three dimensions; SPO-R as a 
bifactor model with two dimensions). We also contrasted those models which included 
the original scale of legitimacy of protests at collective level against those which used the 
simplified scale for the same construct. Finally, we used bi-variate correlations to 
examine evidence for convergent validity of SPO-R and perceived repression with the 
trust in police procedures scale in both samples. 
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2.5.3 Results  
As in Study 1, each proposed dimension was made up of four items in both samples. The 
items associated with each dimension, their respective descriptive statistics by country, 
and standardised factor loadings are reported in Table 2.4. 
 
Table 2.4. Descriptive statistics and standardised factor loadings of items per scale. 
      UK (n = 337) Chile (n = 310) 
Dimension Code Items M  
(SD) 
Factor 
Loadings 
M  
(SD) 
Factor 
Loadings 
Government 
openness 
Go1 The government restricts political 
expressions involving participation in 
protests  
2.42 
 (1.11) 
.84 2.95 
(1.25) 
.77 
Go2 This government hinders 
participation in marches and protests 
2.55 
(1.11) 
.85 3.21 
(1.30) 
.81 
Go3 The government is against people 
expressing their discontent by 
participating in protests  
2.69 
(1.21) 
.83 2.92 
(1.33) 
.80 
Go4 Those who participate in protests are 
labelled as criminals by this 
government  
2.15  
(1.22) 
.70 3.03 
(1.33) 
.64 
Perceived 
repression 
Rep2 The police use an indiscriminate 
violence against the protesters  
2.34 
(0.86) 
.80 3.62 
(1.11) 
.89 
Rep3 Carrying out protests in this country 
is difficult because these are 
immediately attacked by the police 
2.07 
(0.92) 
.74 3.16 
(1.14) 
.77 
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Rep4 In my country, those who participate 
in protests may end up injured by the 
disproportionate violence used by the 
police 
2.31 
(0.87) 
.79 3.44 
(1.18) 
.84 
Rep5 To disperse a protest, police officers 
commonly hit demonstrators 
2.42 
(0.89) 
.76 3.55 
(1.11) 
.91 
Legitimacy of 
protests 
(original 
scale) 
Leg1 People of my country think that 
participating in protests is a valid 
political action 
3.84 
(0.89) 
.78 3.64 
(1.10) 
.70 
Leg2 Citizens are of the opinion that 
carrying out protests is fine even 
when not sharing the protesters’ 
concerns 
3.48 
(1.00) 
.76 3.32 
(1.12) 
.73 
Leg3 People think that taking part in 
protests is legitimate in spite of the 
fact these can be inconvenient 
3.62 
(0.91) 
.77 2.97 
(1.16) 
.78 
Leg4 The people of my country think that 
demonstrations are an important 
activity in a democratic system 
3.67 
(0.97) 
.67 3.17 
(1.11) 
.60 
Legitimacy of 
protests 
(simplified 
scale) 
Pleg1 Protests are a valid action 3.91 
(0.89) 
.87 3.58 
(1.08) 
.72 
Pleg2 Demonstrations are fine even if they 
are inconvenient 
3.42 
(1.07) 
.78 2.94 
(1.13) 
.70 
Pleg3 Demonstrators are threat to public 
order 
2.49 
(1.02) 
-.58 2.98 
(1.17) 
-.50 
Pleg4 Protests are an important part of our 
democratic system 
3.61 
(0.98) 
.74 3.24 
(1.13) 
.83 
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While the government openness and legitimacy of protests factors consisted of the same 
items as in the previous study, perceived repression maintained just three of its original 
items including a new one for both samples (see Table 2.4). This new item (‘to disperse 
a protest, police officers commonly hit demonstrators’) was introduced in the 
questionnaire as an improved version of ‘in this country, the protests are dispersed using 
violent methods’. 
 
In terms of the adjustment to the data, each proposed dimension reached acceptable fit 
indices in both samples (see Table 2.5). An exception to this is the RMSEA obtained for 
legitimacy of protests (original scale) which was higher than the recommended threshold 
(.08) in the Chilean sample. However, we decided to maintain the configuration of this 
construct following the recommendations of Kenny, Kaniskan, and McCoach (2014) on 
the artificial overestimation of RMSEA in models with small sample size and low degrees 
of freedom. 
 
Turning now to measurement invariance testing by dimension, results suggested that 
government openness just reached a partial strict invariance (the detailed results of each 
dimension can be found in Appendix 6). As in Study 1, model fit indices became weaker 
when all intercepts were assumed to be equal, but their values were acceptable when the 
intercepts and the residual variance of two of the items were unconstrained.   
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Table 2.5. Internal consistency reliability indices and model fit statistics for each subscale by 
country. 
 
Having determined the level of invariance showed by government openness across 
samples, it is now necessary to discuss the other dimensions. According to the results, 
 UK  
 
 
      
90% CI for 
RMSEA 
Subscale ω χ2 df CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA LL UL 
Government openness .88 3.14 2 .99 .99 .01 .03 .00 .11 
Perceived repression .85 2.30 2 .99 .99 .01 .02 .00 .10 
Legitimacy of protests  
(original scale) 
.83 5.13 2 .99 .97 .01 .06 .00 .13 
Legitimacy of protests  
(simplified scale) 
.63 2.17 2 1.00 .99 .01 .01 .00 .10 
 CHILE 
 
 
      
90% CI for 
RMSEA 
Subscale ω χ2 df CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA LL UL 
Government openness .85 5.48 2 .98 .96 .01 .07 .03 .15 
Perceived repression .92 6.73 2 .99 .97 .01 .08 .02 .16 
Legitimacy of protests  
(original scale) 
.80 8.57 2 .96 .90 .03 .10 .04 .17 
Legitimacy of protests  
(simplified scale) 
.58 5.31 2 .98 .94 .02 .07 .00 .15 
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equal factor loadings, intercepts, and residual variance could be assumed for perceived 
repression. With respect to legitimacy of protests at a collective level, both versions of 
the scale reached different levels of invariance. First, the original scale had equal factor 
loadings across samples. Second, we demonstrated that only items ‘leg2’ (‘citizens are of 
the opinion that carrying out protests is fine even when not sharing the protesters’ 
concerns’) and ‘leg4’ (‘the people of my country think that demonstrations are an 
important activity in a democratic system’) had equal intercepts (partial strong variance) 
and residual variances (partial strict variance) across countries. Moreover, the simplified 
version of the legitimacy of protests scale reached a full strong level of invariance, which 
implies that the factor loadings and intercepts of all its indicators were equal across 
samples.  
 
Regarding the structural configuration of SPO-R, all the models tested in both countries 
fitted to the data apart from the hierarchical models (SPO-R as a second order factor) 
which did not converge (as in Study 1). Nevertheless, despite the good results 
demonstrated by almost all the alternative models, the bifactor model including just two 
sub-dimensions - (UK: ωh = .83, 95% CI [0.80, 0.86]; Chile: ωh = .76, 95% CI [0.70, 
0.81]), government openness (UK: ωs = .07, 95% CI [0.23, 0.42]; Chile: ωs = .12, 95% CI 
[0.32, 0.52]) and perceived repression (UK: ωs = .12, 95% CI [0.08, 0.31]; Chile: ωs = 
.41, 95% CI [0.06, 0.19]) - was always the better alternative (see model 5 in Table 2.6). 
 
With respect to the role of legitimacy of protests in SPO-R, those bifactor models which 
included the original version of the legitimacy of protests scale in the Chilean sample and 
those that used the simplified version of the latter construct (in both samples) 
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demonstrated a good fit (see models 3 and 4 in Table 2.6). However, these models were 
rejected because the items in both versions of the legitimacy of protests at a collective 
level scale (original and simplified) presented high factor loadings for the subscale but 
very low loadings (<= .20) for the general dimension (SPO-R). 
 
Table 2.6. Model fit statistics and close-fit indices associated with CFA models by country. 
UK 
              90% CI for 
RMSEA 
Model χ2 df CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA LL UL 
1) Three first order factors (legitimacy of 
protest based on meta-perceptions) 
74.12 51 .98 .98 .03 .03 .01 .05 
2) Three first order factors (legitimacy of 
protest based on perceptions) 
80.05 51 .98 .97 .04 .03 .02 .05 
3) Bifactor model (three dimensions) using 
legitimacy of protest based on meta-
perceptions 
54.34 43 .99 .99 .03 .02 .00 .04 
4) Bifactor model (three dimensions) using 
legitimacy of protest based on perceptions 
54.92 43 .99 .99 .02 .02 .00 .04 
5) Alternative bifactor model (two 
dimensions 
13.23 13 1.00 1.00 .01 .00 .00 .05 
  
88 
 
CHILE 
              90% CI for 
RMSEA 
Model χ2 df CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA LL UL 
1) Three first order factors (legitimacy of 
protest based on meta-perceptions) 
111.17 51 .96 .95 .04 .06 .04 .07 
2) Three first order factors (legitimacy of 
protest based on perceptions) 
118.88 51 .95 .94 .04 .06 .05 .08 
3) Bifactor model (three dimensions) 
using legitimacy of protest based on meta-
perceptions 
89.19 43 .97 .95 .03 .05 .04 .07 
4) Bifactor model (three dimensions) 
using legitimacy of protest based on 
perceptions 
94.85 43 .97 .95 .03 .06 .04 .07 
5) Alternative bifactor model (two 
dimensions) 
27.42 13 .98 .97 .02 .06 .02 .09 
 
Considering these results, we suggest that legitimacy of protests at collective level does 
not belong to SPO-R and the latter is a multidimensional construct comprising two 
dimensions that refer to the extent to which people perceive government (government 
openness) and police openness (perceived repression) in relation to protests. However, as 
mentioned in Study 1, this openness should be understood and interpreted in terms of the 
absence of repression against protesters rather than authorities’ willingness to allow or 
facilitate protesters actions. Accordingly, the version of the scale tested in this study 
should be named SPO-R.    
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With respect to SPO-R’s measurement invariance in a bifactor model configuration, 
multi-group analyses demonstrated that equal factor loadings (weak level of invariance) 
in relation to the general factor (SPO-R) and its dimensions (government openness and 
perceived repression) can be assumed. These results confirm those obtained in Study 1, 
where SPO-R intercepts and residual variances differed between samples. 
 
Finally, we found evidentiary support for the claim that SPO-R correlates well in both 
countries with trust in police procedural justice during protest (UK: r = .62, p < .001; 
Chile: r = .42, p < .001), while the perceived repression shows at least a negative medium 
size correlation with the latter construct in the UK (r = -.27, p < .002), and a medium-
high correlation in the Chilean sample (r = -.61, p < .001). 
 
2.5.4 Discussion 
The results of Study 2 confirm that government openness, perceived repression, and 
legitimacy of protests reach different levels of measurement invariance across the UK 
and Chile. This is an important finding for two reasons. First, items are highly correlated 
with their respective factor, no matter the specific political context that participants come 
from. Second, and the results are replicable independent of the specific characteristics of 
the samples. However, the fact that neither all intercepts nor residual variances were equal 
in both studies suggests that at some level the hypothesised dimensions might be affected 
by specific phenomena associated with each country involved in the project. Thus, we 
can suggest that further research should explore the role of police brutality against 
protesters in Chile (Cummings, 2015; Human Right Watch, 2017), as well as the 
routinization of protests and the disconnection of political elites with social movements 
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in this country (Somma & Bargsted, 2015) as potential antecedents that might help to 
explain the differences. 
 
Moreover, Study 2 confirms that government openness and perceived repression are 
components of the same general dimension (SPO-R). This suggests that alongside the 
‘objective’ facts associated with statistics, macro-economic drivers, laws, or some 
political measures, researchers should give heed to people’s perceptions regarding 
authorities’ behaviour (the government and the police) in the evaluation of political 
context openness in relation to collective action. Despite these results, we need to reaffirm 
that in our current work the term ‘openness’ exclusively referred to the perceived lack of 
repression against protesters’ actions. We believe that the scale should be developed in 
the future to also measure the perceived extent to which the political context supports 
protests, and the extent people perceive the authorities carry out specific actions to 
facilitate protests. Thus, we think there should be different versions of the SPO scale 
according to the three main possible actions authorities may carry out in relation to 
protests: SPO-R (repression); SPO-C (consent); SPO-F (facilitation). 
 
Regarding the relation between the legitimacy of protests and SPO-R, we confirm that 
none of the versions of the scale (original and simplified) elaborated to measure the 
former construct can be considered part of the SPO-R as a general factor. This means that 
when people evaluate the attitudes and behaviour of other political actors regarding 
protests, public opinion and authorities might be considered separately without a 
continuum or correspondence existing between them.  
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2.6. General discussion 
 
The contribution of the studies reported in this paper to the fields of collective action and 
social movement studies is two-fold. First, theoretically, this paper contributes the 
subjective or psychological counterpart to the social structural affordances regarded as 
key predictors of social movement activity by Political Opportunities Structures theorists. 
In the last 20 years, social movement theories have moved to an increased recognition of 
the role of the subjective and psychological points of view (e.g., Honari, 2017, 2018a; 
Jaspers, 2017; Kurzman, 1996; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013; van 
Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2018). The present work is part of this development, and 
as such it builds a bridge between sociological social movements approaches and 
psychological collective action approaches (see Simon & Klandermans, 2001; van 
Zomeren, 2016).  
 
The second contribution is practical, as this study has served to produce an instrument 
that can be used by different researchers and which we believe will enhance future 
empirical work on social movements and collective action. Instead of having to elaborate 
ad hoc measures for the subjective perception of political conditions in relation to 
protests, future researchers can draw upon a validated measurement scale: the SPO. In 
terms of their practical use and in consideration of its multidimensionality, we 
recommend that those who want to use the current version of the scale (SPO-R) should 
incorporate the eight items (i.e., four for each dimension) we reported in this paper into 
their questionnaires to obtain and interpret the scores accurately.  
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Researchers can use any version of our scale to measure the legitimacy of protests because 
this construct does not belong to SPO-R. We think a possible explanation for the latter 
might be that people consider the opinion of authorities and other citizens at different 
levels of analysis and importance. This is in line with Rucht’s (2004) conceptualization 
about social movements’ groups of reference, where in spite of being part of the same 
political context, the politico-administrative system and general public appear as different 
players that can establish unique and particular relations with social movements. 
Certainly, the clarification of the role of public opinion in the evaluation of political 
conditions is a relevant topic that should be considered in further research. 
 
Finally, we want to highlight three main points that future research should address to 
develop the current version of SPO and extend its scope. First, despite SPO’s 
contributions to the field of collective action, it is essentially limited to the perceptions of 
actors that are usually directly exposed to public scrutiny (the government and police). 
Due to this, new research should make efforts to incorporate perceptions of other actors 
are not so visible to public opinion (e.g., law or courts of justice) but still might impact 
people’s evaluation of their political context. Second, as discussed above, we think 
different versions of the SPO scale need to be developed according the dimension of 
‘openness’ researchers want to assess. Specifically, we called our version SPO-R because 
our items specifically address the (lack of) repression against protesters, instead of the 
mere authorization (SPO-C, consent) or the active facilitation of protests by authorities 
(SPO-F, facilitation). Last but not least, new studies should provide more evidence for 
the external phase of construct validation (see Flake et al., 2017). This means researchers 
need to test if SPO-R and its dimensions are capable of predicting relevant attitudes (e.g., 
willingness to take part in protests) or (actual) behaviours in relation to collective action. 
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Furthermore, future research should explore the convergent/divergent validity between 
SPO-R’s dimensions and other constructs that have been used in recent literature to assess 
the political context where protests take place, such as perceived political cynicism, 
external efficacy, and political trust (see Lee 2010; Lee & Chan, 2018; Sabucedo et al., 
2017; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2018).  
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Chapter 3 
Support for protesters’ violence against the police: The role of public opinion and 
perceived restrictions on protests  
 
 
Cite as: 
Saavedra, P., Drury, J., & Easterbrook, M. (2019). Support for protesters’ violence 
against the police: The role of public opinion and perceived restrictions on protests. 
Manuscript in preparation. 
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3.1 Abstract 
 
Examination of non-participants’ reasons for supporting protest violence against the 
police has been neglected in the literature. We carried out survey (Study 1; n UK = 377, n 
Chile = 309) and experiments (Study 2; n UK = 141, n Chile = 262) in the UK and Chile 
showing that people are more willing to support protesters’ violence against police when 
they perceive that the government and police try to restrict the presence of protests. In 
addition, Britons also consider the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to 
protests in their endorsement of protest violence. These findings highlight the importance 
of non-participants in the legitimisation of protesters’ actions. The inclusion of both the 
perceived restrictions imposed on protests and the legitimacy given by public opinion to 
protests represents a significant advance in the psychological study of collective action.  
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3.2 Introduction 
 
Why might non-participants support protesters’ violence against the police? Since the 
psychological literature has turned its attention to collective action, most studies have 
concentrated on describing the roles of social identity, collective efficacy, group-based 
anger and moral convictions on the intentions, or actual behaviour related to collective 
action (see Drury & Reicher, 2000; Morgan & Chan, 2016; Tausch & Becker, 2013; van 
Zomeren, 2013, van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012; van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, 
& Bettache, 2011). However, researchers have neglected the reasons non-participants 
might support the use of physical violence during protests (cf. Bohler-Muller et al., 2017; 
Gerber et al., 2018; Saab et al., 2016; Thomas & Louis, 2014). Exploring non-
participants’ reasons to support protest violence, and in particular violence against police, 
is an essential issue if we consider episodes where protesters have used violence with 
different levels of support from public opinion, such as the 2010 student protests in the 
UK (Lewis, et al., 2010), the anti-Trump protests in the US (Ellis & Marco, 2017), anti-
government demonstrations in Venezuela in 2017 (e.g., “Venezuela crisis”, 2017), and 
the recent protests carried out by indigenous people in Chile (e.g., “Chile activists burn 
bus”, 2017). Thus, the importance of the present study is rooted in the identification of 
those social-psychological factors that may help to explain non-participants’ support for 
protest violence against the police.  
 
Although previous research has argued that implicit theories about social change (see 
Shuman et al., 2016), group-based anger (see Tausch et al., 2011), and system-justifying 
beliefs (see Jost et al., 2012) might be antecedents of willingness to carry out different 
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actions during protests, most of these studies have classified protest violence as 
illegitimate (i.e., non-normative actions) by default. Conversely, in the present study, 
rather than using a priori normative criteria we consider protest violence as a subset of 
collective action which can gain legitimacy depending on people’s perceptions of 
authorities’ restrictions to the right to protest and public opinion. 
 
3.2.1 What leads to the use of violence during protests?  
In a speech in 1967, Martin Luther King Jr argued that riots were the language of the 
unheard (i.e., those who had been ignored by society) and the only way to prevent 
violence during protests was the implementation of social justice on behalf of African-
Americans in the US (Veterans of the Civil Right Movement, n.d.). Although King did 
not explicitly support the use of violence to reach the goals of his movement, he offered 
a potential explanation for why African-American people used violence, based on the 
illegitimacy of group inequalities. This argument is in line with social identity theory 
(SIT) regarding those social structural conditions are necessary for collective action 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In addition, other scholars have also suggested that feelings of 
contempt (see Becker, Tausch, & Wagner, 2011; Tausch & Becker, 2013; Tausch et al., 
2011), relative deprivation caused by injustices and inequalities (see Kawakami & Dion, 
1995), identification with their own group (see Hogg, Meehan, & Farquharson, 2010; 
Jiménez-Moya, Spears, Rodríguez-Bailón, & de Lemus, 2015), the perceived inefficacy 
of alternative action paths to reach social change (Wright et al., 1990), and the lack of 
control to change unfavourable conditions (see Wright & Tropp, 2002, for a review) are 
factors that people may consider to carry out violent actions during protests.  
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From a different point of view, the elaborated social identity model (ESIM; Drury & 
Reicher, 2000; Stott & Drury, 2000, 2017) suggests that the interaction between protesters 
and the police is a critical factor that can legitimise protest violence (Stott & Drury, 2000; 
Stott et al., 2018; Stott, Drury, & Reicher, 2016). The latter is particularly relevant for 
those who initially were not willing to be involved in violent actions but who came to 
both defend themselves against perceived police violence, and to punish police officers 
for their illegitimate actions against protesters (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2018; Maguire, 
Barak, Cross, & Lugo, 2018). Hence, coming back to our historical example and 
following ESIM, it could be argued that the structural injustices they were suffering and 
the quality of police-protesters interactions might partially explain African-Americans 
legitimisation of violence during the 60s.  
 
Despite the fact the arguments presented above offer a plausible explanation for the 
legitimisation of protest violence, they are limited to actual protesters’ behaviour and do 
not address either non-participants’ reactions to the occurrence of violence during protests 
nor the reasons to support violent actions against the police. Therefore, the question now 
is when do non-participants support protest violence - and in particular, violence against 
the police? This question is crucial considering that to achieve desired social change, 
protesters need to seek out support from broader society for their specific demands and 
the actions they carry out on the streets (e.g., Selvanathan & Lickel, 2019b; Teixeira, 
Spears, & Yzerbyt, 2019). To answer it, we suggest that two factors should be considered: 
features of the political context and public opinion. 
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3.2.2 Features of the political context and protesters’ violence 
Political opportunities approach (Kriesi, 2004; McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1994) has 
established that the tolerance (i.e., openness) of the political system to the presence of 
social movements is decisive to understand people’s participation and support for protests 
(e.g., Brockett, 1991; Eisinger, 1973). However, one of the main shortcomings of this 
approach is its failure to explain which type of actions people are willing to perform and 
support during protests (see Meyer & Minkoff, 2004, for a discussion). In an attempt to 
solve this issue, Goldstone and Tilly (2001) propose that political opportunities should be 
considered along with two factors: levels of repression (see Della Porta, 1995; Della Porta 
& Fillieule, 2004; Opp & Roehl, 1990; Tilly, 1978) and the type of regime that people 
need to confront (e.g., democratic or authoritarian). Thus, people might support violence 
when they are under an authoritarian regime characterised by a low acceptance of protests 
and high degrees of repression (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001). In addition to this, Tilly (2008) 
suggests that the actions people might carry out and support during mobilisation processes 
cannot merely be explained by the immediate context (i.e., political opportunities and 
repression) because each society would manage a limited range of actions which may be 
performed during mobilisations processes (e.g., protests). These actions would rely on 
past interactions between actors (e.g., protesters and police officers) and the relationship 
between these actors and broader structures of power (e.g., political system) in a specific 
historical setting. As we will show, this is a central idea to interpret and understand 
differences between countries concerning the type of protest actions people may (or may 
not) support. In line with this, we agree with Tilly’s (2008, p. 41) statement on those who 
conduct transnational comparisons: “analysts of political phenomena should not be 
searching for broad transnational empirical generalisations but for the causal mechanisms 
100 
 
and processes that in different combinations, sequences, and initial conditions produce 
political variation and change”. 
 
Although sociologists have produced a considerable literature on the role of political 
contextual features in the dynamics of social movements, an integration of these features 
in the psychological analysis of collective action is still lacking (van Zomeren, 2016, for 
a discussion). To put it differently, while psychological research has explored the role of 
some contextual features regarding protests as the perceptions of risk (Ayanian & Tausch, 
2016), trust in the political system (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2018), and 
presence of corruption (Thomas & Louis, 2014), just a few works have examined the 
relevance of people’s perceptions of the measures taken by the police (e.g., Radburn et 
al., 2018) and governmental officials regarding protests (see Drury et al., 2012). 
 
To tackle the issue mentioned above, Saavedra and Drury (2019b) suggest a novel 
construct (subjective political openness, SPO) and a scale of measurement aimed at 
evaluating the perceived political context regarding protests based on authorities’ 
behaviours (SPO-Repression, or SPO-R). Embedded with a broader move seeking that 
social movements research pay more attention to people’s response (micro-level of 
analysis) to the macro-level conditions (i.e., structural conditions) in relation to 
mobilization processes (see Earl, 2011, for a review; see also Honari, 2017, 2018a), SPO-
R is a psychological tool aimed at measuring people’s perceptions of government 
openness/restrictions and police repression. It is noteworthy that SPO-R was validated in 
the UK and Chile as a bifactor model comprising a general factor (subjective political 
openness regarding protests) and the two dimensions mentioned above.  
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3.2.3 The role of non-participants and public opinion 
Apart from the features of the political context, sociological research has pointed out that 
non-participants are fundamental to understand the dynamics of social movements. This 
is because non-participants are part of the reference groups that movements have to 
interact with to create alliances and links of cooperation to reach social changes 
(Neidhardt & Rucht, 1991; Rucht, 2004). Moreover, psychological research has 
demonstrated that no-participants can play a crucial role in collective action by potentially 
becoming protesters (Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung, 2015; Subašic et al., 2008), 
validating different tactics (see Gerber et al., 2018; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2015; Saab et 
al., 2016; Thomas & Louis, 2014), or giving legitimacy to protests (see Jiménez-Moya et 
al., 2019). Thus, non-participants could become a source of legitimacy for the actions 
carried out by protesters. The African-American Civil Rights Movement is an excellent 
example considering that it received support from diverse communities and groups which 
were not directly affected by racial discrimination (e.g., white communities and civil 
society groups) (Andrews, Beyerlein, & Tuker Farnum, 2015; McAdam, 1982).  
     
Despite the fact that legitimacy has been shown to be an essential factor in the 
development of protests, hitherto research has equated the perception of protests as a 
legitimate political act with own opinions (e.g., Chayinska et al., 2017; Jiménez-Moya et 
al., 2019) and attitudes towards protesters’ actions (e.g., Sweetman et al., 2019). 
Consequently, we suggest these approaches should be complemented with a perspective 
that acknowledges the construction of legitimacy around protests at a collective level (i.e., 
given by other non-participants). This collective construction might be based on both the 
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legitimacy given by convention to protests in democratic regimes and meta-perceptions 
(i.e., perceptions of other people’s perceptions) about this convention. Regarding meta-
perceptions, we suggest their normative component that refers to knowledge of other 
people’s impressions about ourselves or our group (Carlson & Barranti, 2016; West, 
2016) might be expanded to include other people’s thoughts about protests in a specific 
context. Although based on a normative component, we need to clarify there is a 
distinction between our understanding of meta-perceptions and the well-known concept 
of injunctive norms (see Cialdini, Kallgreen, & Reno, 2003, for a review). While the latter 
refers to the perceived acceptance/rejection of specific behaviours by others (e.g., 
participation in protests), the former concept addresses how people perceive the opinion 
or the position of others in relation to a specific phenomenon (e.g., protests as acts of 
worth in a democracy) at different levels of analysis (i.e., country, community, 
interpersonal; e.g., Swim, Geiger, & Lengieza, 2019).  
 
Following the above distinction, the use of meta-perceptions could help us to understand 
two issues related to the role of non-participants in collective action. First, meta-
perceptions could help to get a better understanding of the relationship between 
legitimacy, collective action, and social change that so far has been mainly restricted to 
the nature of intergroup conflicts (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and people’s motives to 
defend the status quo (Jost, Becker, Osborne, & Badaan, 2017; Jost et. al., 2012). Second, 
perceptions of other people’s thoughts (public opinion) could be considered as a source 
of legitimisation of protests as well as of the (violent) actions carried out by protesters. 
This means that the legitimacy of protests might depend upon a collective construction 
(public opinion), allowing us to extend ESIM taking into account that normative change 
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in protests (e.g., the legitimisation of violent actions employed by protesters) might be 
endorsed by people not directly involved in them (i.e., non-participants).  
 
Moreover, an unexplored issue in the literature is the potential relationship between the 
two factors mentioned above, the perceived features of the political context related to 
authorities’ measures and collective legitimisation of protests. To put it differently, we 
still do not know if people’s perceptions of authorities’ restrictions imposed on protests 
have any impact on the extent to which people perceive that others (de) legitimise protests 
in a specific time and place. 
 
3.3 The current research 
 
The aim of the present research is threefold. First, test the impact of the perceived 
restrictions on protests on non-participants’ support for protest violence against the 
police. Second, explore if these perceived restrictions on protests affect how people 
perceive that public opinion legitimises protests. Third, examine the influence of 
perceived legitimacy of protests on non-participants’ support for protesters’ violence 
against the police.  
 
For the two studies reported in this paper, we compared samples from the UK and Chile. 
Whereas Study 1 is a cross-sectional study where the Subjective Political Openness 
Repression (SPO-R) scale was employed to measure the perceived restrictions regarding 
protests, Study 2 is an experiment where the objective political scenario in which a 
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hypothetical protest took place was manipulated. It is worth mentioning that we selected 
the UK and Chile considering their long tradition of protests and divergent styles of 
protest policing. In line with Tilly’s (2008) idea about transnational comparisons, before 
going through our studies, we offer a concise overview of the current political situation 
of both countries; their policing protests; the occurrence of protest violence; and the 
relationship between protesters and authorities. 
 
Regarding the UK, like in other western advanced democracies, (peaceful) protests have 
become routinised activities and considered as an intrinsic part of the democratic system 
through which different groups can freely express their concerns and complaints. In line 
with this, protest violence, as well as the deployment of riot police officers, are relatively 
rare on British soil (see Reiner, 1998). Indeed, in some areas, police officers have received 
specialised training (Police Liaison Officers) to promote dialogue with protesters (see 
Gorringe et al., 2012, for an overview). In contrast to this sometimes called friendly 
approach to policing protests (see Della Porta et al., 1998 for a discussion), Chilean 
authorities have maintained a coercive approach based on the use of riot police (e.g., 
“Chile: Clashes erupt”, 2018) and paramilitary forces to manage public order (e.g., 
Bonnefoy, 2018). As a consequence, Chilean police (Carabineros) have been 
internationally condemned in successive years due to their systematic abuse of power and 
brutality against protesters (e.g., Human Rights Watch, 2017). Thus, and unlike the UK, 
protesters’ clashes with Carabineros may be considered as a commonplace of the Chilean 
political scene.  
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Moreover, to compare protests and protesters’ violence in both countries, two important 
phenomena should also be taken into account. First, while the UK has kept a stable 
democracy, Chile went through a transition process (from a dictatorship to democracy) 
that lasted until the early 2000s. During that period, Chileans put aside their right to 
protest to no jeopardise the stability of the new democracy, favouring a system mainly 
led by professional politicians and technocrats (see Hipsher, 1998). In practical terms, 
this meant that protests were despised until a few years ago when people started to come 
onto the streets and protest on behalf of different causes (see Garretón et al., 2017, for a 
review). Furthermore, according to Cummings (2015), the latter might imply that older 
generations (those who suffered repression during the dictatorship and those who were 
young during the first democratic government) could have a less favourable view of 
protests in comparison to those who were born into democracy and do not have to fear 
for the same constraints than their parents and grandparents. Second, the relationship 
between police forces and political authorities are far from being similar between these 
two countries. While the Carabineros is a militarised force organised at a national level 
under the direct subordination to the Minister of Interior, British police forces are 
relatively autonomous from the government and organised by jurisdictional areas. A 
direct consequence of this might be the lack of accountability of Carabineros’ actions 
during protests due to the strong support they have continuously received from political 
authorities (see Fuentes, 2006, for a discussion).   
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3.4 Study 1 
 
The main hypotheses for this study are summarised in the theoretical model presented 
below (see Figure 3.1), and can be stated as follows: the more non-participants perceive 
their political context as restricted to protests, the more willing they will be to support 
protesters’ violence against the police (H1). Considering that previous research has not 
examined the relationship between perceived restrictions and perceived legitimacy given 
by public opinion to protests, we propose two ad-hoc hypotheses for it. On the one hand, 
the resistance hypothesis would suggest there is no continuity between perceived 
authorities’ restrictions and public opinion legitimation of protests. The latter means that 
non-participants think that public opinion supports protests as a reaction against imposed 
restrictions. Accordingly, the more the authorities try to hinder protesters’ activities, the 
more non-participants think that public opinion legitimises protests (H2). 
 
On the other hand, we propose the alignment hypothesis. This hypothesis would assume 
the existence of a potential continuity between non-participants’ perceptions of 
authorities’ restrictions and public opinion’s legitimisation of protests. In other words, 
non-participants would perceive that public opinion gives less legitimacy to protests the 
more restrictions authorities implement, and vice versa (H3).  
 
Concerning the relationship between the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion 
and support for protest violence, we suggest that the more legitimacy public opinion gives 
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to protests, the more likely non-participants are to support protesters’ violence against 
police (H4). Moreover, considering that SPO-R scale has two components in a bifactor 
model configuration (perceived repression and government restrictions), we can propose 
specific hypotheses for each of them. First, because repression always represents a threat 
to protests, we expect that perceived repression will be directly related to non-
participants’ support for protesters’ violence (H5). Second, we will explore whether the 
relationship between perceived repression and perceived legitimacy given by public 
opinion to protests is coherent with either the resistance or alignment hypotheses (H6). 
Third, due to the less visible role of the government (compared to the police) in the 
handling of protests, we propose that non-participants’ perceptions about government 
behaviour regarding collective action might have no direct effect on their support for 
protest violence against the police. Alternatively, we put forward that perceptions of 
government actions might have an indirect effect on the support for protesters’ violence 
against the police via its influence on the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to 
protests (H7).  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Theoretical model of Study 1. 
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3.4.1 Method 
Procedure and participants. Ethical approvals for this study were obtained from 
the Cross Schools Research Ethics Committee of the University of Sussex in the UK, and 
from the Comité Ético Científico en Ciencias Sociales, Artes, y Humanidades of the 
Pontificia Universidad Católica in Chile. Participants in the UK were randomly recruited 
through Prolific, a platform that hosted an online version of the questionnaire, while in 
Chile a research assistant carried out face-to-face recruitment using information about the 
socioeconomic status and gender on Santiago de Chile population as a proxy for a quota 
sample.  
 
The sample size from each country was calculated using a Monte Carlo simulation based 
on the results from a validation study of the SPO-R scale (see Saavedra & Drury, 2019b). 
The analysis suggested that 300 observations are required to use structural equation 
modeling (SEM), including a bifactor model with two dimensions. Thus, 377 British 
people (59.69% Female; Age: M = 34.82, SD = 11.89), and 310 Chileans (64.72% 
Female; Age: M = 27.33, SD = 11.06) with different rates of participation in the 12 months 
prior to data collection (British people: 10.61%; Chileans: 54.84 %) took part in this 
study. 
 
Measures. A questionnaire developed in English was translated and back-
translated to and from Spanish to get comparable instruments in both countries.   
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The items associated with each SPO-R dimension were included in the questionnaire. 
Thus, participants read the following stem ‘thinking about the current government of your 
country, please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below’ before 
responding on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) 
to four items related to government restrictions (e.g., ‘the government restricts political 
expressions involving participation in protests’). The stem ‘thinking about the protests 
and demonstrations that are carried out in the streets of the UK (Chile), please indicate 
how common are the following situations’ preceded the four items to measure perceived 
repression (e.g., ‘the police use indiscriminate violence against the protesters’) based on 
a frequency scale (1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = always) (see all the 
items in Appendix 7). 
 
We also included three items developed and validated by Saavedra and Drury (2019b) as 
measures of the perceived legitimacy given by others to protests (meta-perceptions) at 
country level (public opinion). Thus, participants read ‘taking into account what people 
of your country think about the presence of social movements and protests, please indicate 
how typical the following statements are of public opinion’ as a stem before to each 
statement (e.g., ‘people of my country think that participating in protests is a valid 
political action’) on a typicality scale (1= very untypical to 5 = very typical). 
 
Regarding support for protest violence against the police, we created four items depicting 
police transgressions during protests for this study (e.g., ‘when police officers arrest 
demonstrators without giving any explanation’). These items were preceded by the 
following stem ‘when is the use of physical violence by protesters justified?’ and 
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measured using a frequency scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (always) (see all the items 
in Appendix 7).  
 
Finally, we included one item to measure people’s identification with their current 
government (e.g., ‘how represented do you feel by the British/Chilean government?’), as 
well as sociodemographic measures like gender, age, and total income (all considered as 
control variables in the analyses). 
 
Analysis. We used MPLUS 7.11 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012) to analyse both 
samples. In a first step, we evaluated the latent structure of each construct mentioned 
above and the SPO-R configuration as a bifactor model. To facilitate the interpretation of 
SPO-R in our models as restrictions on protests we decided to keep the (negative) valence 
Saavedra and Drury gave to their original items. In addition, considering that the original 
items for government openness refer to government actions to hinder protests, we 
relabelled this dimension as government restrictions. Thus, high scores in SPO-R mean 
participants perceive more restrictions on protests from authorities (the government and 
the police) in their respective countries.  
 
In a second step, we calculated the internal reliability of the scales included in this study 
through the Omega (ω) coefficient. We selected this indicator for two reasons. First, 
unlike Cronbach’s alpha, ω does not assume either the tau-equivalence or 
unidimensionality of constructs (Dunn et al., 2014). Second, the use of ω is highly 
recommended to measure the reliability of multidimensional constructs assuming that a 
scale could be part of a more complex structure (e.g., bifactor model) and its reliability 
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can be disaggregated after controlling for the general factor (see Gignac, 2014; Reise, 
Bonifay, & Haviland, 2013).  
 
In a third step, we demonstrated that in both samples perceived legitimacy of protests, 
support for protesters’ violence against the police, and SPO-R (configured as a bifactor 
model with two sub-dimensions) were independent factors. Subsequently, structural 
equation modeling (SEM) using Maximum Likelihood Robust (MLR) as estimator was 
conducted to test the theoretical model (see Figure 3.1). In addition, we used multi-group 
analysis and Wald Test to check the differences between Chilean and British samples.  
 
In a fourth step, we took advantage of the similar proportion of Chileans with (54.86%) 
and without (45.14%) previous experience in protest to run a multi-group analysis and 
test whether the relations included in our theoretical model were affected by previous 
participation in protests.        
 
3.4.2 Results 
The analyses conducted to calculate the reliability of the scales demonstrated that all of 
them reached acceptable levels of internal consistency (> .70) in both samples; see Table 
3.1.  
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Table 3.1. Reliability of the scales using coefficients Omega (ω).  
Variables     
 
UK    Chile 
1. SPO-R .92 .91 
2. Government restrictions .89 .85 
3. Perceived repression .86 .92 
4. Perceived legitimacy of protests .86 .79 
5. Support for protesters’ violence .89 .92 
 
On the question of the independence of the latent factors, we demonstrated that the 
proposed model (three independent factors, one of them in a bifactor configuration) fit 
the data well in both the British (χ2 (76) = 82.05, p = .297; RMSEA = .01; 90% CI [0.00, 
0.03]; SRMR = .02; CFI = .99) and Chilean samples (χ2 (76) = 110.91, p = .005; RMSEA 
= .03; 90% CI [0.02, 0.05]); SRMR = .03; CFI = .98).  
  
Regarding the structural equation modelling, the proposed theoretical model fitted well 
to the data from the UK (χ2 (130) = 210.00, p < .001; RMSEA = .04; 90% CI [0.03, 0.05]; 
SRMR = .07; CFI = .96) and Chile (χ2 (130) = 219.68, p < .001; RMSEA = .04; 90% CI 
[0.03, 0.05]; SRMR = .07; CFI = .96), explaining 15.3% and 16.5% of the variance of 
support for protesters’ violence against the police respectively. The correlations between 
all variables included in the model are reported in Table 3.2. 
 
113 
 
Table 3.2. Correlations among the variables included in the model. Coefficients between SPO 
and its dimensions are equal to zero due to the specifications associated with bifactor models. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
British sample (N = 377) 
     
1. SPO-R       1.00 
    
2. Government restrictions .00   1.00 
   
3. Perceived repression .00     .00    1.00 
  
4. P. Legitimacy of protests      -.42***     .21     .30** 1.00 
 
5. Support for protesters’ violence     .27**    -.01 .03 -.01    1.00 
6. Identification with the government       -.36*** .00 .00  .04   .03 
7. Gender .02 .00 .00 .00     .12* 
8. Age    -.16** .00 .00     .19**    -.09† 
9. Income -.01 .00 .00 .01   -.02 
Chilean sample (N = 310) 
     
1. SPO-R       1.00 
    
2. Government restrictions .00    1.00 
   
3. Perceived repression .00 .00   1.00 
  
4. P. Legitimacy of protests        -.06  -.24†    -.16†   1.00 
 
5. Support for protesters’ violence       .32*** .00 .13†    -.11†    1.00 
6. Identification with the government       -.24*** .00 .00     .04     -.09 
7. Gender -.13 .00 .00  -.25***     .14* 
8. Age -.10 .00 .00     .10   .00 
9. Income -.12 .00 .00    -.03     -.09 
Note: Significance of coefficients is indicated †p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
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The results supported H1 demonstrating that in both samples, non-participants’ support 
for protesters’ violence against the police was positively predicted by a political context 
perceived as more restricted to protests. With respect to the relationship between 
perceived political context and legitimacy given by public opinion to protests, our 
evidence provided support for the alignment hypothesis (H3) and not for the resistance 
hypothesis (H2). This suggests that both British and Chilean people may perceive that 
public opinion’s legitimisation of protest depends on the extent that authorities restrict 
the presence of protests on the streets (see Figure 3.2). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Results of the SEM for both samples. The model was controlled by identification with 
the government, gender, age, and total income. Regression coefficients are the unstandardized 
estimates. Significance of coefficients is indicated †p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
Moreover, we found differences by country regarding the role of the perceived legitimacy 
given to protest on the support for the use of violence against police officers (H4). 
Whereas British participants supported protesters’ violence the more they perceived 
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public opinion legitimates protests, the same relation was non-significant for Chileans 
(Wald χ2 (1) = 2.76, p = .096). In a posteriori analysis, we confirmed there were no 
indirect effects of the perceived political context on support for protesters’ violence via 
the perceived legitimacy given to protests by public opinion in the British sample (point 
estimate: -.04, SE = .02, p = .113).   
 
In the case of the hypotheses related to SPO-R dimensions, we obtained different results 
by country. On the one hand, perceived repression was directly related to more support 
for protesters’ violence against police officers for Chileans but not for British participants 
(H5). Nevertheless, these results must be interpreted with caution because the difference 
between the regression coefficients obtained in each country was not statistically 
significant (Wald χ2 (1) = 4.73, p = .491). On the other hand, only British participants 
perceived that levels of repression against the protesters might be positively associated 
with a greater legitimacy given by public opinion to protests (Wald χ2 (1) = 4.57, p = .032) 
(H6). This an interesting result considering that in the specific case of the police 
transgression, British participants provided support for the resistance rather than for the 
alignment hypothesis when they evaluated authority’s behaviour in general. However, 
even though this last result might also suggest perceived repression has an indirect effect 
on support for protesters’ violence against the police via perceived legitimacy of protests, 
we found that the indirect effects were non-significant (point estimate: .026, SE = .018, p 
= .146).    
 
With respect to the relationship between government restrictions and the perceived 
legitimacy given to protests by public opinion (H7), we found no correlation between 
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these two variables in any sample. Therefore, the described path was not calculated in the 
final model reported in this section. 
 
Finally, through a multi-group analysis, we found that our model works equally for those 
Chileans who had participated in protests and those who not (χ2 (276) = 401.29, p < .001; 
RMSEA = .05; 90% CI [0.04, 0.06]; SRMR = .07; CFI = .94). The latter suggests that 
Chileans’ support for protesters’ violence against the police may depend on their 
perceptions of the restrictions imposed on protests regardless of their previous experience 
attending demonstrations. 
 
3.4.3 Discussion  
Our results are consistent with the idea that non-participants’ perceptions of authorities’ 
restrictions on protests might have a direct impact on their support for protest violence 
against the police. In addition, the results showed that people’s perceptions of public 
opinion legitimisation of protests depend on the perceived restrictions authorities impose 
on protests. Thus, we suggest that people may see a continuity (alignment hypothesis) 
between how restricted is the scenario and the legitimacy given by other people to 
protests. Interestingly, this continuity collapses when British people evaluate police 
behaviour separately. In particular, British people may tend to perceive that public 
opinion gives more legitimacy to protest, the more the police repress protesters (the 
resistance hypothesis). Undoubtedly, further evidence is required to clarify these 
differences.  
 
117 
 
Taking into account the different results obtained in each sample, another point that needs 
clarification is the link between the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to 
protests and support for protesters’ violence against the police. We might speculate that 
these differences can be attributed to the specific historical processes people in each 
country have gone through. Thus, it is plausible that Chileans do not relate public opinion 
legitimisation of protests to support protesters’ actions because protests came back to the 
Chilean political scene as legitimate actions only a few years ago. Moreover, it seems the 
high levels of police brutality against protesters have been reflected in how Chileans 
might increase their support for protesters’ violence when they perceive police repression 
during protests. In contrast, for Britons, public opinion legitimation of protests may act 
as an important factor to take into account before supporting protest violence against the 
police.  
 
Overall, our results suggest that non-participants consider authorities’ restrictions and 
public opinion to evaluate the political context where protests take place and support 
protest violence against police. In order to overcome the limitations of a cross-sectional 
study, we designed an experiment (Study 2) in which authorities’ measures regarding 
protests (i.e., restrictions and facilitation) were manipulated. As in Study 1, similar 
procedures were carried out in samples from the UK and Chile to allow comparability, 
while we included the same constructs reported in the models above to maintain 
coherence between studies.    
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3.5 Study 2 
 
The second study was an experiment aimed at examining non-participants’ support for 
protesters’ violence against the police in different political scenarios. For this, the 
objective conditions of a political scenario were manipulated using vignettes in which the 
authorities (government and police) restricted or facilitated a bogus student protest.  
 
The general design of this study combined the ideas developed in the political 
opportunities perspective about the role of objective (i.e., external to the individuals) 
political conditions on the occurrence of protests (McAdam, 1996; Tarrow, 1994; Tilly, 
1978) with a subjective approach embedded within the concept of subjective political 
openness (SPO) (see Saavedra & Drury, 2019b). With this, we wanted to compare 
whether people’s perceptions of the conditions they must confront could be as important 
as the objective conditions themselves. 
 
On the one hand, the main hypotheses relating to the objective political conditions are the 
following: when people are exposed to favourable political conditions for protests people 
would perceive their political context as less restrictive, while the opposite would happen 
under a restrictive political context (H1). Based on the results of Study 1 concerning the 
alignment hypothesis, we also expect that the perceived legitimacy given by public 
opinion to protests would have a close relationship with the objective conditions people 
have to face. Thus, people would perceive that public opinion grants less legitimacy to 
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protests when authorities implement restrictions on protests in comparison to scenarios 
where authorities do not implement such restrictions (H2). At the same time, we expect 
that a restricted objective scenario would lead people to increase their support for protest 
violence against the police (H3). 
 
On the other hand, in order to corroborate our previous results, we tested similar 
hypotheses as those tested in Study 1. Thus, we expect that the more the people perceive 
their political context as restrictive to protests, the more willing people might be to 
support protesters’ violence against the police (H4). In line with the alignment hypothesis 
supported in Study 1, we expect that, in a political context perceived as more restrictive, 
people might perceive that public opinion grants less legitimacy to protests (H5); and the 
perceived legitimation of protests by others might correlate with greater support for 
protesters’ violence against the police (H6). 
 
Moreover, we propose the objective political context (experimental conditions) might 
have an effect on support for protesters’ violence against the police via the subjective 
perceptions about those conditions (H7) and the perceived legitimacy given by public 
opinion to protests (H8).  
 
3.5.1 Method 
Participants. Ethical approvals for this study were obtained from the Cross 
Schools Research Ethics Committee of the University of Sussex in the UK, and from the 
Comité Ético Científico en Ciencias Sociales, Artes, y Humanidades of the Pontificia 
Universidad Católica in Chile. To calculate the sample size in each country, we followed 
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Boone’s (2012) recommendation of around 200 participants to get a minimum statistical 
power (.80) in a model with multiple mediators. Thus, the overall sample comprised 141 
undergraduates from a British university (75.17% Female; Age: M = 19.22, SD = 2.35), 
and 262 students from a Chilean university (60.68% Female; Age: M = 21.06, SD = 2.35). 
Regarding their previous experience in protests/demonstrations, British (12.1%) and 
Chilean (49.2%) participants for this study reported a similar rate of participation than 
those who took part in Study 1.  
 
Design and procedure. Participants in both countries filled in an online 
questionnaire after being invited during teaching events by a research assistant (Chile), 
or through an online platform in the UK. In each country, after answering demographics 
items and general questions about protests and politics, all participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the experimental conditions (control, facilitated, and restricted). 
 
In each condition, participants read a fictional news article announcing a student protest 
about government plans to increase university tuition fees. In the control condition, 
participants read a neutral article stating that a student protest would take place in the 
following days, while in the manipulations we added a description of the reactions of 
government and police authorities to this announcement. Hence, in the facilitated 
condition, the article described authorities accepting the protest as part of a democratic 
system, while they announced that the police would facilitate the protest by implementing 
traffic diversions wearing their traditional uniforms. By contrast, in the restricted 
condition, the authorities were against any public demonstration about the new university 
fees. Thus, in the article, authorities consider the student protest as a threat to public order 
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and the stability of the country. Also, authorities declare the riot police would be in the 
streets to conduct more stop and search procedures, as well as to use baton rounds and 
horses in case any protest took place (see all the vignettes in Appendix 8).   
 
After reading the article, participants filled in the second part of the questionnaire, which 
included all the dependent variables of this study. 
 
Measures. We included two items as manipulation checks: ‘according to the 
article, to what extent did the authorities try to prevent the protest from taking place?’ and 
‘according to the article, to what extent do police cooperate with the development of the 
protest?’ Both manipulations were assessed using a scale ranging from 1 (none) to 5 (a 
lot).   
 
To measure the perceived political context using the SPO-R scale, we included the same 
four items of government restrictions (ω the UK = .92; ω Chile = .95) and perceived 
repression (ω the UK = .93; ω Chile = .94) used in Study 1, adapting the anchor of these 
items to the scenario presented in the news articles (see Appendix 8). 
 
We used three items (two from Study 1 and one new) to measure perceived legitimacy of 
protests (ω the UK = .82; ω Chile = .86), and four items (three items from Study 1 and 
one new) to measure support for protesters’ violence against the police (ω the UK = .95; 
ω Chile = .96). We also included the same item as used in Study 1 to measure 
identification with the government (see all the items in the Appendix 8).   
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Analysis. We employed Rstudio for the descriptive statistics, to calculate the 
reliability of the scales, and for running multiple regressions in each dataset. Besides, we 
used Mplus implementing bootstrapping with 10,000 re-samples and 95% bias-corrected 
confidence intervals to test our hypotheses. 
 
In the first step of the analyses, we checked that the manipulations worked as expected. 
In a second step, we calculated the descriptive statistics (see Table 3.3) and the internal 
reliability of each scale using an Omega coefficient as in Study 1, although this time 
composites of the included variables were used instead of latent factors. We decided to 
use composites mainly because 500 observations is the minimum sample size required to 
use a bifactor model as a mediator and detect unbiased mediated effects (Gonzalez & 
MacKinnon, 2018). Therefore, taking into account our actual sample size, we calculated 
SPO-R scores as an average of the composites associated with government restrictions 
and perceived repression.  
 
In a third step, we used path analysis (in Mplus) to test our hypotheses. As the focus of 
these analyses was to compare the effects of the contextual conditions on support for 
protesters’ violence, we created two new dummy variables using the control condition as 
reference category to interpret the main results of our experiment. In addition, we used 
the joint test of significance (see Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007, for a review) along with 
bootstrapping to calculate the indirect effects (from simple and serial mediations) of our 
proposed model.   
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In a fourth step, in the context of a multi-group analysis, we conducted a Wald Test (using 
ML as estimator) to check differences in paths coefficients between both samples. Based 
on the results in Study 1, we paid particular attention to the effect of the perceived 
legitimacy of protests on support for protesters’ violence against the police. 
 
3.5.2 Results 
Manipulation checks. We tested the effects of the manipulations using ANOVAs 
for each sample. We found a main effect of the manipulations on people’s perceptions 
that the authorities would try to prevent the protests in both British, F(2, 138) = 29.89, p 
< .001, η2 = .30, and Chilean samples F(2, 259) = 115.80, p < .001, η2 = .47. In both 
samples, the authorities were perceived as more reluctant to allow protest in the restricted 
(Mthe UK = 3.47; MChile = 4.07) than in facilitated (Mthe UK = 2.08; MChile = 1.83) and control 
conditions (Mthe UK = 2.31; MChile = 2.13). However, Tukey’s post-hoc comparisons did 
not show significant differences between the control and facilitated conditions in either 
of the samples.  
 
We also identified a main effect of the perceptions of the police’s role as a facilitator in 
the protest for both British, F(2, 138) = 19.03, p < .001, η2 = .22, and Chilean participants, 
F(2, 259) = 59.41, p < .001, η2 = .31. This means that people perceived the police as more 
willing to facilitate the protests in facilitated (Mthe UK = 3.74; MChile = 3.65) than restricted 
(Mthe UK = 2.76; MChile = 2.01) or control conditions (Mthe UK = 2.69; MChile = 2.06). 
However, no significant difference was found regarding the role of the police between 
the restricted and control conditions after Tukey’s post-hoc tests.    
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Descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics of the scales included in this study by 
experimental condition are reported below (see Table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3. Means and standard deviations of the main variables included in the analyses by 
country and experimental condition. 
                            
 
 The UK    Chile  
Control 
condition 
Restricted 
 condition 
Facilitated 
 condition 
 
Control 
 condition 
Restricted 
 condition 
Facilitated 
 condition 
M  SD M  SD M  SD   M  SD M  SD M SD 
SPO-R 2.9 0.7 3.51 0.71 2.30 0.88 
 
3.07 0.89 3.82 0.87 2.45 0.94 
P. Legitimacy 
of protests 
3.78 0.66 3.77 0.60 3.92 0.63 
 
3.15 0.97 3.23 0.83 3.39 0.92 
Support for       
protesters’ 
violence 
2.30 1.00 2.37 1.09 2.24 1.10 
  
2.35 1.21 2.63 1.20 2.38 1.33 
 
Main results. An overview of the results associated with the main hypotheses 
(H1-H8) is presented in Figure 3.3. The proposed model explained 14% and 7% of the 
variance of support for protest violence against the police for the British and Chilean 
sample respectively. Our findings show that in comparison with the neutral (control) 
condition, favourable objective contextual conditions were associated with less perceived 
restrictions on protests in both countries. Conversely, those who were assigned to the 
restricted objective conditions perceived their context as less favourable to carry out 
protests than those in the neutral (control) condition (H1). Regarding H2, our analysis 
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demonstrated that only those Chilean participants in a more restricted context perceived 
that public opinion gave more legitimacy to protests, although the difference between this 
and the same path for the British sample was not statistically significant (Wald χ2 (1) = 
2.56, p = .10). However, we want to point out that this was an unexpected result 
considering that our original hypothesis was that perceptions of public opinion 
legitimising protests would be in line with the objective political conditions. This result 
might suggest that some people perceive that public opinion grants more legitimacy to 
protests when authorities hinder protests in comparison to a scenario where authorities do 
not take any special measures (the resistance hypothesis). In addition, we found that a 
context where protests are facilitated or restricted did not have a direct effect on non-
participants’ support protesters’ violence against the police in either sample as was 
proposed in H3 (UK = F(2, 138) = .161, p = .851, η2 = .002; Chile = F(2, 259) = 1.362, 
p = .258, η2 = .010).  
 
Regarding the relation of the perceived authorities’ restrictions with both the perceived 
legitimacy given by public opinion to protests and support for protesters’ violence against 
the police, our results are similar to those obtained in Study 1. Thus, for both British and 
Chilean participants, the more government and the police were perceived to prevent 
protests, the more the people supported protesters’ violence against police (H4). In line 
with the alignment hypothesis supported in Study 1, results also showed that the more our 
participants perceived that the authorities restricted protests, they believed that public 
opinion granted less legitimacy to protests (H5). Moreover, we confirmed that British 
people supported protesters’ violence against police the more they perceived that public 
opinion legitimised protests (H6), while for Chileans, this association was not significant 
(Wald χ2 (1) = 6.51, p = .010). 
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Figure 3.3. Multiple mediation model controlled by identification with the government, age, and 
gender. Unstandardized estimates and significance of coefficients are reported, †p < .1, *p < .05, 
**p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
Even though we did not find a direct effect of objective political conditions on support 
for protesters’ violence, we tested indirect effects following both Hayes’s (2018) criticism 
of the well-known causal steps strategy to establish mediation (see Baron & Kenny, 1986) 
as well as the idea that direct effects should not be a requirement to look for indirect 
effects. Thus, as it was expected (H7), we detected indirect effects of both objective 
conditions, facilitated (the UK = point estimate: -.19, SE = .09, 95% CI [-0.38, -0.06]; 
Chile = point estimate: -.18, SE = .06, 95% CI [-0.31, -0.07]) and restricted (the UK = 
point estimate: .19, SE = .09, 95% CI [0.05, 0.37]; point estimate: .24, SE = .08, 95% CI 
[0.12, 0.41]), on support for protesters’ violence against the police via the subjective 
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perceptions of these conditions (SPO-R) in both samples. However, we found that 
legitimacy given by others to protests mediated the effects of the objective and subjective 
context conditions on support for protesters’ violence for the British (facilitated condition 
= point estimate: .036, SE = .03, 95% CI [0.00, 0.11]; restricted condition = point 
estimate: -.036, SE = .02, 95% CI [-0.10, -0.00]) but not for the Chilean sample (facilitated 
condition = point estimate: -.003, SE = .01, 95% CI [-.03, .02]; restricted condition = 
point estimate: .004, SE = .02, 95% CI [-.02, .04]). In other words, while British and 
Chilean people may consider their own ideas about authorities’ actions to support (or not) 
protest violence against the police, only the former group took into account other people’s 
views about protests to support protest violence against police officers. 
 
3.5.3 Discussion  
This experimental study confirmed the results obtained in Study 1 regarding the 
importance of perceived restrictions on protests on non-participants’ support for 
protesters’ violence against police officers. This means the variables maintain a direct 
relationship with each other, and therefore, it is likely that non-participants support protest 
violence as a backlash against the restrictions authorities impose on protests. 
 
In this study, we also confirmed the negative link between perceived restrictions and the 
perceived legitimacy given by others to protests. Thus, when people perceive that the 
authorities (i.e., government and the police) try to hinder protests, they might perceive 
that public opinion grants less legitimacy to protests as political acts. In other words, for 
British and Chilean people, public opinion might legitimise protests according to the 
measures authorities take to manage protesters’ actions (alignment hypothesis). 
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 Moreover, it is worth noting that the unexpected result for the direct link between the 
restricted scenario and public opinion legitimacy of protests may open the door to new 
research questions on how people can seek public opinion approval for resistance acts 
against authorities’ restrictions (resistance hypothesis).  
 
Finally, as in Study 1, we found that the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to 
protests plays a role in the support for protesters’ violence only for British people. It might 
imply that British people’s support for the use of violence against the police relies on the 
expected support public opinion may provide to the act of protest as well as on the 
restrictions imposed by authorities, whereas for Chileans only the latter factor plays a 
role. Although in the general discussion section we argue that particular characteristics of 
the British and Chilean political settings (public opinion approval for protests, different 
repertoires of protests, and prevalence of police brutality) might explain these different 
patterns, we propose that additional research combining psychological, sociological, 
historical, and anthropological contributions is necessary to confirm which interpretation 
is more accurate.  
 
3.6 General discussion 
 
The two studies reported here stress the relevance of non-participants’ perceptions of 
authorities’ restrictions to protests on support for protest violence against the police. Thus, 
extrapolating our findings to the initial example from the situation during the 60s in the 
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United States, we suggest that some people might justify the riots that took place in the 
American streets as well as violence carried out by African-American people not just 
because of the long-standing injustices these group suffered, but also as a response to the 
political authorities who failed to protect black people’s lives from the attack of white 
supremacists, restricted the political participation of black communities, and punished 
with repression any public demonstration on behalf of the American Civil Rights 
Movement (see Bermanzohn, 2000 and Nimtz, 2016, for reviews).  
 
The results of these studies can also be considered as a response to van Zomeren’s 
argument (2016) for the necessity of integrating features of the political context into the 
study of collective action. Specifically, a new antecedent, the perceived restrictions 
imposed on protests (SPO-R), can be integrated into the literature, complementing 
previous findings that highlighted the role of social identity, group efficacy, procedural 
justice, and (in)efficacy of alternative actions on non-participants’ support for protesters’ 
violence against the police. Nevertheless, a still unresolved issue is the divergence 
between the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests and endorsement of 
protest violence against the police by country. Thus, Studies 1 and 2 confirmed the same 
pattern of results for this association, positive and significant for British people but not 
significant for Chileans. We suggest this might be rooted in different levels of 
routinization and approval of protests in these countries, especially considering that 
protests were highly stigmatised and even criminalised by the Chilean dictatorship and 
the subsequent democratic governments. Consequently, it might be possible that Chileans 
do not look for the approval of public opinion to support protesters’ actions because its a 
priori negative view of protests, while the opposite may be true for Britons. In other 
words, it seems Chileans and Britons interact differently with other actors (public 
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opinion) in their particular settings taking into account how these other actors have 
interacted with social mobilisation processes in the recent past.  
 
From a different point of view, even though collective violence has taken place 
throughout both British (e.g., Metropolitan Police Service [MPS], 2012; Thompson, 
1971; Tilly, 2008) and Chilean history (see Salazar, 2006, for a review), nowadays, these 
type of episodes are rare in the UK but still frequent in Chile. Consequently, we suggest 
that the high levels of police brutality against protesters it is a crucial factor that might 
explain why Chileans highlight the role of authorities’ restrictions in their support for 
protesters’ violence against police. This means that even though in both countries people 
might have learned to perform some types of physical aggression to resist police 
repression, the prevalence of police misconduct during protests might be behind the 
emphasis Chileans put on interactions with the police instead of others actors to explain 
their support for protesters’ violence. Moreover, we also conjecture that Chilean police’s 
lack of accountability can play a role in this phenomenon. However, we suggest further 
research should address this specific topic.  
 
Regarding the limitations of our studies, we should acknowledge the fact that none of the 
research was conducted in a context characterised by high levels of repression and 
political violence (cf. Ayanian & Tausch, 2016). Even though we stressed police brutality 
in Chile and its differences with the British policing protest approach, it is necessary to 
recall these two countries have a democratic system where the actions of the police and 
government agents are limited by law and civil organisations that advocate on behalf of 
protesters’ human rights. By contrast, we propose the results for the tested relationships 
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might be different if considering the real threats (e.g., being arbitrarily arrested, wounded, 
or killed by agents of the state) people living in repressive contexts (i.e., where democracy 
and the right to protest are not guaranteed) have to cope with every day.  
 
Moreover, we need to mention two methodological limitations in Study 2. First, the use 
of composed instead of latent variables (as in Study 1) prevented testing specific 
hypotheses for each of SPO-R’s dimensions (one of the main strengths of bifactor 
models). Second, there is the use of vignettes. Although vignettes are easy to implement, 
it is challenging to manipulate fictional political scenarios with this technique without 
participants considering their views about the actual political system to answer the 
questions. Even though the manipulations worked as expected, we think this problem was 
reflected in the manipulation tests where the control condition did not show relevant 
differences compared with the experimental conditions. In addition, it is worth 
mentioning that vignettes are not able to capture the dynamic of protests as processes that 
can include moments where participants adhere to the protocol set by the authorities as 
well as actions of resistance and even insurgency against the established order (see Day, 
Seedat, Cornell, & Suffla, 2018, for a discussion). Therefore, to expand the scope of 
results reported above, future research should be conducted in countries with reportedly 
high levels of repression against protests. Also, SPO-R should be used in its bifactor 
configuration as a mediator in experimental studies, while other materials (e.g., videos) 
might be considered to show changes in the conditions that protesters need to face during 
a protest. 
 
132 
 
Across two studies, we have provided complementary evidence about how non-
participants might support protesters’ violence against the police when they (non-
participants) perceive the authorities (police and government) try to restrict protests. The 
latter can be considered a form of public backlash against restrictions imposed on the 
right to protest, and therefore, we suggest that authorities should be aware of the impact 
their actions might have on both people directly involved in protests and non-participants. 
In line with this, our results suggest that non-participants’ support for protest violence 
against the police follows a specific rationale centred on the conditions offered by the 
political system to protests and what other people (public opinion) might think about these 
activities.     
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Chapter 4 
Beyond peaceful protest: When non-participants support violence against the 
police 
 
 
Cite as: 
Saavedra, P., & Drury, J. (2019). Beyond peaceful protest: When non-participants 
support violence against the police. Manuscript in preparation. 
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4.1 Abstract 
 
One of the most controversial issues related to protests is the use of violence by protesters. 
Although there is a strong social norm against protest violence, research has suggested 
that protesters’ endorsement of non-violent actions can change according to the 
legitimacy of police actions during protests. However, both non-participants’ support for 
protest violence and its relationship with authorities’ measures regarding protests have 
barely been studied. To address this, we interviewed 17 British undergraduate students 
with diverse previous experiences as protesters about their views on protest violence. For 
the interviews, we used vignettes to describe two fictional scenarios, one where the 
government and the police actively restrict the right to protest and another where 
authorities facilitate protesters’ actions. A thematic analysis incorporating elements from 
the ideological dilemmas approach was carried out to explore the range of arguments 
related to protest violence. We found that most participants articulated a variety of 
expressions that made up a recognisable cultural pattern: protest should be peaceful. 
However, when participants perceived that ‘the right to protest’ was threatened by state 
repression, those who earlier rejected protest violence argued that they would support the 
use of violence against the police as ‘self-defence’. Our findings suggest there are 
pervasive frameworks for interpreting and responding to real contexts of political 
openness and repression, and reflective of people’s ability to simultaneously hold 
contradictory views about the legitimacy of protest violence. 
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4.2 Introduction 
 
Even though there is a recent global trend towards restricting the right to protest by some 
governments, one of the most recognisable characteristics of Western democracies (as 
well as an indicator of their strength) is to allow people to organise and take part in 
protests (Howie, 2018). Indeed, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General 
Assembly, 1948) supports the right to protest under the umbrella of the rights of freedom 
of speech and peaceful assembly. However, Jarman and Hamilton (2009) have pointed 
that restricting the right to protest to peaceful actions is problematic because it ignores 
both the existence of tensions during protests and people’s reasons to join in violent 
confrontations. Indeed, although there is a pervasive and supposedly ‘universal’ norm to 
promote peaceful protests to reach social change (see Murdie & Purser, 2017, for a 
discussion), people have continued carrying out protest violence worldwide to challenge 
the status quo – for example, the summer 2019 protests in Hong Kong (e.g., Yeung, Sidhu, 
& Wright, 2019).  
 
Considering that protest violence has occurred in various places, scholars of social 
movements and collective action have tried to describe the political conditions (e.g., Della 
Porta, 1995; Tarrow, 1994) and the social-psychological factors (see Drury & Reicher, 
2018; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2015; Tausch et al., 2011) that might explain people’s 
willingness to carry out violent actions during social mobilization processes. However, 
non-participants’ reasons to support protest violence by challengers of the status quo have 
received less attention (cf. Saab et al., 2016; Saavedra, Drury, & Easterbrook, 2019). The 
present study is an attempt to identify these reasons focused on protest violence against 
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the police and the political conditions under which protests take place. Following Neville 
and Reicher’s (2018) idea of studying the impact of crowds (e.g., protests) on people 
outside the crowd, we interviewed a group of British university students to explore their 
support for protest violence in a political scenario where the right to protest is either 
harshly restricted or facilitated by authorities . To put it differently, our main aim is to 
explore if people’s adherence to the societal norm that protests should be peaceful is 
conditional on the political context protesters have to face. 
 
4.2.1 Violence during social mobilisation processes 
One of the most well-known accounts of violence during social mobilisation processes 
can be found in the work of Gustave Le Bon. From Le Bon’s (1895/2002) point of view, 
people in crowds are capable of carrying out violent and ‘atrocious’ acts due to the 
crowd’s intrinsic irrationality. In particular, he argues that in crowds, individuals resort 
to violence due to their lack of both self-control and critical thinking. Indeed, in 
subsequent work, Le Bon (1898/1980) claimed that because of their inherent danger, 
authorities should prevent the occurrence of crowds and fight them to keep public order. 
Since then, scholars have tried to explain the occurrence of violence within crowds using 
diverse approaches (see Drury et al., 2012, for a review) like stressing its normativity 
(e.g., emergent norm theory; Turner & Killian, 1972), rationality (e.g., game theory; Berk, 
1974), as well as the role of social identity (i.e., the social identity model of crowd 
behaviour, SIM; Reicher, 1984). 
 
Based on the SIM, the elaborated social identity model of collective conflict (ESIM; 
Drury & Reicher, 2000) proposes that violence in diverse events involving crowds is a 
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function of the dynamic relationship among different groups of participants (e.g., police 
and protesters) rather than a consequence of the supposed inherent irrationality of crowds 
(Reicher et al., 2007). In line with this, researchers have demonstrated that participants in 
demonstrations who initially rejected violence may agree with the use of violence once 
the actions carried by police officers are considered illegitimate (e.g., try to hinder 
protests through coercion) and indiscriminate (i.e., police act against everyone in the 
crowd) (see Reicher, Stott, Cronin, & Adang, 2004, for a review; Stott & Drury, 2000). 
In this case, the collective legitimisation of protest violence within crowds can be 
explained through the emergence of new norms of conflict as a result of the interaction 
with police officers. Thus, what was previously unacceptable for most people (i.e., protest 
violence) may become acceptable as acts of self-defence against, or retaliation for, 
illegitimate aggression carried out against peaceful protesters (see Drury & Reicher, 
2018). 
 
It worth noting that in parallel to ESIM, a large amount of social-psychological research 
mainly draws upon the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA; van Zomeren 
et al., 2008) and has explored diverse antecedents that may predict people’s participation 
in different forms of collective action including protest violence. In particular, some of 
those studies have suggested that social beliefs about how fair or dangerous the world is 
(see Gulevich, Sarieva, Nevruev, & Yagiyayev, 2017), and certain implicit theories about 
social change (see Shuman et al., 2016) may increase people’s readiness and willingness 
to carry out violent actions during protests (e.g., throw stones or bottles, clashing with the 
police). In addition, researchers have also suggested that certain emotions (i.e., anger and 
contempt) are critical to predict people’s intentions to carry out non-violent or violent 
actions respectively (see Becker, Tausch, & Wagner, 2011; Tausch et al., 2011). 
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Apart from their focus on the dynamic of protests rather than on predicting people’s future 
participation in these activities, a crucial discrepancy among those works drawing upon 
ESIM and those based on SIMCA is the conceptualisation of norms regarding protest 
violence. While Reicher and collaborators have suggested that protest violence may 
dynamically emerge as a new norm of conflict according to protesters’ interaction with 
the police, most of the subsequent research based on SIMCA has employed the ‘static’ 
binary categorisation normative and non-normative actions as a point of reference to 
judge people’s action tendencies (see Wright et al., 1990). Thus, under the latter 
categorisation, protest violence has consistently been labelled as non-normative, or even 
as a radical action, due to its apparent incompatibility with societal norms regarding the 
use of violence (see Becker & Tausch, 2015, for a discussion).  
 
4.2.2 The perceived political context  
With respect to the political context, a large body of sociological literature has addressed 
the influence of political conditions on the actions that protesters might undertake. From 
different approaches based on political opportunities, sociologists have explored the 
potential effects of the political authorities’ openness (see Eisinger, 1973; Meyer, 2004, 
for a review; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Tarrow, 1994), the presence of repression (see 
Davenport, 1995, 2004; Della Porta, 1995), and the regime type activists need to confront 
(see Hipsher, 1998; Regan & Henderson, 2002) on social movement dynamics. Although 
several sociologists have held that the impact of political opportunities on social 
movements is necessarily mediated by the perceptions that participants share about these 
opportunities (see Gamson & Meyer, 1996, for a discussion; Suh, 2001), while others 
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have argued for the need to explore individual perceptions about the political conditions 
people have to face (Earl, 2011; Honari 2017, 2018a), psychological research has not 
delved on how people perceive the political context in relation to protests. 
 
To our knowledge, there are two main approaches aimed at exploring people’s 
perceptions of their political context regarding protests from a psychological perspective. 
The first of them has used measures associated with people’s trust in political institutions, 
politicians, and their representativeness (e.g., Lee & Chan, 2018; Li, Lee, & Li, 2016; van 
Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2018), whereas the second has used a validated scale of 
measurement, subjective political openness repression (SPO-R), to evaluate non-
participants’ perceptions of the restrictions that both the government and the police 
impose on protests (see Saavedra & Drury, 2019b). Thus, employing SPO-R, Saavedra 
and collaborators (2019) have demonstrated that non-participants may support protesters’ 
violence against the police according to the extent people perceive authorities impose 
harsh restrictions on protests. 
 
4.2.3 Public opinion and non-participants’ support for protest violence 
Apart from incorporating the perceived political context into the analysis of protest, we 
suggest the work of Saavedra and collaborators is useful to understand non-participants’ 
support for protesters’ violence for two other reasons. First, it has included public opinion 
as a factor that people may consider when supporting protesters’ violence. This suggests 
that to understand protest violence, what other people think about protests should be 
considered alongside other aspects described in psychological research on collective 
action such as the efficacy of alternative actions (e.g., Saab et al., 2016), perceived police 
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legitimacy (e.g., Gerber et al., 2018), corruption perceptions (e.g., Thomas & Louis, 
2014), and the potential damage to the public image of high status groups (e.g., Teixeira 
et al., 2019).  
 
A second reason to take into account Saavedra and collaborators’ work is its 
conceptualization of protest violence as a variable and context-sensitive phenomenon. 
Thus, non-participants’ support for protest violence follows a rationale centred in the 
specific perceived contextual conditions (i.e., government restrictions and police actions) 
where the protests take place, and does not necessarily imply a dis-identification with 
protesters (see Feinberg et al., 2017) or attributing irrationality to those who use violence 
(see Orazani & Leidner, 2019a, 2019b; Simpson et al., 2018). 
 
Given that support for violence against the police may vary according to the restrictions 
authorities impose on protests, we suggest that the use of specific tools associated with 
the concept of ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988) could help us to get a deeper 
understanding of non-participants’ accounts of protest violence. The main reason for this 
is that the ideological dilemmas concept seeks to challenge the notion that public opinion 
is necessarily coherent and unchangeable in relation to different aspect of the social world 
(e.g., ‘protests need to be peaceful’), as has been traditionally proposed in social sciences 
(see Condor & Gibson, 2007). Thus, what Billig and collaborators (1988) have suggested 
is that social scientists need to analyse different features of people’s discourse to explore 
the presence of contradictory ideas once people could face (or at least imagine) the same 
phenomenon in different scenarios. The latter is because both formal ideologies and 
everyday common sense embody incoherencies and dilemmas people need to solve in 
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their daily lives (e.g., Condor, 2011; Towns & Adams, 2009). In other words, the 
ideological dilemmas concept considers both the particular context where the individuals 
are situated and people as active agents able to interpret the inherent contradictions of 
their social world (e.g., using violence to defend the right to protest) instead of just 
following an explicit belief system (see Gibson, 2011). 
  
4.3 The present research 
 
This study seeks to explore non-participants’ support for (and then legitimisation of) 
protesters’ violence against the police, taking into account the political conditions under 
which protests take place. Thus, similar to what ESIM has described for protesters, our 
aim is to inquire whether non-participants might support protest violence against the 
police in response to a changing social context. In particular, we want to know whether 
non-participants might hold contradictory ideas (i.e., protests should be peaceful vs 
defend the right to protest) when authorities impose harsh restrictions on protests. Even 
though protest violence in the United Kingdom has been rather scarce (see Reiner, 1998), 
we think this dynamic process may be possible because non-participants are active 
interpreters rather than passive recipients of formal ideologies and societal norms 
concerning protests. 
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4.4 Method 
 
Participants 
British undergraduate students received course credits as a reward for taking part in the 
study. The recruitment was carried out using an online platform where the researchers 
published two separate calls for participants regarding a study about protests in the UK. 
While the first call was looking for students who had participated at least once in protests, 
the second was aimed at people without any experience. Initially, we considered a 
minimum of twenty participants (ten people with and ten people without experience in 
protests). However, after conducting seventeen interviews (nine women and eight men), 
we decided to stop the recruitment considering that regardless of participants’ previous 
experience in protests, more or less the same themes and patterns of response appeared 
during the interviews without adding new elements that may have enriched our analysis. 
 
Concerning the range of experience of those who had attended protests in the past, 
participants declared having participated at a minimum of one and a maximum of ten 
protests on different topics. However, none of them claimed to be an activist, part of a 
social movement, nor a member of a political party. 
 
Procedure 
We designed an interview schedule as well as two vignettes of a fictional student protest 
in the UK. The first of these vignettes described a scenario where the government and the 
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police try to restrict the protest announcing measures such as deploying riot police and 
police horses; authorising the use of batons; and conducting random stop and search. By 
contrast, in the second vignette, the government and police officers acted as facilitators 
of the same student protest. Thus, in this vignette, the Prime Minister publicly reinforces 
people’s right to protest, while the police are engaged in helping protesters and kept the 
protest safe. To minimise the effect of the order in which vignettes were presented playing 
a role in participants’ answers, we randomised vignettes’ presentation order in each 
interview. 
 
The materials for this study were designed to get interviews that lasted between 25 and 
45 minutes (see the complete interview schedule in Appendix 9). In the first part of the 
interview, we asked participants about their own experience in protests (e.g., ‘have you 
participated in some protest before? About what?’), and their thoughts about protests 
carried out in the UK (e.g., ‘what is your opinion about protests in general?’). In the 
second part, the participants read the first vignette, and then answered some questions 
regarding hypothetical situations might happen under the described circumstances (e.g., 
‘would you participate in this protest?’ or ‘what would you think if some people threw 
objects at the police?’). In the third part of the interview, participants answered the same 
type of questions described above but concerning the scenario described in the second 
vignette (see all the vignettes in the Appendix 9).  
 
Analytic approach 
We used the guidelines described by Braun and Clarke (2006) as a reference to conduct 
our thematic analysis. Thus, the first author listened and re-listened to the interviews 
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during the data collection process to get a general idea of the information provided by the 
interviewees. In a subsequent step, the audio interviews were transcribed, and the scripts 
re-read several times seeking to identify relevant topics about the use of violence in 
protests. Then, we compared these topics across interviews and created broader categories 
of themes. Once we identified the most salient themes, we analysed different sections of 
each interview delimited by the question, ‘what would you think if people hit or threw 
objects to the police during this protest?’ Then, following the analytic strategy proposed 
in the ideological dilemmas approach, we focused our efforts in exploring the possible 
existence of contradictory ideas participants might hold regarding protest violence and 
how they talked about these.  
 
4.5 Results 
 
In the analysis of our interviews, we identified five main themes: protests should be 
peaceful; authorities should ensure the right to protest; protest violence is illegitimate 
when the right to protest is guaranteed; harsh restrictions to the right to protest make 
violence more likely; self-defence actions against the police. 
 
4.5.1 Protests should be peaceful 
Regardless of their experience in protests, interviewees assumed and explicitly 
recognised that taking part in protests is a right that people have to voice their opinions 
on diverse societal issues. In line with this, in Extract 1, Emily (who has not participated 
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in protests) argues that this right should not be restricted, while protests need to be 
conducted in a peaceful way:  
 
1. Emily1: […] I think it is kind of universal opinion that government should not 
stop people from saying what they want to say, and if it is a peaceful protest that 
is fair. 
 
Indeed, for some participants, as Laura (who has participated in protests) in Extract 2, the 
absence of violence is an essential requirement that protests have to meet. To put it 
differently, Laura holds that those who want to protest in favour of a cause should do it 
peacefully, otherwise, protesters’ actions may be de-politicised and considered as mere 
riots: 
 
2. Laura: I think as long they [protests] are peaceful, and it is like...I think when 
people use it is as an excuse to like, do rioting or just kind of riot shops, I think it 
is just kind of like quite mess and really useless […] I think if it is something you 
really truly believe, in a way you truly believe that needs to be changed, and if 
you’re doing it in a peaceful way. 
 
 
1 All names have been changed to preserve anonymity 
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Despite the fact that our interviewees demonstrated being aligned with the pervasive idea 
that protest should be peaceful, only a few of them offered a clear definition of what can 
be understood as a peaceful protest. Interestingly, in Extract 3, Jenny (who has not 
participated in protests) offers a criterion that may define a peaceful protest: the absence 
of both criminal damage and wounded people:  
 
3. Jenny: [a protest where] there is no criminal damage, people don’t usually get 
hurt [inaudible]. They [journalists] do some cover times where there is a lot of 
people and sometimes do get hurt in large con [concentrations] of people but it is 
usually no [inaudible], no damage or people come injured. 
 
Indeed, Jenny’s definition of a peaceful protest partially matched other interviewees’ 
views that mostly associated peaceful protests with the lack of physical aggression among 
participants. An example of this can be found in Extract 4, where Emily mentions that a 
peaceful protest is an activity in which physical violence is absent. In other words, 
Emily’s concerns about keeping protests peaceful are not just about potential outcomes 
(criminal damage or wounded people) but also for the occurrence of physical aggression 
(process): 
 
4. Emily: [in a peaceful protest] I would be comfortable just going because you 
think you will be surrounded by like...by people who believe what you believe but 
you don’t have to be worried that is gonna turned into people fighting or any of 
that. 
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According to these interviews, it can be argued that our participants recognise the right 
to protest as a universal right that allows people to have their say within a democracy. 
However, the legitimate exercise of this right is restricted to the use of non-violent actions 
by protesters. This means that, at least initially, our interviewees were in agreement with 
the pervasive idea that protests should be peaceful.  
 
4.5.2 Authorities should ensure the right to protest  
Closely related to the norm that protest should be peaceful, we found that when our 
interviewees referred to either of the fictional scenarios, they repeatedly mentioned that 
in a democratic society the duty of both the police and government authorities is to 
guarantee that people can voice their opinion in the streets. Thus, in Extract 5, Alison 
(who has not participated in protests) positively evaluates that authorities allow people to 
have their say, even when these authorities may have the capability (e.g., equipment and 
officers) to hinder protesters’ actions: 
 
5. Alison: I think is good the government is allowing [the student protest in the 
facilitated scenario] ...mmm...people’s voice has to be heard. I think it is important 
if we say we’re a democracy that we can...mmm...to voice our opinions. So, it is 
good that they [authorities] value that because they can easily just ignore the 
protest and have the police... mmm ... stopping them [students] from protesting. 
So, yeah, I think is good. It shows that we’re allowed to have freedom of speech. 
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Apart from allowing protests, in Extract 6, Laura argues that the political authorities and 
the police also have the responsibility to monitor protests in case ‘something violent’ 
happens as well as to protect those who can be affected. In other words, alongside 
ensuring that people can protest peacefully in the streets, people expect that police officers 
implement measures to protect protesters. Conversely, Laura also suggests that any 
restriction imposed on peaceful protests might be considered as a sort of transgression to 
the freedom of speech: 
   
6. Laura: So, I think is good there would be police in there to make sure, like...I 
think is good get the policemen just to make sure that nothing look violent 
happens...but when they’re shutting down anything even if it is a peaceful protest 
that is gonna...I don’t understand why they would do that. It is just a bit pointless, 
like that is when your freedom of speech right is taking away slightly. 
 
In line with the idea about the police’s role in protesters’ protection, Alison (in Extract 7) 
suggests that cooperation between authorities and protesters would help to keep protests 
safe for everyone. Indeed, Alison argues that violence is less likely to occur when the 
police are engaged in facilitating protesters’ actions and establishing a cooperative 
relationship with protesters. The latter would prevent the emergence of a power imbalance 
and therefore, a conflict between protesters and police officers is less likely to occur:  
 
7. Alison: I think it is good, like personally, I think is good if the police aren’t 
fighting the protesters but helping them. I think...mmm...it is important for people 
safety...mmm...and also in some ways it shows support for the protesters because 
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it is kind of suggest they are in the same team instead of fighting each other […] 
I think in a situation where the police are aiding them, it kind of suggest that...there 
is not a such great power imbalance […] I mean, the police are not necessarily 
protesters but they’re not trying to stop the protest. So, in some ways they are 
allowing it up.  
 
4.5.3 Protest violence is illegitimate when the right to protest is guaranteed 
In the context of facilitated protests and the norm of keep protests peaceful, in Extract 8, 
Sarah states that violence is out of place when police officers try to facilitate protests. In 
other words, for her, protest violence cannot be legitimated in a scenario where there is 
neither a manifest power imbalance between police and protesters or restrictions imposed 
on protests. Moreover, Sarah makes a negative judgement on those who violate the 
societal norm of peaceful protests, while she argues that the police should not be chosen 
as a target of violence because police officers are not responsible for political decisions:  
 
8. Sarah: Why you first gonna hurt the police? They are just standing 
there…make, ensure safe, they are not actually…the police didn’t make decision 
on increased the budget. So, I think it would be silly, especially in a peaceful 
protest […] I would be…if the police were just literally standing by a barriers, I 
just think that is evil because hitting someone is not right and especially to a police 
officer who hasn’t done anything personally to you…even if you don’t like the 
police force, they haven’t done anything directly to you, so, I would be shocked. 
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In line with Sarah’s argument, in Extract 9, Laura argues that if protesters resorted into 
violence when protest activities were facilitated, public opinion would withdraw its 
support for both protesters’ actions and their claims. Laura also suggests that, under 
favourable conditions for protests (i.e., absence of conflict between groups), violence is 
as an irrational behaviour carried out by people that cannot think properly about their 
actions. The latter means that for our interviewers, when authorities facilitate protesters’ 
actions, violence is not acceptable by any means and its occurrence is attributable to 
individual psychology:  
 
9. Interviewer: Do you think this kind of actions [throwing objects or hit police 
officers] can change what other people think about protests? 
Laura: Yeah, I would be less like to support them [the protesters] I think. If they 
were violent...about the support from other people, if I was looking it from the 
other side, and then they being violent, it would be less likely they just support 
them. It would be...I think, it would cloud judgements of the characters as well. I 
just, they can’t be a very rational people. 
 
4.5.4 Harsh restrictions to the right to protest make violence more likely 
In contrast to what might happen in a scenario where authorities actively facilitate 
protests, it seems that placing harsh restrictions on the right to protest makes it more likely 
that people resort to violence against the police. Our interviewees gave three reasons for 
this. First, authorities’ restrictions on the right to protest might make evident the existence 
of a direct conflict in the streets, protesters versus police officers (as Alison points in 
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Extract 10). Undoubtedly, this emergent conflict might also involve an imbalance of 
power between both groups taking into account police officers are those who have the 
technical capabilities and the support from political authorities to disperse any protest: 
 
10. Alison: Mmm...well, the police in this scenario aren’t supporting the 
protesters and they [the police] are going all the way to stop the protesters...like, 
kind of like...It is kind of becomes like two teams going against each other.  
 
Second, the measures implemented by the police in the restricted scenario (e.g., the use 
of batons and the deployment of riot units) may be seen as real threats to protesters who 
might react to these measures using violence against police officers. The latter is stressed 
by Peter (who has not participated in protests) in Extract 11. Thus, Peter declares that the 
imposition of harsh restrictions against protesters might lead to a ‘disaster’ characterized 
by clashes against the police:  
 
11. Peter: If you put the police riot, you put the dog, you put the batons, so there 
are gonna be tough. So, of course the protest wants get many numbers as it could 
if the police and those forces [inaudible] whereas at the same time the people who 
are getting to protest are the hard guys. When I say hard, I mean they are brave, 
they are courageous but there are more hooligans in that sample space than in if it 
was open [like in the facilitated scenario]. So, there are more hooligans, so, if you 
have all these hooligans together and then you have... They [protesters] are 
fighting for the freedom of speech and at the same time you have police trying to 
suppress them. The result will be a disaster. 
152 
 
 
It worth noting that the ‘disaster’ mentioned by Peter is not limited to physical clashes 
with police officers, it also involves protesters needing to fight against authorities’ 
restrictions to defend freedom of speech. Thus, when authorities impose restrictions on 
the right to protest, our interviewee suggests a conflict between challengers to the status 
quo and the police might emerge because of two reasons. First, threats to the physical 
integrity of protesters, and second, threats to the exercise of freedom of speech. 
 
According to our interviewees, a third reason that might explain the occurrence of 
violence is the type of people who may join protests in cases of authorities restricting the 
right to protest. Thus, Peter identified two broad categories of people who might hit the 
streets under the described circumstances. First, a depoliticised group, ‘hooligans’, who 
are those that in a facilitated scenario could be considered as a ‘conflictual minority’ 
looking for confrontations with the police. Second, ‘brave protesters’ that might be 
willing to hit the streets and confront the restrictions to people’s freedom of speech. In 
other words, in a scenario full of constraints and threats against protesters, these two 
categories of people might act together to challenge authorities’ measures and confront 
the police. However, it is necessary to highlight that for several interviewees, as Laura in 
Extract 12, the potential occurrence of protest violence, and the subsequent violation of 
the norm that protest should be peaceful, may backfire, causing a decrease in turnout: 
 
12. Laura: I feel no, I think what could end up happening is less people...who 
want a peaceful protest could not go there. 
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4.5.5 Self-defence actions against the police 
In line with the idea that the restrictions imposed on the right to protest may act as a pre-
condition or provocation to turn protests into violence, we found that our interviewers 
justified protest violence against the police to defend themselves from authorities’ 
measures and protect the right to protest:  
 
13. Sarah: mmm…well, obviously…I don’t know because I haven’t never been 
in that situation but from watching stuff you can tell if someone is attacked by the 
police they fight back. You wanted to say in your head that you wouldn’t fight 
back but in that situation you probably would because there is someone restricting 
you for no reason. I’m already angry about the cops, you can be really angry, so, 
you will fight back against the police but…I don’t know, I might have to go to 
protest and see.  
 
In Extract 13, Sarah suggests that she may support the use of protest violence as self-
defence in response to police attacks (i.e., police officers as main aggressors), and the 
constraints imposed on people’s right to protest. This means that under some 
circumstances (e.g., police repression), to protect their rights, people may have to decide 
between conformity to societal norms or choose alternative methods (e.g., use of 
violence) that are not necessarily aligned with those norms. However, rather than being a 
straightforward decision, supporting the use of violence against the police involves a 
conflict for Sarah. Thus, in a first moment, Sarah mentions that she cannot imagine herself 
breaking the societal norm of not using violence in protests. Indeed, her statement 
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suggests that keeping the protest peaceful is a norm most of the people are aware of even 
though someone is unfairly attacked. 
 
Nevertheless, in a second moment, Sarah argues that despite fighting back might be a no 
desirable outcome, people might support protest violence against the police as a reaction 
to the harsh restrictions that authorities have arbitrarily imposed on protests. The 
equivocations mentioned above shed light on how Sarah grapples with contradictory 
ideas about protest violence. On the one hand, as the societal norm establishes, protest 
violence should not be allowed. On the other hand, this norm is challenged as a result of 
police transgressions against the right to protests and freedom of speech. 
 
Apart from Sarah, other interviewees also expressed contradictory ideas (dilemmas) 
about protest violence against the police but used diverse strategies to deal with it. For 
instance, Paul (who has no experience in protests), in Extract 14, declares that he would 
never use physical violence against the police. Nevertheless, he says he would understand 
if other people (i.e., protesters) fought back against police if the authorities do not 
guarantee the right to protest and police officers are the main aggressors during a peaceful 
protest. In other words, Paul’s formula to support protest violence without completely 
discarding the societal norm about keep protests peaceful consists in making other people 
responsible of carrying out self-defence actions, while he reaffirms that himself could not 
participate in any violent action against the police:  
 
14. Paul: Well, I think it would be me on a personal level. I think, you know, if 
someone is, you know, say hit by the police in a peaceful protest and then they act 
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in self-defence, then it is justified but me personally I would not do it [fighting 
back the police] because of the person I am. 
 
Another interesting strategy to deal with the dilemma can be found in Extract 15. There, 
Peter depoliticises his own (potential) reasons to fight back against the police. For him, 
fighting the police would be a matter of survival, a result of an instinct to stay alive in a 
dangerous context, instead of fight against either authorities’ restrictions or police 
repression against the right to protest. However, he also argues that police aggression is 
due to him or someone else going against the criteria to define a peaceful protest (e.g., no 
criminal damage or fight against the police):  
 
15. Peter: Wow…no, if they attacked me physically, well. Yeah, I would fight 
back because, you know, it is a primal instinct to want be safe yourself but at the 
same they are police, and who knows, maybe I did something. Maybe, I look like 
someone who hit the police or like who broke in to a store [inaudible] So, you can 
say they [the police] justify in taking me for questioning but I would fight back 
and I would try to run away. 
 
In terms of the actions our interviewees would consider as legitimate self-defence, some 
of them suggested that instead of fighting back, the most appropriate action to confront 
restrictions on the right to protests would be pushing back against the police. Thus, in 
Extract 16, Rebecca (who has not participated in protests) states that in case of facing 
police repression, she would try to run away from police officers or push them back: 
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16. Rebecca: I think I would just like try to run away or get [inaudible] how to 
defend me, like push them away. 
 
Even though most of our interviewees supported protesters’ self-defence against the 
police when authorities impose harsh restrictions on protests, a few of them rejected the 
use of violence in all circumstances. Thus, similarly to what Drury and Reicher (2018) 
have described for actual protesters, in Extract 17, Paul expresses that even though he 
could shout at the police, he would refuse supporting violence against the police based on 
a moral argument, non-violent actions should prevail during protests and those who use 
violence are doing something wrong no matter the conditions under which protests are 
carried out: 
 
17. Paul: I probably get involved in shouting, but I wouldn’t use physical force 
again it. If you’re in a peaceful protest and then the police are using aggressions 
while everyone is being peaceful it shows that...paths you on the right side and 
they’re on the wrong for showing aggression to people. 
 
Like Paul, Claire (who has participated in protests) also rejects that protesters can use 
violence against the police even in a scenario where police impose harsh restrictions to 
protest. Indeed, she passes over the potential conflict between the police and protesters, 
suggesting that tensions during protests can be solved using ‘rational’ methods among 
‘capable’ individuals that want to reach some social change. Thus, for Claire (in Extract 
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18), violence would be a ‘wild’ behaviour with a negative impact on protest’s public 
image:  
 
18. Claire: I wouldn’t like condone that [protest violence against the police], I 
wouldn’t do it personally. I think, I can’t do anything about it...mmm...I mean, I 
know people are angry but I think that can almost...I think when people use sort 
of violence and stuff, it almost makes that cause less kind of credible because they 
just see like sort of wild hooligans rather than people, you know, intelligent people 
who go to university and want to make a difference in the world.  
 
Finally, we also found a couple of cases in which the rejection of protest violence 
responds to a practical rather than a moral argument. Thus, Brian, in Extract 19, argues 
that in the hypothetical case of being part of a protest, he would not fight back the police 
because of the negative consequence this may have for him. However, he also suggests 
that in case of being attacked by police officers, one particular form to defend themselves 
or other protesters is to record videos of police transgressions and then share them on 
social media. Thus, the use of videos and the internet may be considered as an alternative 
self-defence action in which people can employ a device used in their everyday lives (e.g., 
mobile phone) to gain support from public opinion without involving the use of violence: 
 
19. Brian: Probably, I would be quite scared. I guess, I would try to get people 
around to film it, and I would try to film myself […] I wouldn’t like respond by 
attacking them because they’re gonna have, well…I’ll get beat up and probably 
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arrested. So, I would try to keep it…I wouldn’t respond with violence but I would 
try to record it and share it. 
  
4.6 Discussion 
 
The analysis presented above helps us to show that the discussion about the use of 
violence in protests cannot be limited to judge protesters’ actions as either ‘good’ 
(normative) or ‘bad’ (non-normative), or restricted to an over idealization of non-violent 
actions to reach social change (see Seidman, 1995, for a discussion). Instead, we suggest 
the analysis of these actions should respond to a more comprehensive approach where 
non-participants are active readers of collective action who can evaluate both the political 
circumstances protesters have to face (e.g., authorities’ restrictions) and the dynamic of 
collective action (e.g., power imbalances). Consequently, judgments about specific 
actions (e.g., protest violence) should be considered as part of the everyday dilemmas 
people face. This argument suggests that people might hold contradictory ideas about the 
legitimacy of protest violence (as self-defence), making non-participants’ support for 
protest violence as a context-sensitive variable rather than an unalterable belief. Hence, 
even though for some people protest violence should always be rejected, for others, self-
defence actions against the police may become acceptable when authorities impose harsh 
restrictions on protests and police officers act as the main aggressors. To put it differently, 
people’s support for protest violence is context-sensitive (i.e., based on the dynamic of 
protests and authorities’ restrictions), and selective. 
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Considering that non-participants’ support for self-defence actions is selective and 
context-sensitive, future research on people’s support for violence against the police must 
include the comparison between diverse (real or hypothetical) scenarios where non-
participants can evaluate critical events such as authorities’ measures and police actions 
regarding protests. Otherwise, it may be impossible to explore in detail the circumstances 
that explain people’s support for protesters’ self-defence actions, while collective action 
research will continue to be trapped in de-contextualised analyses of protesters’ 
behaviour. 
 
In terms of the type of actions that non-protesters’ may be willing to support, it seems 
that our interviewees share a sort of ‘self-defence’ repertoire. Hence, there may be a set 
of actions (e.g., pushing back and yelling at the police) that most participants know and 
accept as self-defence against the police. We believe that even though some interviewers 
mentioned that they would support (or be willing to) fighting the police, most of them 
may prefer pushing back or yelling at the police because of the real or perceived negative 
consequences (e.g., getting criminal records) that people may face for hitting a police 
officer. Interestingly, for other interviewers recording videos of police transgressions and 
sharing them on social media appears as an alternative form of self-defence without 
involving physical contact, or resistance through technology (Cammaerts, 2012). The 
latter may indicate that (British) non-participants learnt about a set of actions that may 
become acceptable as people’s self-defence against police transgressions, while other 
behaviours which don’t involve physical violence (e.g., disobey police orders) but might 
be interpreted as punishable actions by some police officers (see Soares, Barbosa, & 
Matos, 2018, for a discussion), can help people to face authorities’ transgressions 
exposing them to a broader audience. 
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Moreover, we suggest there are five reasons why research on this particular topic must 
go beyond the use of the mainstream labels (i.e., normative and non-normative) 
researchers have used to categorise protesters’ actions. First, this categorisation ignores 
that public opinion’s legitimisation of specific actions might change as a function of the 
interaction between authorities and protesters, throughout time, and across cultures. Thus, 
the use of violence defined in a neutral form as “the threat or exertion of physical force 
which could cause bodily injury” (Ball-Rokeach, 1972, p.101) may be considered a 
legitimate action within a society under some specific circumstances (e.g., high levels of 
repression implemented by an authoritarian regime) and in certain historical moments.  
 
Second, communities differ in their judgements about the use of violence in collective 
action because they have different repertoires of protests (see Tilly, 1986, 2008). The 
latter implies that both the actions that protesters may carry out (e.g., clashing with the 
police) as well as people’s legitimisation of these actions rely on a network of shared 
knowledge and values located in a specific time and place.  
 
Third, protest violence does not necessarily affect a whole protest, and its legitimacy may 
change throughout a single protest event (see Day et al., 2018). In other words, what was 
unacceptable behaviour (e.g., throwing objects at the police) may become acceptable and 
then unacceptable again within the same mobilisation process. As normative and non-
normative actions are static categories, it would be impossible to analyse correctly the 
dynamic described above, as well as non-participants’ evaluations of these changes.  
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Fourth, there is the potential stigmatisation of those who use violence in protests (see 
Ball-Rokeach, 1972, 1980). In other words, those protesters who for whatever reason go 
beyond the pervasive norm that protests must be peaceful might be treated as outsiders 
(even as criminals) that are not capable of behaving in a civilised way (e.g., “Hong Kong 
leader Lam condemns ‘rioters’ after violent clashes”, 2019). In line with this, 
unfortunately, and ignoring the inherent conflict behind the emergence of violence, many 
scholars have given a negative connotation per se to protest violence even relating it to 
processes associated with terrorism as extremism and radicalisation (e.g., Becker, Tausch, 
Spears, & Christ, 2011; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2015; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009; 
Schumpe et al., 2018; Thomas et al., 2014). We firmly believe that treating protest 
violence as a deviant collective behaviour limits the understanding of both protesters’ 
reasons to carry out protest violence as well as non-protesters’ support for self-defence 
actions in a particular political context. Indeed, we think that using the terminology 
mentioned above may help to reproduce and maintain the status quo on behalf of 
economic and political elites.  
 
Fifth, given the de-contextualised nature of normative and non-normative categories, 
there is a high risk that those interested in the study of collective action (and protests in 
particular) neglect the fact that sometimes people need to use and support violence as a 
primary or alternative strategy to achieve social change, fight against authoritarian 
regimes, or resist authorities’ misconduct within democracies (see Seidman, 2015). 
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4.6.1 Limitations and future research 
Considering that our interviewees and the protesters presented in the vignette shared the 
same identity category, students, future research should explore whether non-
participants’ support for self-defence actions is a universal phenomenon on behalf of 
those who suffered from authorities restrictions, or contrarily, it depends on who the 
protesters are (e.g., non-students adults).  
 
Another essential aspect that researchers should address is whether non-participants may 
support self-defence actions carried out against counter-protesters. In other words, 
researchers should explore if, under a restricted political context, non-participants would 
support protest violence against those protesters who defend the status quo or the actions 
carried out by police force (e.g., pro-police demonstrators). 
 
Moreover, taking into account that most non-participants cannot perceive protesters’ 
actions first-hand, media communications becomes a critical factor that mediates what 
happens in the streets and non-participants’ support for protesters’ actions (see 
Koopmans, 2004a; Neville & Reicher, 2018 for a discussion). In line with this, future 
research needs to explore how bias in media coverage of protests main affect non-
participants’ support for self-defence actions against the police when authorities restrict 
the right to protest. Addressing the role of media is particularly important once we 
consider that previous literature on communication has stressed how social movements’ 
prospects can be affected by media ownership and connection with political elites (see 
Chan & Lee, 1984; Chan, 2017; Tan, 2017); consumption patterns of media (see Lee, 
2018); the negative coverage of those protests where violence occurs (see Boyle, 
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McLeod, & Armstrong, 2012; Lee, 2014; McLeod, 2007); and the impact of different 
media framing on the legitimacy of mobilization processes (see Valentim, 2019).  
 
Finally, as this study was conducted in an advanced Western democracy where the right 
to protest is granted, researchers should explore non-participants’ support for protesters 
actions in places where the exercise of these rights are restricted (e.g., Singapore), or in 
non-Western democracies without a long tradition of protests. For this, researchers must 
be aware that there are different cultural norms regarding protests. On the one hand, 
societies may grant a high value to protests in the development of societal life. On the 
other hand, people may consider protests as not so desirable activities in highly 
hierarchical societies where maintaining harmony within groups is a priority over 
individual dissent. Consequently, more than seeking mere replications, scholars must 
ensure their studies become meaningful for the particular contexts where these are carried 
out.  
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Chapter 5 
Solidarity with those who hit the streets: Public opinion and support for 
protesters’ self-defence actions when the right to protest is restricted 
 
 
Cite as: 
Saavedra, P., & Drury, J. (2019). Solidarity with those who hit the streets: Public opinion 
and support for protesters’ self-defence actions when the right to protest is restricted. 
Manuscript in preparation. 
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5.1 Abstract 
 
Previous social-psychological research has neglected the impact of public opinion’s 
legitimisation of protests on non-participants’ support for protesters’ self-defence actions. 
In two experiments, involving English adults as participants, we combined vignettes 
describing various extents of public opinion legitimisation of protests with footage of 
police repression during a student protest in England (Study 1; N = 151), and against pro-
independence demonstrators in Catalonia (Study 2; N = 150). Results demonstrated that 
solidarity with protesters mediates the relationship between public opinion’s 
legitimisation of protests and non-participants’ support for protesters’ self-defence 
actions against the police. However, we found distinctive patterns for each scenario. 
Whereas people showed solidarity with protesters when English public opinion 
delegitimised the student protest, the same happened regarding the protest in Catalonia 
only when English public opinion gave legitimacy to the pro-independence movement. 
Also, we found that own opinions about the right to protest play an essential role in feeling 
solidarity with victims of police repression and support for protesters’ self-defence 
actions.  
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5.2 Introduction 
 
Street protests are routinized activities in most of the Western democracies (Meyer & 
Tarrow, 1998). Thus, people frequently choose to join massive demonstrations worldwide 
to have their say, defend their rights, or protest about diverse issues. Recent examples of 
this are the ‘Stop Brexit’ protests in the UK (Otte, 2019); anti-Bolsonaro demonstrations 
in Brazil (Phillips, 2018); and women’s marches in Chile (“Peaceful marches”, 2019). 
Although mostly peaceful, from time to time protest violence occurs in Western countries, 
as was the case in the 2010 student protest in England (Coughlan, 2010), during the 
Catalonia referendum (Burgen, 2017), and for the yellow vest protests in Paris (Rubin, 
2018).  
 
Social-psychological research has tried to explain people’s willingness to join non-
normative actions (e.g., protest violence) through diverse factors such as injustice 
appraisals (van Zomeren et al., 2008), group-based emotions (Tausch & Becker, 2013; 
Tausch et al., 2011), and implicit theories about social change (Shuman et al., 2016). 
Moreover, the elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour (ESIM; Drury et al., 
in press, for a review; Drury & Reicher, 2000) explains that people’s involvement in 
protest violence can be due to changes in identity boundaries and the emergence of new 
norms of conflict as consequence of group-level interactions with the police. To put it 
differently, according to ESIM, violence becomes acceptable when protesters perceive 
police actions to be illegitimate and indiscriminate.  
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Drawing upon ESIM, recent research has explored how certain processes operating 
among protesters (e.g., empowerment) can be extended to those who are not taking part 
in collective action (see Selvanathan & Lickel, 2019b). In line with this, Saavedra and 
collaborators have demonstrated that non-participants might support protesters’ violence 
against police officers (as self-defence actions) due to the perceived legitimisation that 
public opinion gives to protests and the restrictions that authorities impose on the right to 
protest (Saavedra & Drury, 2019a; Saavedra et al., 2019). However, scholars have not yet 
examined how non-participants’ support for protesters’ self-defence may change, 
depending on both public opinion approvals of protests and the specific mechanism 
operating behind this support. To address this gap, we designed two experiments that 
tested whether different extents of public opinion’s legitimisation of protests predicts 
non-participants’ support for protesters self-defence actions; and whether solidarity with 
protesters mediates this effect. In addition, we explored whether own opinions on the 
right to protest and social dominance orientation, influences this process. 
 
5.2.1 Public opinion’s legitimation of protests  
Research on collective action has suggested that legitimacy of protests based on own 
opinions (Chayinska et al., 2017) and de-politicized evaluative attributes (e.g., ‘horrible’, 
‘fabulous’; see Sweetman et al., 2019) are important antecedents of people’s willingness 
to take part in collective action. However, Saavedra and Drury (2019b) have suggested 
these approaches only consider the legitimacy of protests at an individual level (i.e., 
personal preferences), and therefore, they should be complemented with a relational 
perspective that considers the perceived legitimacy that public opinion (i.e., collective 
level) may grant to these activities. As the same authors have claimed, this re-
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conceptualisation of legitimacy of protests draws upon two different approaches. First, 
Neidhardt and Rucht’s (1991) ideas about considering public opinion as one of the 
reference groups which social movements and protests need to interact with. Second, the 
historical and relational conceptualisation of context for collective action proposed in 
ESIM (see Drury et al., 2012; Reicher, 1996a).  
 
A critical aspect of the legitimacy given by public opinion to protests is its relationship 
with the perceived restrictions authorities impose on protesters’ actions. On the one hand, 
Saavedra and collaborators (2019) have suggested that people may perceive that public 
opinion is aligned with these restrictions (i.e., alignment hypothesis). On the other hand, 
it is also possible that people perceive public opinion gives more legitimacy to protests 
against the authorities’ restrictions (i.e., resistance hypothesis). However, to this date, 
evidence has only supported the first of these hypotheses.  
 
5.2.2 Non-participants and protesters’ actions 
For many years, social-psychological research has highlighted the importance of non-
participants to the success of collective action. Non-participants are a source for 
movements to find more people to join in their actions through politicized identification 
(Simon & Klandermans, 2001), emotional social support (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, 
& Leach, 2004), and solidarity with disadvantaged groups (Saab et al., 2015; Subašić et 
al., 2008). Conversely, only a few studies have explained the relevance and the reasons 
for which non-participants support protesters’ actions (e.g., Stuart et al., 2018; Teixeira 
et al., 2019) especially when these actions involve the use of violence (e.g., Bohler-Muller 
et al., 2017; Saab et al., 2016; Thomas & Louis, 2014). It is worth noting that recent 
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advances in social-psychological research have suggested that the perceived restrictions 
imposed by authorities and the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests 
may explain non-participants’ support for protest violence in the UK and Chile (Saavedra 
et al., 2019). Indeed, after conducting an interview-based study, Saavedra and Drury 
(2019a) argued that non-participants might face an ideological dilemma: ‘protests should 
be peaceful’ versus ‘defend the right to protest’. This dilemma implies that when non-
participants perceive the government to impose arbitrary restrictions to the right to 
protest, and police actions are considered illegitimate, non-participants may change their 
norms regarding the use of violence and support protest violence against police officers 
as self-defence. 
 
We suggest that Saavedra and Drury’s study mentioned above is especially relevant for 
research on non-participants’ role in collective action because of two reasons. First, it 
shows that like actual protesters (see Drury & Reicher, 2000; Drury & Reicher, 2018), 
non-participants may change their norms about the use of violence in protests depending 
on the political context for protests. Thus, it can be argued that non-participants’ support 
for protest violence against the police is a dynamic process that depends on the perceived 
restrictions authorities impose on protests, and goes beyond the static categorisation (i.e., 
‘normative’ and ‘non-normative’) scholars usually use to evaluate collective action (e.g., 
Sweetman et al., 2019; Tausch et al., 2011; Wright et al., 1990). Consequently, non-
participants can disagree with protesters’ violence when authorities guarantee people’s 
right to protest, while violence against the police may be supported as self-defence actions 
when protesters need to confront authorities’ restrictive measures concerning this right. 
Second, because its focus is on the perceived political context protesters’ need to face, 
Saavedra and Drury’s (2019a) work challenges some recent arguments about the backlash 
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effects that protest violence might have on protest public image, such as public opinion’s 
lack of support (see Feinberg et al., 2017; Simpson et al., 2018).  
 
5.2.3 Protests and mass media  
Although some non-participants may get an impression of protesters’ actions first-hand, 
most people form their opinions about protesters through the information displayed in 
mass media (e.g., newspapers, television, and the internet). Consequently, protesters’ 
actions are mostly mediated by media and communications practices at different levels 
(Cammaerts, 2012). In particular, Chan and Lee (1984) suggest that media coverage of 
protests is biased according to media ownership and their closeness to political elites. 
Based on this, media communication scholars have developed the concept of ‘protest 
paradigm’ to account for a type of media coverage that systematically displays a negative 
and de-contextualized image of protest where protesters are demonised, their claims 
delegitimised, and public opinion is shown to be extremely critical to protests (Mcleod, 
2007; see Tan 2017, for a review). Indeed, scholars have demonstrated that one of the 
main reasons for protest paradigm emergence is the occurrence of violence during 
protests (Lee, 2014; Mcleod & Hertog, 1992). 
 
However, the fact that information about protests is mediated through mass media 
representations does not necessarily mean that people are passive receivers of this 
information. Instead, people continuously monitor what happens on the streets, and when 
they see images considered as a provocation or outrage (e.g., police use of tear gas against 
peaceful protesters), this situation can prompt people to take part in protests actively (e.g., 
Lee and Chan, 2018; Tang, 2015).   
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5.2.4 Solidarity with protesters 
Psychological research on intragroup processes has demonstrated that solidarity is a 
component of identification with the in-group (Leach et al., 2008). Thus, those who 
identify themselves as a part of a group may tend to feel a bond of commitment towards 
fellow group members. Subsequent work in collective action has expanded the scope of 
intragroup solidarity to intergroup processes using two different approaches.  
 
The first approach conceptualises solidarity to be the sympathy that members of the 
majority group may feel towards the disadvantages that minority groups suffer. Following 
this idea, several works have integrated solidarity into the social identity model of 
collective action (SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2011) to explain 
how members of disadvantaged groups can find support or allies for their collective action 
in both the majority (Ochoa, Manalastas, Deguchi, & Louis, 2019; Saab et al., 2015) or 
third groups (Klavina & van Zomeren, 2018). Moreover, during recent years, some 
researchers have been trying to explain acting in solidarity with minority groups by 
integrating SIMCA with a construct based on a supposed ideological preference for 
keeping intergroup hierarchies and inequalities - social dominance orientation (SDO; 
Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). In short, 
SDO researchers have argued that general audiences (e.g., Stewart et al., 2016), as well 
as those members of advantaged groups (e.g., Stewart & Tran, 2018) that show low levels 
of social dominance (and therefore a preference for intergroup equality), might be more 
inclined to demonstrate solidarity with the minority group and join collective action on 
their behalf. 
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The second approach has suggested that solidarity is based on something other than pure 
sympathy towards disadvantaged groups. Thus, solidarity would be a political act 
(political solidarity) from members of the public audience aimed at collaborating with 
members of the minority groups to challenge authorities that have lost their legitimacy 
(Subašić et al., 2008). In line with this, people from majority groups (i.e., public opinion) 
may feel a bond of commitment with members of a minority (disadvantaged group) in 
their struggles against authorities to reach the expected social change. As subsequent 
works have demonstrated, this political solidarity bond would be crucial to mobilising 
members of the majority group on behalf of others in need through a process of self-
recategorization (see Subašić, Hardacre, Elton, Branscombe, Ryan, & Reynolds, 2018). 
To put it differently, members of the majority expand the boundaries of their group to 
create a higher-order identity that allows collaboration between members of the minority 
and majority groups to fight against authorities.  
 
Despite the fact the key advantage of the political solidarity approach is that it stresses 
the importance of third parties (e.g., public opinion) in the analysis of collective action, 
there are two issues that social-psychological research has not yet addressed. First, 
existing research has not considered the support that members of general audience (i.e., 
non-participants) may grant to specific protesters’ actions (e.g., the use of violence against 
police officers) in solidarity with the restrictions authorities impose on the right to protest. 
Second, there is the question of how non-participants’ solidarity with protesters may be 
affected by the perceived legitimacy that public opinion grants to protests. 
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5.3 The present research 
 
We designed two studies aimed at exploring the influence of public opinion’s legitimation 
of protests on non-participants’ support for protest violence against the police, and the 
role of solidarity as the main mechanism underlying this relationship. These studies were 
based on incidents that occurred in the 2010 student protest in London and the pro-
independence movement in Catalonia, respectively. To better understand the design and 
results reported in the following sections, we provide a brief description of the London 
and Catalonia incidents.  
 
The 2010 student protests took place in London from November to December that year 
to resist government plans for implementing a significant increment in university tuition 
fees and to cut the higher education budget (Vasagar, Lewis, Taylor, & Gabbat, 2010). In 
this context, the National Union of Students (NUS) and the National Campaign Against 
Fees and Cuts (NCAFC) organised massive demonstrations, while the government and 
the police announced controversial measures such as kittling protesters and ensuring a 
heavy police presence in the streets to ‘keep public order’ (Travis, 2010; Walker & Paige, 
2010).  
 
Regarding Catalonia, we need to stress that, along with being one of the wealthiest regions 
in Spain, historically, Catalonia has enjoyed a considerable amount of autonomy from the 
central government. However, in 2010, the Spanish conservative parliament decided to 
outlaw most of these privileges, allegedly to take advantage of the incomes coming from 
this region. As a consequence, the Catalonian pro-independence movement called for a 
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symbolic referendum in 2014 and for a full referendum on 1st October 2017 aimed at 
getting full autonomy (“Catalonia’s bid for independence”, 2018). Although both 
referendums were declared illegal by Spanish authorities, the world was furious after 
international media showed that, in an attempt to prevent the 2017 referendum from 
taking place, Spanish police beat peaceful pro-independence protesters and voters at poll 
stations (Henley & Mason, 2017). 
 
Having described the scenarios in which the critical events happened, we can briefly state 
the main objectives and hypotheses that guide both experiments. Mainly, we want to test 
the effect of the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests on non-
participants’ support for protesters’ self-defence actions against the police. For this, we 
used vignettes to present three different scenarios in which public opinion legitimise 
protests (i.e., people have the right to protest), public opinion delegitimise protests (i.e., 
people should not protest), or was indifferent to them (i.e., it does not matter whether 
protests happen or not). 
 
In line with previous research (see Saavedra et al., 2019), we expect that when people 
perceive that public opinion legitimises protests, they would be more willing to support 
protesters’ self-defence actions in comparison to those who have to face an indifferent 
public opinion (H1). Thus, we expect that when public opinion legitimate protests, people 
feel a bond of solidarity with those protesters in the streets (H2), and this makes them 
more willing to support protest violence against the police as self-defence (H3). 
Conversely, we also suggest that people may be less willing to support protesters’ self-
defence actions when public opinion delegitimise protests in comparison with those who 
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confront an indifferent public opinion (H4), and therefore, it would be less likely for 
people to feel a bond with those protesters who face the authorities’ restrictions (H5). 
Furthermore, we suggest that own opinions about the right to protest are likely to predict 
solidarity with, and support of, protestors’ actions, and thus needs to be controlled for in 
our model. We made the same decision regarding SDO taking into account those 
arguments which suggest its direct relationship with solidarity, and more recently with 
the support for police officers’ excessive use of force to managing non-violent 
demonstrations (see Gerber & Jackson, 2017). 
 
We tested these hypotheses in two experiments. Study 1 uses a sample of English non-
student participants. Study 2 was thus designed to explore potential differences between 
protester samples (English vs. Catalonian), and to additionally explore whether 
participants’ familiarity with the motive of the protest affected the pattern of results found 
in Study 1. Also, it is worth noting that the recruitment processes for both studies were 
carried out in parallel, and therefore this impeded us from making any modification to the 
experimental design based on the results of any of them. 
 
5.4 Study 1 
 
5.4.1 Method 
Participants. Ethical approval for Studies 1 and 2 was obtained from the Cross 
Schools Research Ethics Committee of the University of Sussex. Subsequently, for Study 
1, we set Prolific to recruit our participants (N = 150; 50 participants per condition). We 
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activated the recruitment filters available on this online platform to distribute the advert 
of our experiment only to those users who self-categorised as English citizens, residing 
in England, and were non-students. We decided to use these filters for two reasons. One 
was to ensure consistency between participants’ nationality and the place where they live 
with the characterisation of public opinion we manipulated (English public opinion). The 
second reason was to avoid participants of the study being in the same social category 
(i.e., students) as the fictional protesters presented in the manipulations, a shortcoming of 
previous works in this area (see Saavedra & Drury, 2019a; Saavedra et al., 2019). 
Consequently, only those users who met our selection criteria received an advert about a 
study on protests in England. 
 
As a result of the data collection process described above, 151 English adults (80.13% 
Female; Age: M = 36.73, SD = 9.84) were recruited for Study 1. Regarding their previous 
experience as protesters, only seven participants declared they had participated in 
marches or protests in the 12 months before this study. 
 
Design and procedure. Participants received a link to an online survey 
comprising three stages. In the first stage, participants answered items aimed at measuring 
demographics, their own opinions about the right to protest, previous participation in 
protests, and social dominance orientation (SDO). In the second stage, participants had to 
read one of the fictional news articles (randomly assigned manipulation) where English 
public opinion legitimises (i.e., people argued that students had the right to protest), 
delegitimise (i.e., people claimed students should not protest), or was indifferent (i.e., 
people did not care) to the 2010 student protest in London (see all the vignettes in 
177 
 
Appendix 10). For this, we invoked public opinion using statements about general public 
reaction to protests (i.e., a pie chart simulating a poll results), and bystanders’ comments 
regarding protesters’ actions (see McLeod & Hertog, 1992,). It is worth noting that for all 
the vignettes we described a political context where authorities (i.e., the government and 
police) imposed restrictions to protests. 
 
Once participants read the story about the protest, they watched two minutes of footage 
in which the police beat peaceful protesters in a rally organised by NCAFC at Parliament 
Square (see the link to the footage in Appendix 10). In other words, along with the news 
article, we included images that might be considered as a public provocation (i.e., police 
repression) for non-participants. To ensure that participants read the entire story and 
watched the full footage before continuing to the next stage, we set the minimum time 
(two minutes) participants must stay in the sections dedicated to each, the vignette and 
the footage.  
 
In the third stage of the experiment, after watching the footage, participants answered a 
set of items aimed at measuring their solidarity with protesters. Also, their support for 
various actions protesters could carry out against the police (e.g., fight the police back) 
were measured. After completing this stage, each participant received a £0.75 reward. 
 
Measures. We included two questions as manipulations checks, ‘to what extent 
do people think students have the right to protest?’ and ‘to what extent people think 
protests are important for a democratic system?’ Both questions were evaluated on a scale 
ranging from 1 (none) to 5 (a lot).  
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To measure support for protesters’ actions against the police, participants indicated their 
support for eight different actions student protesters might carry out in response to the 
actions showed in the footage (e.g., ‘yell at the police’, ‘tackle mounted police officers’). 
Non-participants’ support for each action was evaluated using a scale ranging from 1 
(strongly oppose) to 5 (strongly support). It is worth mentioning that some of these items 
(see all the items in Appendix 10) draw upon the actions categorised as protesters’ self-
defence by Saavedra and Drury (2019a). 
 
Solidarity with protesters (r = .89) was measured using two items (e.g., ‘I feel a bond of 
solidarity with protesters’) adapted from Leach et al. (2008) rated on a scale from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
 
Using the same scale mentioned above, own opinions about the right to protest were 
measured with three items (α = .88) that were specially adapted to be used in this study 
(e.g., ‘I think that participating in protests is a valid political action’).  
 
Finally, we included the SDO-short scale (Pratto et al., 2013) comprising four items (e.g., 
‘Group equality should be our ideal’) to measure social dominance orientation (α = .72). 
Thus, participants evaluated each SDO statement on a scale from 1 (extremely oppose) to 
10 (extremely favour). 
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Analytical procedure. We used Stata to get the descriptive statistics of all the 
variables included in this study; carry out exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on the items 
aimed to measure the support for protesters’ actions; as well as to calculate the internal 
reliability of the scales involved in the model.  
 
To test our mediation model using a categorical independent variable (i.e., 
manipulations), we employed MPLUS 7. Thus, we created dummy variables to calculate 
the indirect effects of public opinion’s (de) legitimisation of protests on both solidarity 
with protesters and support for protesters’ actions assuming the indifference condition as 
the reference group. Because our mediation model included a categorical independent 
variable, we followed Hayes and Preacher’s (2014) guidelines to calculate and interpret 
the ‘relative’ indirect, direct, and total effects using bootstrap with 10,000 re-samples and 
95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. Furthermore, this model was controlled for age, 
gender, previous participation in protests, own opinions about the right to protest, and 
SDO. 
 
In a subsequent step, we explored the possibility of getting interaction effects between 
the experimental conditions (public opinion’s legitimisation of protest) with own opinions 
about the right to protest in solidarity with protesters. In other words, we explored the 
interaction among different levels of legitimacy (i.e., individual and collective) on the 
bond non-participants might feel they have with those protesters suffering from police 
repression. 
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5.4.2 Results 
Manipulation checks. We carried out ANOVAs to test the main effects of the 
manipulations. Thus, using a robust analysis of variance, we found that the experimental 
manipulations affected people’s perceptions of whether a general audience acknowledge 
students’ right to protest (first manipulation check), F(2, 126.17) = 74.04, p < .001. In 
particular, people in the ‘legitimised’ condition (M = 4.26) perceived that public opinion 
would tend to recognise more the students’ right to protest in comparison with those 
participants exposed to either the ‘delegitimised’ (M = 2.27) or ‘indifference’ (M = 3.19) 
condition. Also, Tukey’s post-hoc comparisons demonstrated that those participants in 
the ‘delegitimised’ condition perceived public opinion as more reluctant to recognise 
students’ right to protest in contrast with those who had to face an indifferent general 
audience. 
 
Regarding the second manipulation check, we found that participants’ perceptions about 
the importance public opinion give to protests in a democratic system changed across 
experimental conditions, F(2, 148) = 44.66, p < .001. Thus, those in the ‘legitimised’ 
condition perceived that public opinion gave higher importance to protest (M = 3.97) in 
comparison with those participants who faced a public opinion that delegitimised (M = 
2.54) or was indifferent to the student protest (M = 2.54). However, we did not find 
significant differences in the scores reported by those in the ‘delegitimised’ and 
indifference conditions. We suggest this taking into account that the indifference 
condition included a negative statement claiming that ‘people have to work hard instead 
of wasting their time in protests’. 
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Main results. To check whether all the activities protesters might perform against 
the police were part of a unique factor, we carried out an exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) using Maximum Likelihood as extracting method. The results of this analysis 
demonstrated that participants of our study identified two broad categories of protesters’ 
actions. Whereas the first category included three protesters’ actions (e.g., ‘pushing the 
police back’; α = .79) people might label as self-defence (see Saavedra & Drury, 2019a), 
the second category involved five actions (α = .94) aimed at inflicting direct harm on 
police officers (e.g., ‘throwing stones and other objects at the police’).  
 
Table 5.1. Means and standard deviations of the main variables included in the analyses by 
experimental condition.  
 
Indifference 
condition 
  Legitimised 
 condition 
 
  Delegitimised 
Condition 
M SD   M SD   M SD 
Solidarity with protesters 3.15 1.24 
 
3.16 1.14 
 
3.50 1.25 
Support for self-defence actions 2.51 1.06 
 
2.24 0.92 
 
2.37 1.03 
Support for actions to inflict harm on police officers 1.41 0.69  1.16 0.4  1.28 0.68 
Own opinions about the right to protest 3.92 0.89   3.63 0.97   3.77 0.82 
SDO 3.10 1.88  2.65 1.18  3.00 1.48 
 
Once we got the descriptive statistics for all the variables mentioned in the measures 
section (see Table 5.1), we checked their zero-order correlations. Thus, we realised that 
none of the variables included in this study correlates with support for protesters’ actions 
aimed at inflicting harm on police officers (see Table 5.2). Therefore, we decided to focus 
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our analysis on testing the effect of public opinion legitimisation of protests (i.e., 
conditions) on the support for protesters’ self-defence actions, including solidarity with 
protesters as the main mechanism. It is worth mentioning that this model was controlled 
for gender (coded 0 for male and 1 for female), and previous participation in protests 
(coded 0 for no previous participation and 1 for previous participation). 
 
Table 5.2. Zero-order correlations among the variables included in the model.  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Solidarity with protesters 1          
2. Support for self-defence 
actions 
.52*** 1         
3. Support for actions to 
inflict harm on police 
officers 
.07 .41*** 1        
4. Own opinions about the 
right to protest 
.59*** .47*** .11 1       
5. SDO -.27** -.21** -.06 -.35*** 1      
6. Legitimised condition -.06 -.09 -.12 -.11 -.12 1     
7. Delegitimised condition .13 .00 .00 .00 .03 -.49*** 1    
8 Age -.07 -.06 -.14 -.01 .15 -.04 -.02 1   
9. Gender .10 -.02 .07 .01 -.10 -.03 -.01 -.13 1  
10. Previous participation 
in protests 
.18* .18* -.04 .18* -.03 -.08 .04 -.05 .02 1 
Note: Significance of coefficients is indicated *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
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Our mediation model (see Figure 5.1) accounted for 34.3% of the variance associated 
with people’s support for protesters’ self-defence actions. This model shows no direct 
effects of public opinion legitimisation of protests (manipulations) on people’s support 
for self-defence actions. Also, public opinion’s legitimisation of protests did not have any 
impact on solidarity with protesters. Nevertheless, contrary to what we expected, we 
found that only those who faced a public opinion that delegitimises protests (i.e., 
alignment hypothesis) tended to support protesters’ self-defence actions through feeling 
a bond of solidarity with protesters (b = 0.15, 95% CI [0.05, 0.30], p = .04).  
 
Another unexpected but important finding was the role of own opinions about the right 
to protest in the prediction of solidarity with protesters (b = 0.79, 95% CI [0.66, 0.92], p 
< .001). Taking into account this information, we decided to carry out an additional 
analysis to test the interaction between public opinion’s legitimisation of protests and own 
opinions about the right to protest (see Figure 5.2.). In other words, we explored how, in 
a restricted political scenario, solidarity with protesters might depend on two different 
levels of legitimacy, collective (perceived public opinion) and individual (own opinions). 
Our results show that solidarity with protesters depends on the interaction between both 
levels (i.e., individual and collective) of the legitimacy of protests. Indeed, our analysis 
shows that the positive effect of own opinions on solidarity with protesters is slightly 
stronger for those who were allocated in the ‘delegitimised’ condition (b = 1.10, 95% CI 
[0.77, 1.07], p < .001) in comparison to those in the ‘legitimised’ (b = -0.36, 95% CI [-
0.80, 0.60], p = .096) and indifference conditions (b = -0.43, 95% CI [-0.88, 0.00], p = 
.055). To put it differently, own positive views about the right to protest become 
especially important in feel solidarity with repressed protesters when public opinion is 
against protests.  
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Figure 5.1. Mediation model Study 1. The model is controlled for SDO, own opinions about the 
right to protest, gender, age, and previous participation in protests. Regression coefficients are the 
unstandardized estimates. Significance of coefficients is indicated †p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, 
***p < .001. 
 
Considering the results reported above and that, in the model, SDO had no effect on either 
the mediator (b = -0.40, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.43], p = .427) or the dependent variable (b = -
0.27, 95% CI [-0.11, 0.05], p = .593), we suggest that people may feel solidarity with 
protesters and support self-defence actions against the police ‘in resistance’ to a general 
audience that is aligned with the restrictions authorities has imposed on protests. Also, 
we propose that this ‘resistance’ may be triggered because of the contextual 
circumstances non-participants (and protesters) need to cope with, and own opinions 
people have regarding the right to protest.  
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Figure 5.2. Interaction effects in Study 1. Interaction between experimental conditions and own 
opinions about the right to protest to predict political solidarity with protesters.  
 
5.4.3 Discussion 
Although our results did not show a direct effect of the news articles manipulation on 
non-participants’ support for protesters’ self-defence actions against the police, we found 
interesting results regarding the role of solidarity with protesters in this process. Thus, 
non-participants may feel a bond of solidarity with protesters in the streets when news 
articles invoke public opinion aligned with the restrictions that authorities imposed on 
protests. In other words, non-participants may report higher levels of solidarity with 
protesters when the protest paradigm (i.e., negative media portrayal of protests) is aligned 
with the restrictions imposed by authorities in comparison to a scenario where media 
coverage depicts a general audience that is indifferent to protests. Despite being 
unexpected, these results may be useful to begin a discussion about the possibility that 
non-participants feel solidarity with protesters as an act of resistance against the 
restriction to the right to protest as well as against negative biased media coverage of 
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protests. We suggest the evidence we reported about the role of own opinions about the 
right to protest in the prediction of solidarity with protesters may help to support this idea. 
Also, we suggest that it is the violation of shared norms and beliefs (i.e., the right to 
protest), and not ideological orientations (SDO), that can lead non-participants to feel a 
bond with those who are in the streets having their say. 
    
With respect to solidarity with protesters as a mechanism, we suggest that similar to what 
has been described for actual protesters (see Drury and Reicher, 2018), non-participants 
might identify the police as enemies from whom protesters have the right to defend 
themselves when authorities act to avoid protesters’ actions instead of guarantee people’s 
right to protest. This means that even though the media coverage was aligned with 
authorities’ measures against protesters, non-participants should not be considered as 
mere receivers of information concerning protests. Instead, people can interpret what is 
going on during a protest event and support protesters’ actions against the police, as a 
function of the measures implemented by authorities, public opinion’s legitimisation of 
protests, and their own opinions about the right to protest.  
 
5.5 Study 2 
 
5.5.1 Method 
Participants. We used the same procedure as in Study 1 to recruit English adult 
(non-student) participants using Prolific. However, we incorporated two changes to this 
process. First, in the advertisement, we told the potential participants that this study was 
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about the pro-independence movement in Catalonia. Second, we activated an additional 
filter on the online platform to prevent those who took part in Study 1 from taking part in 
this new experiment. Thus, we recruited 150 English adults (59.33% Female; Age: M = 
37.11, SD = 11.07), of which just a few (6%) had taken part in a protest.  
 
Design and procedures. We used similar design and procedures to Study 1. 
However, two differences have to be mentioned. First, considering that in Study 1 neither 
experimental conditions nor solidarity with protesters predicted non-participants’ support 
for actions aimed at inflicting harm on police officers, in Study 2 we tested our mediation 
model only to predict non-participants’ support for self-defence actions. Second, both the 
vignettes and the footage referred to the pro-independence movement in Catalonia (see 
Appendix 11). Thus, the vignette described the legitimacy English public opinion gave to 
protests in Catalonia, whereas the footage showed Spanish police officers beating 
Catalonian demonstrators outside a polling station. As in Study 1, participants received a 
£0.75 reward once they completed the survey. 
 
Measures. We adapted the manipulation checks of Study 1 to the Catalonian 
context. Thus, participants had to rate the following: ‘what extent did people actively 
believe Catalans had the right to vote and protest against government decisions’; and ‘to 
what extent people think protests are important for a democratic system’ on a scale from 
1 (none) to 5 (a lot). 
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We used the same items as in Study 1 to measure support for self-defence actions against 
the police (α = .88), solidarity with protesters (r = .84), own opinions about the right to 
protest (α = .82), and social dominance orientation (α = .81).  
 
Moreover, considering that participants were going to be asked about protests that took 
place outside of their immediate context, we included an additional item to measure self-
reported knowledge about the situation in Catalonia (‘how much do you know about the 
situation in Catalonia?’). This item was rated on a scale from 1 (none) to 5 (a lot). 
 
Analysis. To allow comparability with Study 1, we carried out the analyses using 
the same sets of items to measure support for protesters’ self-defence actions against the 
police. In addition, we tested a mediation model for this dependent variable in the same 
way as in Study 1, including people’s knowledge about the Catalonia pro-independence 
movement as an additional control variable. 
 
5.5.2 Results  
Manipulation checks. The results for our two manipulations checks were similar 
to each other, maybe because, as in Study 1, we included negative references to protests 
in both the delegitimised (i.e., Catalans should not be allowed to protest) and indifference 
conditions (i.e., protests are a waste of time).  
 
Regarding our first manipulation check, we found differences in how participants 
perceived UK public opinion on Catalans’ right to vote and protest, F(2, 121.42) = 48.15, 
189 
 
p < .001. Thus, those participants in the ‘legitimised’ condition perceived that English 
public opinion gave more legitimacy to protests in Catalonia (M = 4.29), in comparison 
to those in the ‘delegitimised’ (M = 2.60) and ‘indifference’ conditions (M = 2.81). 
However, and maybe because of the reasons mentioned above, we did not find significant 
differences between the other two conditions.  
 
The results for the second manipulation check were similar to those described above. 
People perceived that UK public opinion gave different levels of importance to protests 
in a democratic system, F(2, 121.64) = 24.15, p < .001. However, as for the first 
manipulation check, only those in the ‘legitimised’ condition (M = 4.15) reported 
significant differences relative to the other two conditions (delegitimised condition: M = 
2.94; indifference condition: M = 2.91).   
 
Table 5.3. Means and standard deviations of the main variables included in the analyses by 
experimental condition. 
 
Indifference 
condition 
 
Legitimised 
condition 
 
Delegitimised 
condition 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
Solidarity with protesters 3.68 1.06 
 
4.04 0.95 
 
3.97 1.18 
Support for self-defence actions 3.15 1.21 
 
3.35 1.16 
 
3.07 1.22 
Own opinions about the right to protest 4.01 0.85 
 
4.00 0.90 
 
3.90 0.84 
SDO 3.04 1.52  2.91 1.63  3.14 1.93 
Knowledge about Catalonia situation 2.06 0.87  2.19 1.05  2.58 1.10 
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Main results. The descriptive statistics for the key measures within all conditions 
are presented in Table 5.3. We noted the means for people’s support for self-defence 
actions against the police were slightly higher than those obtained in Study 1. Even though 
the scores from both studies are not objectively comparable, we think this is a piece of 
interesting information to bear in mind considering it might be possible that people show 
higher support for protesters’ self-defence actions when protesters are in a different 
political context. 
 
Table 5.4. Zero-order correlations among the variables included in the model.  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Solidarity with protesters 1          
2. Support for self-defence 
actions 
.35*** 1         
3. Own opinions about the 
right to protest 
.36*** .36*** 1        
4. SDO -.28** -.10   -.38*** 1       
5. Legitimised condition .09 .09      .02 -.05 1      
6. Delegitimised condition .04 -.07 -.05 .04 -.50*** 1     
7 Age .14 .00 -.03 .08 -.08 .05 1    
8. Gender .12 -.13 -.09 -.04 .03 .07 .04 1   
9. Previous participation in 
protests 
.03 .04 .20* -.13 -.06 .00 -.17* .14 1  
10. Knowledge about 
Catalonia situation 
.22** .16* .29*** -.14 -.05 .20* .08 -.23** .06 1 
Note: Significance of coefficients is indicated *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
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As in Study 1, we found that neither ‘legitimised’ nor ‘delegitimised’ conditions have 
direct effects on the dependent variable (see Table 5.4). However, as expected, when UK 
public opinion legitimises protests, it is more likely that non-participants feel a bond of 
solidarity with protesters, and this solidarity acts as a mechanism that predicts the support 
for protesters self-defence actions against the police in a different scenario (R2 = .20). 
Moreover, unlike Study 1, there was no significant effect of ‘delegitimised’ condition on 
solidarity with protesters (see Figure 5.3). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Mediation model Study 2. The model is controlled for SDO, own opinions about the 
right to protest, gender, age, and previous participation in protests. Regression coefficients are the 
unstandardized estimates. Significance of coefficients is indicated †p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, 
***p < .001. 
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These results suggest that for protesters’ actions carried out in a different political context 
than one’s own, non-participants may feel solidarity with those protesters who suffer from 
the restrictions imposed on the right to protest only when their own (local) public opinion 
legitimises protests relative to a (local) general audience that is indifferent to protesters’ 
actions (b = 0.97, 95% CI [0.13, 0.24], p = .14). 
 
Regarding the role of own opinions about the right to protest and SDO, the results were 
similar to those of Study 1. Thus, own opinions about the right to protest was a good 
predictor of both solidarity with protesters (b = 0.36, 95% CI [0.16, 0.55], p = .02) and 
support for protesters’ self-defence actions against the police (b = 0.39, 95% CI [0.18, 
0.58], p = .01). With respect to SDO, as in Study 1, it had no relationship with support 
for protesters’ self-defence actions against the police (b = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.17], p = 
.264). However, in this study, SDO had a small effect on solidarity with protesters (b = -
0.10, 95% CI [-0.18, -0.21], p = .03). Considering these results, we tested again the 
interaction between the experimental conditions (public opinion’s legitimisation of 
protests) and own opinions about the right to protest in solidarity with protesters (see 
Figure 5.4).  
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Figure 5.4. Interaction effects in Study 2. Interaction between experimental conditions and own 
opinions about the right to protest to predict political solidarity with protesters. 
 
As in Study 1, we found that the effect of own opinions becomes stronger when people 
are faced with a general audience that delegitimates protests (b = 0.75, 95% CI [0.42, 
1.08], p < .001) in comparison to those conditions where the public opinion is either 
indifferent (b = -0.40, 95% CI [-0.87, 0.56], p = .085) or legitimises protests (b = -0.45, 
95% CI [-0.90, -0.00], p = .047). In other words, own positive views about the right to 
protest become especially predictive of felt solidarity with repressed protesters when 
public opinion is against protests. 
 
5.5.3 Discussion 
The results of Study 2 are very similar to those obtained in Study 1 regarding the role of 
the solidarity with protesters as a mechanism that may predict non-participants’ support 
for protesters’ self-defence actions against the police (i.e., pushing the police back, 
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disobeying police officers’ orders, or yelling at the police). As in Study 1, we found that 
non-participants might feel solidarity with protesters according to the extent that non-
participants perceived that public opinion legitimates protests. However, there is one 
main difference between Study 1 and Study 2 that needs to be addressed. In this study, it 
was public opinion’s legitimisation of protests (not delegitimisation) that led non-
participants to feel solidarity with protesters. This may imply that when protests take 
place in a different political context (e.g., Catalonia), people might feel solidarity with 
protesters only when their local public opinion (i.e., English general audience) explicitly 
legitimises protests at the foreign location and expresses its disagreement with 
authorities’ restrictions on the right to protest. The latter opens the door to think about the 
different mechanisms that could explain non-participants’ support for protesters’ actions 
carried out in an alien political context. Although this may be considered an exciting and 
challenging idea, researchers need to bear in mind the cultural, political, and historical 
differences that can bias the reported support for protesters’ actions. To put it differently, 
it would not be fair nor scientifically rigorous to analyse the support that people living in 
developed Western democracies may give to protesters’ actions in other regions (e.g., 
Africa or East Asia) without considering the existence of divergent social norms 
regarding protests and the type of actions that can be supported (e.g., only peaceful 
actions).  
 
Also, we confirmed the critical role of own opinions about the right to protest in 
predicting solidarity with protesters, as well as the minimal influence that social 
dominance orientation (SDO) has on this construct. 
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5.6 General discussion 
 
Through two studies, we have demonstrated that solidarity with protesters may act as a 
mechanism to predict non-participants’ support for protesters’ self-defence actions 
against the police depending on the legitimacy public opinion grant to protests. In 
particular, we found that non-participants may feel solidarity with protesters due to the 
interaction between two levels of the legitimacy of protests, individual and collective. 
The latter means that non-participants’ take into account their own opinions about the 
right to protest and the extent to which public opinion legitimises protests that take place 
in either a local or foreign political context before feeling solidarity with those who hit 
the streets to fight for a specific cause. 
 
In terms of the theoretical advances, our studies offer two main contributions to the social-
psychological research on protests and collective action. First, our work extends the scope 
of the political solidarity model considering that third parties (i.e., non-participants) may 
support protesters’ self-defence actions against the police without necessarily being 
involved or have the intention to take part in collective action. Although this means non-
protesters may remain ‘inactive’, we do not consider this inactivity to be a negative 
outcome considering that protesters and social movements always need the general 
audience to legitimate both their claims and actions to increase the odds of reaching the 
desired goals (see van Zomeren et al., 2004, for a discussion). Indeed, we suggest that 
when non-participants realise that authorities try to hinder the right to protest and the 
media spread images that cause public indignation (e.g., the police beating protesters), 
solidarity with protesters might lead to support for protesters’ self-defence actions and 
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also provoke non-participants to take action to complain against authorities’ measures, or 
to question the legitimacy of authorities. An excellent example of this can be found in a 
protest that took place during 2019 in Hong Kong. In that event, a large group of mothers 
hit the streets to complain about police repression against young protesters, the use of the 
label ‘rioters’ on those who participated in demonstrations and to demand the local 
political leader’s resignation (see Ng, 2019). 
 
The second contribution of this work is to consider non-participants as active readers of 
both the political context where protests take place and the dynamic of collective action. 
Thus, we hold that non-participants can actively monitor and interpret the information 
about protests they can get from the media. Consequently, aside from their own opinions 
about the right to protest, non-participants may consider three main factors before feeling 
a bond of solidarity with protesters and support protesters’ self-defence actions against 
the police: the restrictions authorities impose on the right to protest, perceived public 
opinion legitimisation of protests, and police actions against protesters. The latter implies 
that instead of attributing the occurrence of violence to protesters alleged ‘irrationality’, 
non-participants (like actual protesters) can understand that protesters’ actions follow a 
specific rationale based on both the political circumstances that set the stage for protests 
and the interaction between protesters and the police.  
  
There are some limitations to the two studies reported that are worth reflecting on. Both 
experiments included footage that may cause public indignation (i.e., police repression 
during protests) just after the experimental manipulations. Although we intentionally 
adopted this design to give more realism to the experiments (i.e., online news and social 
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media usually combines text, images, and footage), we suspect that confounding effects 
may be behind the reported results. However, instead of suggesting that the impact of text 
articles and footages should be tested separately, we believe that future research should 
try to replicate our results using a similar design or combining different pieces of 
information (e.g., Wouters, 2018) to simulate what people usually see about protests on 
media outlets. 
 
Regarding people’s support for protesters’ actions in a different political context, we need 
to acknowledge that in Study 2 the protesters (i.e., Catalans) could be considered as 
similar to those who decided to support (or not) protesters’ actions (i.e., English adults). 
Thus, protesters and non-participants belonged to European democracies suppose a 
limitation because it assumes people in any of these roles share some higher-order 
category (i.e., being European), as well as values and beliefs about democracy that 
partially may explain the results reported above. To address this issue, we propose that 
future studies should focus on exploring non-participants’ support for protesters with 
whom there are no explicit connections or a prior higher-order category (e.g., Europeans 
and Africans) that can facilitate solidarity. 
 
Another limitation future research needs to address is the role of own opinions about the 
right to protest on the prediction of both solidarity with protesters and the support for 
protesters’ self-defence actions. Although we found consistent effects in both studies, it 
is still necessary to further explore how these effects can change according to the 
legitimacy given by public opinion to protests, the political context in which protesters’ 
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actions take place and the type of protest (i.e., peaceful or violent) has predominated in a 
country’s recent past (see Murdie & Purser, 2017, for a discussion). 
  
Undoubtedly, more research is needed to better understand non-participants’ support for 
protesters’ self-defence actions through solidarity. Thus, we suggest that future research 
can extend our model, testing the role of co-victimization (e.g., victims of police 
repression) and inclusive identity salience as measures of solidarity with protesters (see 
Subašić, Schmitt, & Reynolds, 2011); integrating the violation of moral beliefs in relation 
to protests (van Zomeren, Kutlaca, & Turner-Zwinkels, 2018). Also, future research 
should explore how support for protesters’ self-defence actions may be an antecedent of 
people’s willingness to join protests. By examining the factors mentioned above, it might 
be possible to understand better non-participants’ role as active readers of collective 
action and people’s reasons to support protesters’ self-defence actions against the police 
in solidarity with protesters. 
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6. Discussion 
 
In this thesis, I have offered new insights to understand non-participants’ support for 
protesters’ violence. For this, I designed a series of studies using different methods: 
survey-based questionnaires, experiments, and interviews. Furthermore, in Chapters 2 
and 3, I tested part of these insights in two countries, the UK and Chile. In this section, I 
will summarise the main findings of my studies, discuss their theoretical and practical 
implications, and point to their limitations. Finally, I will provide some suggestions on 
how future research may address these limitations and extend the scope of this work. 
 
6.1 Summary of the findings 
In this section, I will present an overview of the main findings I reported in Chapters 2, 
3, 4, and 5 organised by topic of interest. Moreover, the main contributions of these 
studies to the development of each topic will be discussed. 
 
Perceived political context. As described in Chapter 1, the main objective of my 
research was to incorporate people’s perceptions of the political context into the 
psychological analysis of collective action. For this, a fundamental starting point for my 
research was van Zomeren’s (2016) idea of including advances from other fields (e.g., 
sociology) to understand the role of political structures in the psychological study of 
collection action. Along with van Zomeren’s idea, noticing that except for those works 
that draw upon on the elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour (ESIM; Drury 
& Reicher, 2000; Drury & Reicher, 2005) in most of the psychological literature the 
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‘context of collective action’ almost exclusively referred to the socio-structural conditions 
mentioned by Tajfel and Turner (1979). This literature helped me to focus my efforts on 
the study of the perceived political context where protests take place. To put it differently, 
van Zomeren’s arguments, the historical conceptualization of context present in works 
draw upon ESIM (see Drury et al., 2012; Stott et al., 2018), and the limited idea of context 
as intergroup differences (i.e., the difference between groups in direct conflict) in the 
mainstream psychological literature on collective action, were essential ingredients to 
propose a new approach. This approach is built on people’s perceptions of those actors 
(i.e., the government, the police, and public opinion) that have enough influence to set 
and change the scenario where protests take place.   
 
After carrying out a comprehensive literature review, which included sociological and 
political science studies (see Chapter 1), I realised that most of the research included 
analysis about the government, presence of repression, and public opinion as significant 
references for the political context where social movements and protests occur. Regarding 
the influence of the government, I considered that political opportunities (Tarrow, 1994) 
offered a dimension - political openness - that may be susceptible to people’s evaluation. 
As explained in Chapters 1 and 2, this dimension is referred to as the extent the political 
system, particularly the government, allows the presence and development of social 
movements. 
 
Concerning the presence of repression, although the literature describes different forms 
and agents of repression (see Chapter 1), I chose to restrict the definition to the actions 
carried out by the police against protesters. I made this decision taking into account that 
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during protests, in their role of direct managers of crowd events and public order, the 
police are by far the primary and most visible agent of repression that protesters need to 
deal with (at least in Western democracies). It is worth noting that this effort to include 
repression in the psychological analysis of collective action is in line with Earl’s (2011) 
and Honari’s (2017, 2018b) suggestions about the importance of considering people’s 
perceptions of repression and their consequences for the development of social 
mobilisation processes. 
 
Regarding the role of public opinion, I followed Neidhardt and Rucht’s (1991) ideas about 
considering public opinion as a reference group for social movements from which 
activists and protesters can obtain legitimacy for their claims and actions. For this, I 
decided to include public opinion in the analyses using meta-perceptions. The latter 
means that rather than getting an ‘objective' measure of public opinion about protests, my 
main interest was to know people’s perceptions about what other people think about 
protests. 
 
Taking into account the antecedents listed above, in Chapter 2 (Saavedra & Drury, 
2019b), I proposed a new construct- subjective political openness (SPO) - to include 
people’s perceptions of the political context regarding protests into the social-
psychological analysis of collective action. Theoretically, SPO should comprise 
psychological equivalents for political openness (government openness/restrictions), 
perceived repression (carried out by the police against protesters), and the legitimacy 
granted by public opinion to protests (perceived legitimacy of protests). Based on the 
concept of SPO, I developed a scale of measurement (SPO Repression scale, or SPO-R) 
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to evaluate people’s perceived restrictions from the government and the police to the 
occurrence of protest, as well as the perceived legitimacy granted by public opinion to 
protests. This scale was validated as a bifactor model (one general factor comprising two 
dimensions), and its measurement invariance tested in two different studies, each of them 
using samples from the UK and Chile. In contrast to my original idea, the results 
demonstrated that only the first two components (government restrictions and perceived 
repression) belonged to SPO-R, while the perceived legitimacy of protests did not. Thus, 
while people consider government measures and police behaviour together to have a 
global picture of the scenario protesters need to face, public opinion seems to be part of 
a different analytic process.  
 
Although the results were not precisely as expected, I argue that SPO-R scale is a worthy 
contribution which researchers can rely on to include perceived political context in their 
analysis of collective action without the need to create ad hoc items every time. Also, I 
suggest that the configuration of SPO-R as a bifactor model represents a contribution for 
purposes of research for two reasons. First, it can provide information about the global 
political scenario where protests take place (general factor), whereas the influence or 
weight of each component (i.e., government measures and police actions) can be analysed 
separately. Second, because bifactor models are similar to modular designs, SPO-R has 
the potential to extend its scope, adding or rejecting new dimensions (components) that 
other scholars may propose as relevant to the evaluation of the political context regarding 
protests.   
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Support for protesters’ violence against the police. Using different research 
methods, in Chapters 3 (Saavedra et al., 2019) and 4 (Saavedra & Drury, 2019a), I 
demonstrated that similarly to what ESIM describes concerning actual protesters (see 
Drury & Reicher, 2018), non-participants may support violence against police officers as 
a response to the perceived restrictions implemented by the government and the police 
regarding protests. In other words, I suggest that non-participants’ support for the use of 
violence by protesters follows a specific rationale that depends on the restrictions that 
authorities impose on protests in a particular place and time.  
 
While Chapter 3 provides cross-sectional and experimental evidence for the situational 
nature of non-participants’ support for protesters’ violence against the police, Chapter 4 
delved deeper into this topic using vignettes-based interviews with non-participants. 
Interviews, along with ideological dilemmas used as an analytical tool, helped me to get 
a better understanding of the rationales behind the non-participants’ support for protest 
violence. Thus, regardless of their previous experience as protesters, most of the 
interviewees were able to hold contradictory ideas about the support they and others 
(public opinion) may provide to protesters’ violence against the police. Specifically, and 
in line with the pervasive idea that protests need to be ‘peaceful’ (see Jarman & Hamilton, 
2009), the interviewees reported their initial disagreement with protest violence in 
situations where authorities actively tried to facilitate a hypothetical student protest. 
Nevertheless, the same interviewees expressed that they, as well as public opinion, would 
understand (and support) protesters’ use of violence against police officers in case the 
right to protest is under threat due to the restrictions imposed by authorities. To explain 
the existence of these contradictory ideas, I think two elements should be considered.  
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The first element is intrinsically linked to the restrictive measures mentioned in Chapter 
3 (Saavedra et al., 2019), the restriction of the right to protest. Consequently, when people 
refer to the unfavourable conditions that some authorities’ measures can create for protest, 
it seems that these restrictions cannot be considered without their immediate negative 
effect on one of the foundational ideas of Western democracies, the rights to protest and 
freedom of assembly. In other words, those who firstly disagree with the idea of 
protesters’ violence against the police may support these actions when they perceive the 
restrictions put in place by the authorities affect and even violate this right.  
 
The second element that may explain the contradictory ideas about the use of violence 
against the police is the concept of self-defence. In this case, protest violence against the 
police could be supported by non-participants and public opinion when it is 
conceptualised as something that protesters need to do to confront authorities’ restrictions 
and stop police transgressions against protesters. In line with this, some interviewees 
argued that before agreeing with protesters’ violence, it would be necessary to know who 
the aggressor was (i.e., the police or protesters). Conversely, protest violence could not 
be reconceptualised as ‘self-defence’ when people perceive the authorities try to facilitate 
protests, and the police made efforts to guarantee the right to protest. 
 
My work makes an essential contribution to the study of the consequences that protesters’ 
actions may have on those who do not take part in protests. Albeit protesters and social 
movements indeed need that public opinion (i.e., bystanders, sympathisers, non-
sympathisers) support their causes to reach the expected social changes, it is no less true 
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that protesters’ actions are under public scrutiny. Thus, Chapters 3 and 4 extend the scope 
of previous research on the support for protesters’ actions (e.g., Teixeira et al., 2019) 
focusing attention on physical violence against the police. To explore this topic, we 
assumed the same starting point as some psychological research (Drury & Reicher, 2000; 
Reicher et al, 2007; Stott and Drury, 2000) on collective action (and on actual protesters’ 
behaviour) which argues that rather than mindless, protest (crowd) violence follows a 
context-situated rationale. In line with the studies mentioned above, our findings show 
that, similarly to actual protesters, non-participants may back violence against the police 
when they perceive that the authorities try to prevent legitimate protests, these measures 
threaten the right to protest normative in Western democracies, and the police carry out 
actions arbitrarily against protesters. Therefore, I argue that non-participants’ support for 
protesters’ violence against the police is contextually situated and follows a rationale 
based on the perceived characteristics of the political context where protests take place 
and how the authorities shape this context. Considering this, I think it is possible to make 
a final claim. Protest violence against the police (as ‘self-defence’) and non-participants’ 
support for these actions should be considered as a subset of collective action explained 
in terms of their rationale instead of being marginalised and criminalised by authorities, 
researchers, or public opinion.     
 
Legitimacy of protests and public opinion. After reviewing the social-
psychological literature in collective action, it became clear that in relation to collective 
action, the concept of legitimacy has been addressed in the literature under two diverse 
forms: legitimacy of the context (e.g., inequality between groups, see Tajfel & Turner, 
1979; system-justification, see Jost et al., 2017), and own opinions (e.g., Chayinska et al., 
2017; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2019). However, public opinion (i.e., the views of bystanders 
207 
 
and other non-participants) on the legitimacy of protests as acts of value (independently 
of the social group behind the actions) is a neglected topic in the literature. Consequently, 
considering public opinion as one of the reference groups for social movements 
(Neidhardt & Rucht, 1991), as well as the importance non-participants might have for the 
support and success of social mobilization processes (see Simon & Klandermans, 2001; 
Subašić et al., 2008), in Chapter 2 (Saavedra & Drury, 2019b), I suggested that the 
legitimacy given by public opinion to protests might be an essential part of the perceived 
political context.  
 
As described in Chapter 2, I used meta-perceptions, or how people perceive that others 
like them can legitimate the presence of protest in the streets, to measure the perceived 
legitimacy given by public opinion to protests. However, whereas the measures for this 
construct worked properly, it did not belong to SPO-R scale as was expected. Thus, 
people’s evaluation of the political context concerning protests were based on 
government and police actions aimed at facilitating or restricting protests but not on the 
perceived opinion of others non-participants. 
 
Considering the results reported in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 I performed a cross-sectional 
survey and an experiment to test the relationship between the perceived political context 
(based on the government and the police actions to manage protests) and the perceived 
legitimacy given by public opinion to protests. Also, I tested if the second construct 
mediated the relationship between the perceived political context and non-participants’ 
support for protesters violence.   
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For the first relationship mentioned above and considering the novelty of my work, I 
proposed two ad hoc hypotheses. First, the resistance hypothesis. Based on the idea of the 
right to protest, this hypothesis suggests that people might give more legitimacy to 
protests, the more they perceive the authorities are trying to restrict the presence of 
protests in the streets. Second, the alignment hypothesis. The latter suggests that non-
participants’ perceptions about the legitimacy given by public opinion to protests may be 
in line with non-participants’ perceptions of authorities’ restrictions on protesters’ 
actions. Thus, the more restrictive is a political context perceived, non-participants would 
think that public opinion gives less legitimacy to protests. Both the cross-sectional study 
and the experiment provided evidence that supports the alignment hypothesis more than 
the resistance hypothesis in the British and Chilean samples.   
 
Regarding the role of the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion as a mediator of 
the relationship between perceived political context and people’s support for protesters’ 
violence against the police, I found a context-sensitive mediation. The latter means that 
considering other people’s opinion about protests is an important mechanism to 
understand non-participants’ support for the use of violence against the police for British 
people but not for Chilean people. Although this result was consistent in both the cross-
sectional and experimental studies, I am still seeking an explanation for this difference 
embedded in the recent political history of the UK and Chile, the tradition of protests in 
both countries, and in the divergent protest policing approaches. 
 
In Chapter 4 (Saavedra & Drury, 2019a), I again explored how the mechanism mentioned 
above could work in the context of interviews carried out using vignettes. While non-
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participants may hold contradictory opinions regarding the use of violence against the 
police, people also declared that public opinion might legitimate protest violence when 
authorities’ measures threaten the right to protest and police officers were the aggressors. 
Although these results extended what was reported in previous chapters bringing out 
arguments impossible to address through quantitative methods, I realised that there was 
no research where public opinion legitimation of protests was manipulated. Bearing this 
in mind, I designed the experiments reported in Chapter 5 (Saavedra & Drury, 2019c). 
 
Chapter 5 contains the report of two experiments designed to explore how British non-
participants may support protesters’ self-defence actions (i.e., pushing back the police, 
yelling at police officers, and disobeying police orders) according to the extent public 
opinion (de)legitimize protests. For this, I manipulated the legitimacy given by (British) 
public opinion to two famous protests (the 2010 student protests in London and the 
Catalonia Independence Movement in 2017) that took place in contexts where the 
government imposed restrictive measures, and the police carried out indiscriminate 
actions against protesters. I suggested that solidarity with protesters would be a 
mechanism that leads non-participants to support protesters’ self-defence actions when 
people perceive that public opinion expressed resistance (i.e., consider protests were 
legitimate) to the unfavourable conditions the authorities’ set for protests. Conversely, it 
was expected that when public opinion was aligned (i.e., considered protests illegitimate) 
with the restrictions set by authorities, non-participants would not feel any bond of 
solidarity with protesters, and therefore, non-participants would not back self-defence 
actions against the police. The results demonstrated that solidarity with protesters acts as 
a mechanism that explains the influence of perceived legitimacy given by public opinion 
to protest on non-participants’ support for protesters’ self-defensive violence. However, 
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there were differences in how this mechanism worked depending on who the protesters 
were and the own opinions non-participants had about protests.  
 
With respect to who the protesters were, whereas non-participants felt solidarity with 
protesters in Catalonia only when public opinion gave legitimacy to protest to confront a 
restrictive political context (i.e., resistance), solidarity with British student protesters was 
activated only when public opinion was aligned (i.e., delegitimizing protests) with the 
restrictions set by authorities. Moreover, both experiments (i.e., about the Catalonia 
Independence Movement and 2010 student protest) showed that non-participants’ 
previous opinions regarding the legitimacy of protests increased the bond of solidarity 
with protesters when in a restrictive context people perceive that public opinion 
delegitimises protests. 
 
Considering the results described above, my work makes three significant contributions 
regarding the legitimacy of protests. First, it includes a new conceptualisation of the 
legitimacy of protests focused on the perceived value other people give to protesting 
instead of own opinions about these activities, or the legitimacy that a specific group gives 
to protests. This perspective will help that new psychological research in collective action 
considers protests within a broader political system instead of activities exclusively focus 
on solving problems between two main groups in conflict (e.g., protesters and 
authorities). 
 
My second contribution is the consideration of public opinion as a source of legitimacy 
of protests. Even though the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests is 
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not part of the subjective political openness scale (SPO-R), perceptions about other 
people’s views about protests (meta-perceptions) may help to set the political scenario 
where protesters’ actions take place. Thus, representations about other people’s thoughts 
allow people to interpret those norms that rule their immediate context, have an idea of 
the type of actions considered (il)legitimate, actively create their interpretation of this 
context, and promote social change (see Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011). The 
inclusion of meta-perceptions on public opinion’s legitimisation of protests also advances 
the study of collective action because it means going beyond the analysis of own opinions 
regarding protests. Whereas own opinions do not necessarily represent social facts (see 
Elcheroth et al., 2011), our perceptions of what other people think about the political acts 
in which we may take part (or not) give us a more accurate idea of what is going on in 
our context (social facts). However, as I reported in Chapter 5, this does not mean that 
researchers need to discard own opinions from the analysis of collective action. What I 
propose is that perceived legitimacy given by others to protests should be considered 
along with own opinions (or own legitimacy of protests) in the analysis of what non-
participants may think about protests and the actions carried out by protesters.  
 
Last but not least, my third contribution is related to the mechanism through which the 
perceived legitimacy given by others to protests (meta-perceptions) may lead non-
participants to support protesters’ self-defensive actions. Thus, my findings demonstrate 
that non-participants may back self-defence because of a bond of solidarity with those 
protesters that need to face both restrictions to their right to protest and the indiscriminate 
actions of police officers. However, I also found that instead of being a universal feeling 
deployed on behalf of those in need, solidarity with protesters depends on who the 
protesters are (British or Catalonians) and people’s opinions about protests. 
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6.2 Theoretical implications 
In this section, I will discuss the most important implications of my work in terms of 
theoretical advances for the study of collective action from a social psychological point 
of view.   
 
A bridge between psychological and sociological research on collective action. 
For the conceptualisation of the subjective political openness (SPO), I imported advances 
from the sociological literature on social movements to the psychological analysis of 
protests. In particular, I used political opportunities (Tarrow 1994), reference groups 
(Neidhardt & Rucht, 1991), and research on repression (see Della Porta, 1995; Honari, 
2018b) as starting points to create a construct aimed at understanding people’s 
perceptions of their broad political context regarding protests. Thus, SPO has the 
advantage of allowing researchers to analyse people’s perceptions of authorities’ 
behaviours concerning protests, and the possible consequences of these perceptions on 
both people’s willingness to join protests and their support for protesters’ actions. In other 
words, SPO enables researchers to consider the political context for protests as a variable 
rather than a fixed attribute that sets the conditions where protesters actions take place.  
 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that SPO’s development represents an advance in responding 
to two different academic arguments. First, to van Zomeren’s claim (2016) about the 
necessity of including political structural variables into the psychological analysis of 
collective action. Second, to Earl’s (2001) and Honari’s (2017, 2018a) ideas on moving 
the sociological analysis of repression against social movements from its focus on the 
macro and mesosystems (i.e., presence of repression in society) to a perspective that 
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considers people’s perceptions about the repressive measures implemented by different 
authorities. 
  
  A validated scale of measurement for perceived political context. Apart from 
introducing SPO as a new construct for the analysis of protests from a psychological 
perspective, my work has the practical benefit of also providing a scale of measurement 
(SPO-R) to evaluate people’s perceptions of both government restrictions and police 
repression against protesters. This scale was validated in two different countries (the UK 
and Chile) and languages (English and Spanish), enabling researchers to evaluate the 
mentioned dimensions without the need to create ad hoc items every time. It is also 
important to note that the SPO-R scale is configured as a bifactor model where the 
political context can be measured both as a whole as well as considering their components 
separately (e.g., the government and police). As a consequence of this, SPO-R could be 
used to measure people’s perceptions in different political contexts, weighing the 
influence of different actors in it.   
 
Highlighting the role of non-participants on supporting protesters’ actions. In 
line with recent advances in the study of collective action (e.g., Selvanathan & Lickel, 
2019a, 2019b; Stuart et al., 2018) and the idea of exploring the impact of crowds on those 
who are not part of them (see Neville & Reicher, 2018, for a discussion), my work stresses 
the importance of non-participants for protests. Building on previous research into non-
participants’ support for violent actions (i.e., Thomas & Louis, 2014), my approach is the 
first in exploring the effect of the perceived political context on this support, as well as 
focusing the attention on protesters’ violence against the police. I have also argued that 
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in several political contexts (e.g., the UK), non-participants may back violence against 
the police based on the perceived legitimacy public opinion gives to protests. 
Consequently, non-participants may use diverse sources of information (e.g., social 
media, newspapers, television) regarding protests before supporting (or opposing) 
protesters’ actions.  
 
Non-participants’ support for protest violence as a dynamic phenomenon. As 
ESIM describes what happens to actual protesters (see Drury & Reicher, 2000; Drury & 
Reicher, 2005; Drury & Reicher, 2018, for a review), my work shows that non-
participants’ support for violence depends on the interaction between protesters and the 
police, as well as on the conditions set by authorities regarding protests. The latter 
represents an extension of the ESIM’s scope if we consider that non-participants may 
agree with protest violence when they perceive authorities are restricting or violating what 
people consider the legitimate right to protest. 
 
Moreover, my work also contributes to knowing that non-participants may conceptualise 
protest violence as a relational phenomenon which legitimacy may change according to 
the perceived context where protests take place (i.e., imposed restrictions) and who is 
considered the main aggressor (protesters or police officers). This idea challenges the 
arguments included in a plethora of psychological research which assumes that non-
violent and violent actions in protests are mutually exclusive (e.g., Becker & Tausch, 
2015; Sweetman et al., 2019; Tausch et al., 2011; Wright et al., 1990), and that protest 
must be peaceful to ensure non-participants’ support (e.g., Orazani & Leidner, 2019a, 
2019b; Thomas & Louis, 2014). Thus, what I have offered here is an explanation based 
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on the idea that facing a situation where the right to protest is restricted and the police 
attack protesters, non-participants may agree with protest violence even though they 
initially disagree with this type of action. It worth noting that to reconcile these 
contradictory ideas about protesters’ violence, people use the term ‘self-defence’ when 
they consider necessary that protesters take actions against the restrictions imposed by 
authorities. 
 
Perceived legitimacy given by others and own opinions. This work also expands 
the understanding of perceived legitimacy given to protests in three different ways. First, 
it considers public opinion as a source of legitimacy of protest through the use of meta-
perceptions (people’s perceptions of other people thoughts about protests). The inclusion 
of public opinion represents an advance in the analyses of protests because it enables to 
measure the value that people think the society gives to protests beyond own opinions as 
has mostly described until now (e.g., Chayinska et al., 2017). Second, my work considers 
people’s evaluation of protests as political acts of worth, independently of the cognitive 
reactions people may have to protesters’ actions (e.g., Sweetman et al., 2019), and the 
perceived efficacy of certain groups in reaching their expected goals (e.g., Jiménez-Moya 
et. al., 2019). Third, the evidence suggests the perceived legitimacy given by public 
opinion to protest maintains different types of relationship within the perceived political 
context. On the one hand, people may perceive that public opinion’s legitimisation of 
protests directly correlates with the authorities’ measures concerning protests (i.e., 
alignment hypothesis). On the other hand, people perceive that public opinion may grant 
legitimacy to protests when authorities try to restrict protesters’ actions (i.e., resistance 
hypothesis).    
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Solidarity with protesters as a mechanism of support for protesters’ self-defence. 
My work provides evidence that may help to expand the scope of the political solidarity 
model of social change (Subašić et al., 2008). Thus, I suggest that apart from encouraging 
people to join collective action on behalf of minority groups (Saab et al., 2015; Subašić 
et al., 2018), solidarity may act as a mechanism people can draw upon for upholding 
protesters’ self-defence actions in a political context hostile to protests. In other words, 
non-participants may use high-order categories (e.g., ‘protesters are human beings like 
me’) to create a bond with those people whose right to protest is threatened and suffer 
from authorities’ arbitrary actions.  
 
Moreover, the results reported in Chapter 5 (Saavedra & Drury, 2019c) includes two new 
elements non-participants might consider before showing solidarity with those who 
protest in the streets. First, solidarity with protesters is directly related to non-participants’ 
own opinions regarding protests. Indeed, this relation may be stronger when people 
perceive that public opinion delegitimises protests. Second, non-participants would show 
solidarity with protesters in their political context (British students) when public opinion 
is aligned with the restrictions authorities impose on protests. Thus, people may feel 
solidarity with protesters in ‘resistance’ to authorities and public opinion delegitimization 
of protests. Conversely, when protests take place in a different political context 
(Catalonia), non-participants may show solidarity with protesters in ‘resistance’ to 
authorities’ measures but aligned with their public opinion which legitimates protests. 
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6.3 Practical implications 
In line with previous research on collective action (see Drury & Reicher 2018; Drury et 
al., 2012) my work extends the idea that protest violence is not mindless, it follows 
specific patterns, and in particular, that non-participants are aware of these features as 
active readers of collective action. To be precise, I demonstrated that similarly to what 
happens with actual protesters, non-participants may back protesters’ violence against 
police officers (as self-defence) in situations where authorities threaten the right to protest 
and police actions are perceived as illegitimate. Also, I provided evidence on how non-
participants may support protesters’ self-defence actions in solidarity with those 
protesters who face a hostile political context. Consequently, in this section, I will 
describe some of the implications my research may have practically. 
 
The role of the government and the police. As was described in previous 
chapters, people’s perception of their political context as open or restricted to protests is 
a crucial factor for non-participants’ support for protesters’ violence. Therefore, rather 
than restricting protesters’ activities, authorities must focus their efforts on actively 
facilitating the presence of protests in the streets and keep strict control over the actions 
of police officers during demonstrations (e.g., Geneva Academy, 2014; Reicher et al., 
2007; Stott, 2009). Otherwise, non-participants may think the authorities are potential 
enemies that need to or deserve to be attacked by protesters. 
 
From a different point of view, in the event that protesters need to confront a hostile 
context, both authorities and the police may lose legitimacy in front of non-participants. 
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Thus, both the government and the police have to consider their legitimacy is not 
automatically granted and the actions they take against or in favour of protesters may 
change the extent that non-participants agree with protest violence. The latter is essential 
considering that in democratic regimes authorities have the duty of ensuring that people 
can exercise the right to protest and any measure aimed at restricting this right may be 
considered an attack on democratic rights as well as an attempt to maintain the status quo 
on behalf of the political and economic establishment. 
 
Moreover, I suggest there are three potential outcomes for which both political authorities 
and the police must not restrict the right to protest based on the premises that crowds are 
inherently violent and agents of public disorder. First, it has the potential to create a 
political environment where non-participants may perceive that people like them are not 
allowed to have their say, and therefore, the actions protesters can use may be reduced to 
violent acts against the police. Second, similarly to what recent research has reported 
regarding the spread of riots (Drury et al., in press), the situation described above could 
help to propagate an escalation of protest violence where people may back protest 
violence through a psychological mechanism of solidarity with those in the streets and 
disapproval of authorities’ actions. Third, protest violence is rare, and its occurrence does 
not necessarily involve the entire crowd or protest event. Thus, if authorities implement 
measures aimed to avoid the actions of specific groups (i.e., conflictual minority) to all 
protesters without distinction, it may encourage non-participants to support violence 
against the police considering the vast majority of protesters are suffering from arbitrary 
measures which restrict people’s right to protest. Hence, policing protest needs to be 
selective (Reicher et al., 2007), not only to maintain police legitimacy in the eyes of 
protesters but also considering non-participants and public opinion.    
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Role of public opinion. Public opinion is one of the sources from which non-
participants may get an idea about the norms regarding protests, their legitimacy, and the 
type of actions other people support or not. In practical terms, I think that scholars, 
authorities, and journalists need to stop considering public opinion as an entity with 
immutable ideas. Although I am aware the latter conception probably derives from the 
extensive use of quantitative surveys by media communications, governments, and other 
organizations with the objective of knowing people’s opinion about some specific topics 
(e.g., political preferences, voting intention). I argue, however, that this paradigm should 
be challenged to account for the political context people (and protesters) have to face. In 
other words, I suggest that to know other people’s opinions about protests and protest 
violence, people need to be asked about the specific (or at least an imaginary) context 
where these political actions take place. Consequently, we must understand that people’s 
opinions on these topics may change according to the political conditions that protesters 
have to face. 
 
Moreover, in the analysis of public opinion regarding protests, academics and 
practitioners must take into account that non-participants may not always perceive that 
other people grant legitimacy to protesters’ actions when authorities impose restrictions 
on the right to protest (resistance hypothesis). Indeed, as it was demonstrated in other 
chapters, people may also perceive that public opinion is aligned with the government 
and police restrictions on protests (alignment hypothesis). The latter could mean that 
public opinion is framed in concordance with the political establishment, and therefore, 
protesters and their actions run the risk of being vilified by non-participants. 
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Consequently, along with considering the political conditions where protests take place, 
we need to consider the reasons that make people think public opinion can go against (or 
not) authorities’ restrictions. 
 
Media coverage of protests and protest violence. Nowadays, media coverage 
and new technologies (e.g., internet) are vital sources from which people can get an idea 
about protests and those who participate in them (see McGarty, Thomas, Lala, Smith, & 
Bliu, 2014, for a discussion). Thus, through media outlets, people can get an idea of public 
opinion regarding protests and the actions protesters carry out in the streets. However, 
this involves two main issues. One of these concerns the invocation of public opinion in 
media coverage and the other concerns the approach used to frame protests. Regarding 
the first of these problems, public opinion can be depicted in different forms - through 
survey polls, statements by reporters and officials, or the generalisation of some 
bystanders’ views (McLeod & Hertog, 1992). The problem with many of these 
characterisations of public opinion is they can be inaccurate, or mere manipulations aimed 
at demonising protests and protesters.  
 
The second problem, framing of protests, is related to the paradigm of protest (Chan & 
Lee, 1984; McLeod 2007). In short, this means that media coverage may negatively affect 
people’s ideas (e.g., non-participants) by making them see protesters as outsiders (i.e., 
setting a division line between protesters and the whole society), and putting excessive 
emphasis on ‘radical’ actions (e.g., protest violence against the police) carried out by 
protesters (Lee, 2014).     
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Taking into account the significant influence media outlets have over public opinion, I 
think there are some things scholars and practitioners interested in protests can do to help 
non-participants have less biased representations of protesters’ actions. First, it is 
necessary to publicly criticise the idea of ‘mob mentality’ as a concept used to 
delegitimate crowds (e.g., protests) and the actions carried out by a collective. Thus, 
scholars should claim through different media outlets that people in crowds are guided by 
a specific logic which responds to the contextual political conditions people need to 
confront. In line with this, it will be necessary to state that violence is not inherently 
attached to crowds. Instead, violence should be conceptualised as a situational behaviour 
people may use to cope with both police transgressions and government restrictions to 
the right to protest. 
 
Another critical aspect that scholars interested in collective action may reinforce to resist 
misrepresentations about protests is that protest violence can appear and disappear during 
a single event. Thus, protesters could alternate between different actions to confront 
restrictions imposed by authorities or other groups (e.g., counter-protesters). Therefore, 
scholars should point that many reports on protesters’ actions released through media 
outlets (e.g., use of violence against the police) may be only partial snapshots that not 
necessarily represent neither the whole protest nor show the reasons protesters considered 
to carry out those behaviours. In other words, those who research collective action must 
help to demystify media coverage of crowd events, as protests, and the use of violence 
during them.  
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Finally, considering that the description bias in media coverage of protests varies 
depending on both the editorial positions and closeness of media owners with the elites, 
I think that scholars should promote the use of alternative and independent press coverage 
of protests in their analyses. Thus, getting diverse sources of information regarding the 
same event would help to get a less biased story of the actions carried out by protesters, 
the rationale behind them, and the interaction amongst protesters, police officers, and 
counter-protesters. 
 
6.4 Limitations and future research 
In this section, I will discuss some limitations that need to be taken into account to assess 
the impact of the contributions reported throughout the chapters. In addition, I will include 
some suggestions that future research may consider to either address these limitations or 
expanding the scope of this work. 
 
Regarding the SPO-R scale, it is necessary to mention three main limitations; two 
theoretical and one methodological. In terms of theory, the items for this scale were 
worded in negative terms. In other words, they directly measure the perceived level of 
restrictions instead of the perceived level of openness a political context may show about 
protests. Considering that the sociological basis which inspired the scale is referred to the 
acceptance of social movements and that few restrictions to protests do not necessarily 
mean an open political context, I suggest that in the future a new scale aimed to evaluate 
authorities’ capability to facilitate protesters’ actions (see Chapter 2). Thus, a version of 
the scale focus on the facilitation of protests (SPO-F) should be compared with SPO-R in 
the same context to evaluate their similarities/discrepancies.   
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Another theoretical issue related to SPO-R scale is the number of actors that might shape 
the perceived contextual conditions regarding protests. Even though in Chapter 2 we 
clarified that the dimensions proposed to be part of subjective political openness (SPO) 
were chosen following advances in sociology and political science, we are aware that 
considering only the government and the police is a very limited approach that cannot 
explain the whole variability of an actual political context. To address this issue, I propose 
that based on existing theoretical and empirical works, researchers should take advantage 
of SPO-R’s multidimensional nature and modular design to focus their efforts on testing 
new dimensions that might help to get a more elaborate description of how restricted/open 
a political context is regarding protests. As a first step, I suggest that researchers should 
include evaluations of the reference groups mentioned by Neidhardt and Rucht (1991). 
Thus, for example, it would be interesting to know if along with the government and the 
police, people may consider other elements (e.g., the legal system and media coverage of 
protest) to get a more accurate picture of their political context.   
 
Despite how trying to include new dimensions may appear an appealing and challenging 
task, follow-up research should take into account Gamson and Meyer’s (1996) criticism 
of political opportunities (the approach which inspired SPO) when they point out that 
almost everything might be considered as part of the political milieu. Consequently, I 
suggest that the process to add new dimensions for SPO must be based on both strong 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to avoid the paradox of accounting for 
everything without addressing anything at all. 
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With respect to the methodological limitation of the SPO-R scale, despite all the 
advantages of its configuration as bifactor model, it is still true that this type of model 
involves a real challenge for new projects aimed at including the perceived political 
context in the analysis of collective action. Thus, even though psychological research has 
reconsidered the utility of bifactor models and researchers can rely on powerful statistical 
packages (e.g., Mplus, Stata, R) to model multidimensional constructs, I think four main 
difficulties need to be considered for the future development of SPO-R scale (and its 
derivatives) as a bifactor model. First, because of the predominance of unidimensional 
models in psychology, a considerable amount of time is required to understand, interpret, 
and explain adequately multidimensional constructs (see Bonifay, Lane, & Reise, 2017, 
for a discussion). In line with this, researchers may need to make an extra effort to 
demonstrate that a bifactor model configuration is more suitable than a second-order 
factor model (more well-known in psychology) to represent a construct as SPO (see Chen 
et al., 2006, for a discussion). However, researchers also need to keep in mind that bifactor 
models sometimes may ‘artificially’ appear as the best choice due to their tendency to 
overfit to diverse patterns of data (Bonifay & Cai, 2017).  
 
A second difficulty related to the use of bifactor models is they are not easy to set up, 
which could result in anomalous estimates due to misspecifications (Markon, 2019). 
Although some scholars have published handy guidelines to help other researchers in the 
processes of coding and testing this type of model (e.g., Biderman, 2013), the expertise 
required to set and evaluate specific parameters associated with a bifactor model 
sometimes may go far beyond the statistical skills most psychologists have. In addition 
to the necessary technical expertise, the special procedures required to calculate the 
statistical power and required sample size (e.g., Montecarlo simulations), as well as the 
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internal reliability of a multidimensional construct (i.e., Omega coefficients) are reasons 
that may discourage the use of bifactors models in general, and the development of SPO-
R in particular.  
 
A third difficulty researchers might find in expanding the scope of SPO-R is related to 
testing measurement invariance for bifactor models. Thus, complexities associated with 
bifactor models impede that scale comparison across countries becoming an automatized 
process using statistical tools, or that can be carried out following guidelines thought for 
unidimensional constructs.   
 
A fourth difficulty researchers need to cope with in the future development of SPO-R is 
the large sample size required to calculate bifactors models. Considering the complexity 
of a proposed model (i.e., number of dimensions and indicators per dimension), the 
required sample size to test inferences using a bifactor model is larger than those models 
involving only unidimensional constructs. The latter appears especially important when 
bifactor constructs are considered as mediators (see Gonzalez & MacKinnon, 2016). 
 
Although the difficulties mentioned above are serious, by any means, they should not be 
considered fatal or impossible to address by future research. Indeed, the main objective 
to list them is to provide as much information as I can to allow other researchers to make 
informed decisions on what they must bear in mind to expand the scope of SPO-R scale. 
To solve most of the limitations mentioned above there are resources already available 
on conducting Montecarlo simulations using bifactor models with different types of data 
(e.g., Muthén & Muthén, 2009), calculating all versions of Omega coefficients (e.g., 
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Rodriguez, Reise, & Haviland, 2016), and testing measurement invariance in bifactor 
models (Yap et al., 2014).  
 
As it was mentioned in previous chapters, one of the main shortcomings of this research 
is that all the empirical studies were conducted in Western democratic countries, the UK 
and Chile. Despite the fact these countries have a different tradition of protest as well as 
divergent policing approaches to deal with protesters (see Chapters 2 and 3, for a 
discussion), their societies and political regimes were, and currently are, aligned with both 
Western cultural values and Western ideals of democracy. Hence, it is possible to argue 
that in the UK and Chile, people may consider the right to protest as something inherently 
attached to their political systems, as well as something authorities must guarantee for 
everyone. To tackle this limitation, I suggest that SPO-R scale need to be validated, and 
the other reported studies replicated, in Eastern countries/cities with a long tradition of 
protests and diverse political regimes throughout their history as Japan, South Korea (e.g., 
Kim, 2017), and Hong Kong (e.g., Lee & Chan, 2018).  
 
Indeed, I think Hong Kong represents a unique challenge to the study of the perceived 
political conditions where protests take place considering the struggles its inhabitants 
have to go through under the ‘one country, two systems’ policy implemented after the 
British hand-over in 1997.  
 
Even though Hongkongers never got full democratic rights while the city was a British 
colony, they enjoyed more political freedom than those who lived in Mainland China, 
especially after the establishment of People’s Republic of China (Tsang, 2007). This 
227 
 
situation allowed Hongkongers to maintain their long traditions of protests and 
demonstrations, being the annual rally to commemorate Tiananmen Square massacre 
(1989) one of the most iconic collective actions of the city. However, since their 
reunification with the mainland, local activists have denounced an increasing interference 
of the Chinese central government in their local political affairs. These interferences 
represent a masked violation of the Sino-British agreement which guarantees that Hong 
Kong would maintain its own governmental, legal, and economic system at least until 
2047.  
 
According to activists and local politicians (see Bland, 2018) the main consequences of 
the growing influence of Chinese government in Hong Kong political affairs are the 
arbitrary restrictions imposed on the press, as well as to the rights to protest and freedom 
of assembly. The latter becomes especially important after the world learned about two 
main issues of Hong Kong’s current political context regarding protests. First, some of 
those who took part as activists and opinion leaders in the most well-known collective 
action after the reunification, the Umbrella Movement (2014), were prosecuted and 
recently convicted to jail (see Lau & Lok-kei, 2019). Second, at the time of writing, 
Hongkongers have been carrying out street protests against their local government for 
months. Initially, people demanded the Legislative Council of Hong Kong to withdraw a 
bill allowing the extradition of Hong Kong citizens prosecuted for allegedly political 
offences to Mainland China. However, authorities’ unresponsiveness to this demand, 
protests ban, and police brutality made protesters increase their demands to five: the 
complete withdrawal of the extradition bill; that authorities don’t use the word ‘riots’ to 
refer to the protests; the unconditional release of arrested protesters; an independent 
inquiry into police brutality during protests; and the implementation of the universal 
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suffrage (Rourke, 2019). It worth noting that in their almost daily protests, Hongkongers 
have carried out both non-violent and violent actions to complain against authorities and 
defend themselves from indiscriminate arrests and police brutality against protesters. In 
fact, onsite research has shown that a large portion of protesters backs protest violence to 
confront police brutality and pressure the government (Lee, Tang, Yuen, & Cheng, 2019).   
 
Taking into account the antecedents mentioned above, I propose research should put more 
attention to the changing (and more restricted) political context that Hongkongers are 
facing. In particular, I suggest that researching non-participants’ views on protests may 
help us to understand better Hongkongers’ reactions to the increasing restrictions on the 
right to protest and their support for protesters’ actions. 
 
Another scenario that further research on perceived political context may focus on is 
Singapore. In contrast to the situation in Hong Kong, Singapore is already a restricted 
scenario to protests (see Tan, 2017). Despite being declared a parliamentary democracy, 
protests and other public demonstrations were legally banned for a long time. 
Nevertheless, since a couple of decades ago, the Singaporean authorities started a rather 
slow process of political reforms which main outcome was the authorisation of rallies and 
demonstrations within the city-state. Although the current legislation allows people to 
have their say, there are still many restrictions that may make it difficult for Singaporeans’ 
real participation in politics as well in collective action (see Sin, 2017). These restrictions 
are related to who can organize (i.e., only Singaporean citizens) and participate (i.e., only 
Singaporean citizens and permanent residents) in demonstrations; the venue where people 
can meet (i.e., only at the Speakers’ Corners); and the topics can be addressed during the 
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events (e.g., discussion about religious topics are not allowed). Although Singaporeans 
do not have a tradition of protests (protests in this city-state are scarce), I encourage other 
researchers to put attention on the evolution of these liberalisation measures concerning 
protests and evaluate people’s reactions to these new policies longitudinally.  
 
Although the suggestions mentioned above may sound very attractive, it seems essential 
to point out three issues scholars have to consider before studying the perceived political 
context regarding protests in any of these places. First, none of these places represents an 
Eastern culture free from the pervasive influence of Western culture (and its ideals of 
democracy) making difficult to talk about ‘pure’ political systems that respond to the 
needs of a specific society (e.g., East Asian cultures). Therefore, I encourage other 
researchers to be aware that they may often find overlapped and even contradictory ideas 
within political systems that for various reasons (and in different proportions) have 
merged Western political ideals with Eastern cultural values and traditions. 
 
Closely related to the idea described above is the second issue, Western bias. Even though 
studies carried out in WEIRD (Western Educated Industrialized and Democratic) 
countries are over-represented in the current literature on collective action, researchers 
should keep in mind that seeking samples worldwide just for the sake of confirming 
results obtained in America or Europe is counterproductive. Indeed, the main reason to 
avoid mere replications is that, unlike other phenomena, protests are historically situated, 
respond to particular political dynamics as well as to specific cultural values. Hence, to 
avoid simplistic judgments on political systems organized in a different fashion than in 
Western countries, researchers need to delve into the political history of the countries 
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where the projects are carried out, knowing the predominant societal values, and avoid 
excessive criticism of those features do not fit with the Western ideals of democracy (see 
van Zomeren, 2018, for a discussion). To put it differently, instead of trying to ‘force’ 
generalizations of certain political traits or orientations inspired by Western politics, 
future research on perceived political scenarios should adapt its aims, instruments, and 
procedures to the specific contexts where research projects are carried out. 
 
A third issue is on the establishment of cross-cultural research on collective action 
considering the perceived political context where protests take place. In general terms, I 
agree with van Zomeren’s idea (2019) on the core motivations for collective action (i.e., 
group identification, group-based anger, group efficacy beliefs, and moral convictions) 
are context-sensitive, and therefore, the importance of each of them would be a function 
of the features offered by the cultural and political systems. In line with this, I suggest the 
same rationale should be applied to the study of the perceived political context about 
protests through subjective political openness (SPO). Thus, it worth noting that each of 
the current and potential dimensions that may account for people’s perceptions of the 
scenario protesters need to face can be more or less salient depending on the political 
regime; the sort of relationship between different authorities involved in policing protest; 
and the cultural value given to protests.  
 
Moreover, I also think the same rationale mentioned above should be considered to the 
study of non-participants’ support for protest violence. As it was mentioned in Chapters 
3 and 4, support for protesters’ violence depends on both the perceptions of the immediate 
political context and the repertoire of protests available in a specific time and place. 
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Therefore, if researchers are interested in carrying out cross-cultural psychology on 
collective action, they must bear in mind that protesters’ (actual and potential) actions 
may (or not) be aligned with the Western norm that protests must be peaceful. 
 
Another significant limitation of my studies is the use of vignettes to depict the political 
context where protests take place. Besides those limitations mentioned in Chapters 3 and 
4 regarding the difficulties our study participants may have had to engage with a fictional 
scenario, it is necessary to specify an additional issue related to the use of vignettes. 
Although vignettes provide a useful method to depict a general overview of the political 
context about protests, vignettes cannot realistically simulate either modification in the 
measures that authorities (i.e., the government and the police) implement to 
facilitate/restrict protesters’ actions or the occurrence of protest violence. In other words, 
vignettes cannot capture the dynamic of protests concerning the actions carrying out by 
neither protesters nor authorities. Although in Chapter 5 I tried to solve this problem 
combining the use of vignettes and videos to characterise the political context, I suggest 
that future research should include other resources that make possible displaying changes 
in the dynamic of protests. Thus, for example, researchers will need to select and develop 
footage where participants can see changes in the interaction between the police and 
protesters, or photo sequences in which protest violence occurs and then stops or 
disappears. The latter becomes crucial for the analysis of protests and collective action in 
general, once researchers consider that violence does not necessarily occur over a whole 
protest and protesters may alternate the type of actions they perform in a single event. In 
other words, I suggest that in the short-term, the study about the influence of perceived 
political context on non-participants’ support for protest violence should follow the ideas 
proposed in the multimodal reading of public protests (Day et al., 2018). Thus, researchers 
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should focus their efforts on accounting for the shifts regarding the use of violence that 
may occur in a single protest event, how these shifts are represented in both public opinion 
and authorities’ narratives about the (il)legitimacy of protests and on the abandonment of 
the (pervasive) binary non-violent-violent categorization of protests. 
 
Finally, I suggest that assuming the perspective described above may also help to address 
a topic the interviewees pointed in Chapter 4, backing protesters’ violence against the 
police would depend on who is the main aggressor. Thus, I may argue that the use of 
footage or other resources showing the dynamic of a protest might allow comparison of 
people’s reactions to violence initiated by protesters prior to any police action with those 
reactions to protesters’ violence when police officers act as the main aggressors (i.e., self-
defence). Although by any means this implies that protesters’ violence in the absence of 
a direct provocation is mindless, this type of study can be useful to delimit better our 
understanding on what people consider as (il)legitimate self-defence actions.  
  
6.5 Conclusions 
All the studies included in this thesis stress the importance of non-participants as well as 
the integration of the (perceived) political context into the psychological analysis of 
collective action. Indeed, the introduction of a new construct, subjective political 
openness (SPO), is a contribution that allows researchers to include features of the 
political structure (government restrictions and perceived repression) in their analysis of 
protesters’ actions. It is also noteworthy that SPO implies a step in creating a bridge 
between sociological research on social movements and psychological research in 
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collective action that may help to merge different levels of analysis (e.g., macro, meso, 
and microsystems) avoiding unnecessary parallelisms.  
Moreover, my analyses reveal that non-participants’ support for the use of violence 
against the police is based on a similar rationale to that of actual protesters when they 
support or carry out protest violence. In other words, both the perceived political context 
(created by authorities’ restrictions) and the dynamic of protests (the interactions among 
protesters and the police) would be the reference points for people’s evaluations on their 
support for protesters’ violence against the police. Thus, non-participants may 
conceptualise pushing back or even fighting police officers as self-defence actions when 
people perceive the government trying to restrict the right to protest and police arbitrarily 
beating or arresting protesters. Consequently, my research shows that non-participants 
may conceive protest violence as situational and relational phenomena which should not 
be reduced to explanations based on either personal traits, ideological orientations, or to 
the irrationality and dangerousness classically attributed to crowds.  
 
Another significant aspect addressed in this thesis is the role of public opinion as a source 
of legitimacy of protests. In other words, my research contributes to knowing how non-
participants might perceive the relevance that protests have for other people beyond their 
own opinions. This contribution is a valuable insight taking into account that through the 
use of meta-perceptions researchers may get an idea of the importance protest may have 
for a specific society. Also, I provide evidence on the existence of a link between non-
participants’ perceived restrictions by authorities and the perceived legitimacy given by 
others to protests. Therefore, it would be plausible that people may use both sources of 
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information to get an idea about the situation protesters have to face and make a decision 
on granting (or not) support for protesters’ self-defence actions.  
 
Having mentioned the contribution related to the perceived legitimacy given by public 
opinion to protests, its influence on people’s solidarity with protesters in restricted 
scenarios needs to be highlighted as well. Thus, I suggest that solidarity with protesters 
may be differentially activated according to both own opinions on protests and the extent 
to which non-participants perceive public opinion legitimates the protests organised by 
some specific groups. Likewise, I provide evidence that solidarity with protesters acts as 
a mechanism that allows non-participants to back protesters’ self-defence actions in 
scenarios where the authorities restrict protests and public opinion may either follow or 
resist these measures. 
 
Undoubtedly, and for the sake of democracy, protests will continue to take place 
worldwide. Accordingly, researchers need to be aware of the political conditions under 
which these protests take place, the occurrence of protest violence, as well as of the 
dynamics of protests that make non-participants back protesters’ violence against the 
police. Indeed, I think that scholars must focus their efforts on understanding the political 
trajectories and historical repertoire of protests of a specific society before analysing and 
make a judgement over the occurrence of protest violence and the support it can gain from 
non-participants. I firmly believe that the two main effects of these efforts would be that 
those who use (and support) violence against the police during protests were not 
immediately vilified because of their actions and thoughts, and second, that future 
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research in non-Western countries would be less affected by Western ideals of 
democracy. 
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Appendix 1: Online questionnaire (English) for Chapter 2 Study 1 
 
Validation of Subjective Political Openness Scale (SPO) 
 
Information and Consent 
 
Dear participant, 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not 
to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
it will involve. Please take the time to read the following information carefully. 
 
 This research is a questionnaire-based study led by researchers at the School of 
Psychology, University of Sussex. It seeks to compare the opinion of young people 
from different cultures (UK and Chile) about social movements and some activities 
associated to them as marches and protests. The main purpose of this study is to validate 
a scale of measurement that analyses people’s opinions about these topics considering 
those individual and contextual factors that could affect the development of these 
thoughts. 
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We hope you will take part in this study, and to do so, you will be asked to give your 
consent to proceed. If you decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw at any time 
and without giving a reason, till the point that the report of this project is drawn up. 
 
Please take into account that if you decide to participate or not in our study, it will have 
no impact on your marks, assessments, or future studies. 
 
Your participation will consist of completing an online questionnaire specially designed 
for this study; it keeps measures of comparability with the instrument used in Chile by 
people of your same age. Your data will be kept confidential, and your answers will not 
be able to link with your contact details at any level. Completing the questionnaire should 
not take you more than 25 minutes. After that, you are welcome to ask questions about 
the project by contacting the researchers. 
 
Participation in this study does not involve any direct or indirect physical or 
psychological risk, and you will be able to choose between receiving 2 credits, or 
entering in a prize draw (£45) as a reward for the time dedicated to this project. You 
should bear in mind that your odds of winning the draw are shared with those of the 
other participants (250 more or less). 
 
Your involvement will be very valuable in showing the opinions of young British people 
about the social movements, and contrast it with the thoughts of people of your same age 
from another country. The latter will be able to extend the knowledge and understanding 
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of this topic considering the cultural differences that may exist about it. The results of this 
study will be used to write academic papers and will be part of a PhD thesis. No 
identifiable information will be used for any of these purposes. This study has been 
approved by the Sciences & Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee 
(crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk). The project reference number is ER/PS356/2. The University 
of Sussex has insurance in place to cover its legal liabilities in respect of this study. If you 
have any questions or comments regarding the study, please contact Patricio Saavedra 
(P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk), or if you have any concerns about the way in which 
the study has been conducted, please contact John Drury (j.drury@sussex.ac.uk). Thank 
you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you are willing to take part in 
this study please proceed to give your consent. 
 
I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the 
project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet for 
participants. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to fill out an 
online questionnaire. 
 
I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information that I 
disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the reports on the project, either 
by the researcher or by any other party. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part 
or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project till the point that 
the report is drawn up without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way. 
284 
 
 
     By ticking this box I give my consent to participate in this study. 
 
To start, please enter a valid Sussex email address (just to allocate the reward): 
 
Please, indicate what is your current status at University of Sussex 
m Undergraduate student 
m Master student 
m PhD student 
m None 
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Thinking about the current government of your country, please indicate your agreement 
with each of the statements below. For this, please use the following scale where 1 is 
strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The government allows people to protest in the street freely. m  m  m  m  m  
The government values the fact that people express their 
opinion by participating in marches or protests. 
m  m  m  m  m  
The government believes that the protests are a legitimate act 
of political expression. 
m  m  m  m  m  
The government restricts political expressions involving 
participation in protests 
m  m  m  m  m  
This government hinders participation in marches and 
protests 
m  m  m  m  m  
The government is against people expressing their discontent 
by participating in protests 
m  m  m  m  m  
Protests are constantly delegitimised by the current 
government 
m  m  m  m  m  
The protests are respected and their concerns listened by the 
government authorities 
m  m  m  m  m  
The government is concerned to guarantee that people can 
participate in marches and protests without problems 
m  m  m  m  m  
Citizens’ participation in protests is considered as a problem 
by this government 
m  m  m  m  m  
Those who participate in protests are labelled as criminals by 
this government 
m  m  m  m  m  
This government considers protests as a threat to its political 
stability 
m  m  m  m  m  
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Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below. For this, please use the 
following scale where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The people always should be able to protest itself in the street 
freely 
m  m  m  m  m  
I positively value the fact that people express their opinion by 
participating in marches or protests 
m  m  m  m  m  
I think that the protests are a legitimate act of political 
expression. 
m  m  m  m  m  
Political expressions involving participation in protests 
should be restricted 
m  m  m  m  m  
The government should hinder participation in marches and 
protests 
m  m  m  m  m  
I am against that people express their discontent by 
participating in protests 
m  m  m  m  m  
From my perspective the protests are not legitimate in a 
democratic system 
m  m  m  m  m  
I respect that social movements conduct public activities to 
express their concerns 
m  m  m  m  m  
In this country, people participation in marches and protests 
should be guaranteed 
m  m  m  m  m  
Protests are a threat for the political stability of own country m  m  m  m  m  
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Thinking about the protests and demonstrations that are carried out in the street, please 
indicate how often are the following situations. For this please use the next scale where 1 
is never, 2 rarely, 3 sometimes, 4 often, 5 always. 
 
 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 
In this country, the protests are dispersed using violent 
methods 
m  m  m  m  m  
The police use an indiscriminate violence against the 
protesters 
m  m  m  m  m  
Carrying out protests in this country is difficult because these 
are immediately attacked by the police 
m  m  m  m  m  
Those who participate in demonstrations usually are 
persecuted by the police and government 
m  m  m  m  m  
In my country, those who participate in protests may end up 
injured by the disproportionate violence used by the police 
m  m  m  m  m  
Usually in this country, some people are arrested without any 
more justification than having participated in a protest 
m  m  m  m  m  
When a protest takes place, it is immediately stopped by the 
police actions 
m  m  m  m  m  
One of the primary objectives of the police is to prevent the 
development of any political demonstrations 
m  m  m  m  m  
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Thinking about the protests and demonstrations that are carried out in the street please 
indicate your agreement with each of the statements below. For this, please use the 
following scale where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The police can use the violence to break up any kind of protest m  m  m  m  m  
The police have to use force against all participants in a 
protest when some protestors become violent 
m  m  m  m  m  
The police have to prevent anyone carrying out protests in this 
country 
m  m  m  m  m  
All those who participate in protests should be persecuted by 
the police and government 
m  m  m  m  m  
If some people are injured by the police during protests it is 
their own fault 
m  m  m  m  m  
It is legitimate that the police arrest people during a march 
without explanations 
m  m  m  m  m  
Some people should be arrested without any more 
justification than having participated in a protest 
m  m  m  m  m  
When a protest is carried out, its development should be 
immediately stopped by the police 
m  m  m  m  m  
One of the primary objectives of the police should be 
preventing the development of any political demonstrations 
m  m  m  m  m  
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Taking into account what people of your country think about the presence of social 
movements and protests, please indicate how typical the following statements are of 
public opinion. For this, use the next scale where 1 is very untypical and 5 very typical. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
People of my country think that participating in protests is a valid political action m  m  m  m  m  
Citizens are of the opinion that carrying out protests is fine even when not sharing the 
protesters’ concerns m  m  m  m  m  
People think that taking part in protests is legitimate in spite of the fact these can be 
inconvenient m  m  m  m  m  
The people of my country agree that those whose rights are violated can protest m  m  m  m  m  
Citizens of my country believe that those who participate in protests are simply criminals 
whose objective is to destabilise the country m  m  m  m  m  
For the people of my country, those who participate in protests just try to alter the public 
order m  m  m  m  m  
The people of my country think that demonstrations are an important activity in a democratic 
system m  m  m  m  m  
Citizens of my country conceive that participating in marches and protests is a right that all 
of us have m  m  m  m  m  
People of my country positively value that citizens express their concerns organizing 
marches and protests m  m  m  m  m  
The people of my country think that demonstrations are a necessary activity in a democratic 
system m  m  m  m  m  
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Taking into account what you think about the presence of social movements and protests 
in your country, please indicate how typical the following statements are of your own 
opinion. For this, use the next scale where 1 is very untypical and 5 very typical. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
I think that participating in protests is a valid political action m  m  m  m  m  
It is fine that people carry out protests even though I do not share the protesters’ 
concerns 
m  m  m  m  m  
I value the development of protests in spite of the fact these can be inconvenient m  m  m  m  m  
I agree that those whose rights are violated can protest m  m  m  m  m  
Those who participate in protests are simple criminals whose objective is to 
destabilise the country 
m  m  m  m  m  
Those who participate in protests just try to alter the public order m  m  m  m  m  
Demonstrations are an important activity in a democratic system m  m  m  m  m  
Participating in marches and protests is a right that all of us have m  m  m  m  m  
I positively value that citizens express their concerns organizing marches and 
protests 
m  m  m  m  m  
I think that demonstrations are a necessary activity in a democratic system m  m  m  m  m  
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Thinking about the police of your country, please indicate your agreement with each of 
the following statements. For this please use the following scale where 1 is strongly 
disagree and 5 strongly agree. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
In a protest the police always use procedures that are fair for 
everyone 
m  m  m  m  m  
During a protest the police always clearly explain the reasons 
behind their actions 
m  m  m  m  m  
During a protest the police provide opportunity for unfair 
decisions to be corrected 
m  m  m  m  m  
Generally, the police make decisions based in facts, non in 
personal opinions 
m  m  m  m  m  
 
Please, indicate your agreement with each of the following statements. For this, please 
use the following scale where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
People like me don't have any say about what the government 
does 
m  m  m  m  m  
I don't think public officials care much what people like me 
think 
m  m  m  m  m  
People like me can generate social changes m  m  m  m  m  
If I put my mind to it, I would carry out actions to influence 
the way in what the government make decisions 
m  m  m  m  m  
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Please, assess each of the following statements about the government actions using the 
following scale where 1 is none attention and 5 a lot of attention. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
How much attention do you feel the government pays to what 
the people think when it decides what to do? 
m  m  m  m  m  
How much attention do you feel the government pays to 
social movements claims, when it decides what to do? 
m  m  m  m  m  
How much attention do you feel the government pays to 
social movements claims, when these use the violence? 
m  m  m  m  m  
How much attention do you feel the government pays to 
social movements claims, when these act peacefully? 
m  m  m  m  m  
 
Please indicate your extent of your confidence in each of the political institutions using 
the following scale where 1 is none confidence and 5 a lot of confidence. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The politicians m  m  m  m  m  
The parliament m  m  m  m  m  
The government m  m  m  m  m  
Courts of Justice m  m  m  m  m  
 
Have you participated in marches or protests during the last 12 months? 
m Yes 
m No 
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Please indicate how much you value the following groups or social movements, using 
the next scale where 1 is nothing and 5 a lot. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Student social movements m  m  m  m  m  
Those Social movements that support labour claims m  m  m  m  m  
Environmental movements m  m  m  m  m  
Those Social movements that support indigenous claims m  m  m  m  m  
Those Social movements that support sexual diversity m  m  m  m  m  
Pro-Immigrant movements m  m  m  m  m  
 
Thinking in the list of social movements that you read before, please indicate which is 
the most valuable for you: 
m Student social movements 
m Those social movements that support labour claims 
m Environmental movements 
m Those social movements that support indigenous claims 
m Those social movements that support sexual diversity 
m Pro-Immigrant movements 
 
Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below referred to the social 
movement that you selected as the most valuable. For this, please use the following scale 
where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
I feel committed to this movement m  m  m  m  m  
I identify with this movement m  m  m  m  m  
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How old are you? 
 
Sex 
m Female  
m Male 
m Other  
 
What is your nationality? 
 
In which country do you live? 
 
What kind of reward would you prefer for your participation in this study? 
m 2 Credits 
m Enter in a prize draw (£45) 
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Appendix 2: Online questionnaire (Spanish) for Chapter 2 Study 1 
 
 
Validación Escala Subjective Political Openness 
 
Carta de consentimiento informado 
 
Usted ha sido invitado a participar en el estudio “Subjective Political Openness” a cargo 
de los investigadores Patricio Saavedra y John Drury de la University of Sussex, Reino 
Unido, y Roberto González Gutiérrez de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. El 
objeto de esta carta es ayudarlo a tomar la decisión de participar en la presente 
investigación. 
 
¿Cuál es el propósito de esta investigación?   
Esta investigación forma parte de un proyecto internacional que busca comparar las 
opiniones que tienen los jóvenes de dos culturas distintas (Reino Unido y Chile) sobre los 
movimientos sociales y actividades asociadas a estos como son las marchas y protestas. 
Uno de los objetivos fundamentales de esta investigación es validar que analiza las 
opiniones que las personas tienen sobre estas temáticas, de tal forma de considerar tanto 
factores individuales como contextuales que pueden estar influyendo en el desarrollo de 
estas opiniones. 
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¿En qué consiste tu participación? 
Tu participación consistirá en contestar un cuestionario online especialmente diseñado 
para este estudio, que mantiene medidas de comparabilidad con las de los otros países 
participantes del proyecto de investigación. En el cuestionario se te pedirá que indiques 
tu opinión de la sociedad chilena y la vida en Chile. 
 
¿Cuánto durará tu participación? Tu participación total en el proyecto será de 25 minutos, 
que es el tiempo que demora contestar el cuestionario online.  
 
¿Qué riesgos corres al participar? 
Al participar de este estudio no corres ningún riesgo físico ni psicológico, tanto directa 
como indirectamente. 
 
¿Qué beneficios puede tener tu participación? 
Al contar con una muestra de chilenos como tú, será posible mostrar las opiniones de los 
jóvenes chilenos sobre los movimientos sociales y compararlas con la de otro país y 
cultura, lo que permitirá enriquecer el conocimiento, análisis y comprensión de este tema 
considerando las diferencias de cada uno de los países participantes en este estudio 
transcultural. Asimismo, entre todos los participantes de este estudio se sorteará un Kindle 
PaperWhite una vez finalizada la recolección de datos durante abril de 2016. 
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¿Qué pasa con la información y datos que entregue? Los investigadores mantendrán 
CONFIDENCIALIDAD con respecto a cualquier información obtenida en este estudio. 
Así los datos de contacto que el encuestador te solicitará al momento de aceptar participar 
en este proyecto serán solo con el fin de enviarte el correo con el link que te dirigirá al 
cuestionario online. El equipo de investigación a cargo resguardará tus datos recopilados 
en la hoja de reclutamiento sellados en una bodega por un espacio de 5 años, luego de los 
cuales serán destruidos de tal forma de impedir su divulgación o mal uso. De todas 
maneras te aseguramos que tu información de contacto no será incluida al momento de 
consignar los archivos de datos para su análisis, siendo tu encuesta identificable 
solamente por un número único que se encuentra asociado a tus respuestas mas no a quién 
lo respondió. Así también se asegura a los participantes que los datos recopilados en este 
estudio solo serán utilizados para los fines de esta investigación específica. 
 
¿Es obligación participar? ¿Puedo arrepentirme después de participar? 
Tú NO estás obligado de ninguna manera a participar en este estudio. Si accedes a 
participar, puedes dejar de hacerlo en cualquier momento sin repercusión alguna y sin 
necesidad de justificar tal acción frente al encuestador o al equipo de investigación a cargo 
del proyecto. 
 
¿A quién puedo contactar para saber más de este estudio o si me surgen dudas? 
Teniendo en Si tienes cualquier pregunta acerca de esta investigación, puedes contactar a 
Patricio Saavedra Morales de la University of Sussex. Su email es P.Saavedra-
Morales@sussex.ac.uk Si usted tiene alguna consulta o preocupación respecto a sus 
derechos como participante de este estudio, puede contactar al Comité Ético Científico 
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de Ciencias Sociales, Artes y Humanidades. Presidenta: María Elena Gronemeyer. 
Contacto: eticadeinvestigacion@uc.cl. 
 
Al hacer click en ‘Aceptar’ estarás indicando que has tenido la oportunidad de leer esta 
declaración de consentimiento informado y ACEPTAS participar en este proyecto. Si, 
por el contrario, no deseas participar, haz click en ‘Rechazar’. 
 
  Aceptar  
  Rechazar 
 
  
299 
 
Pensando en el gobierno de tu país, por favor indica tu grado de acuerdo con cada una de 
las siguientes afirmaciones. Para ello utiliza la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es 
muy en desacuerdo y 5 muy de acuerdo. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
El gobierno permite que la gente se manifieste libremente en las calles  m  m  m  m  m  
El gobierno valora que la gente exprese su opinión participando en 
marchas o protestas  
m  m  m  m  m  
Para el gobierno las protestas son un acto legítimo de expresión 
política  
m  m  m  m  m  
El gobierno restringe expresiones políticas que implican la 
participación en protestas.  
m  m  m  m  m  
El gobierno obstaculiza la participación de la gente en marchas y 
protestas  
m  m  m  m  m  
Este gobierno se opone a que la gente exprese su descontento 
participando en protestas  
m  m  m  m  m  
Las movilizaciones sociales son constantemente deslegitimadas por 
parte de este gobierno  
m  m  m  m  m  
Las movilizaciones sociales son respetadas por parte de las 
autoridades de gobierno  
m  m  m  m  m  
El gobierno está preocupado de garantizar que la gente pueda 
participar en marchas y protestas  
m  m  m  m  m  
La participación de los ciudadanos en protestas es vista como un 
problema por este gobierno  
m  m  m  m  m  
Quiénes participan en protestas son etiquetados como criminales por 
este gobierno  
m  m  m  m  m  
Este gobierno considera las protestas como una amenaza para su 
estabilidad  
m  m  m  m  m  
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Indica tu grado de acuerdo con cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones. Para ello utiliza 
la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es muy en desacuerdo y 5 muy de acuerdo. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
La gente siempre debería poder manifestarse libremente en las 
calles 
m  m  m  m  m  
Valoro positivamente que la gente exprese su opinión 
participando en marchas o protestas 
m  m  m  m  m  
Para mí las protestas son acto legítimo de expresión política m  m  m  m  m  
Deberían restringirse expresiones políticas que impliquen la 
participación en protestas  
m  m  m  m  m  
El gobierno debería obstaculizar la participación de la gente 
en marchas y protestas  
m  m  m  m  m  
Estoy en contra de que la gente exprese su descontento 
participando en protestas  
m  m  m  m  m  
Desde mi punto de vista las protestas carecen de legitimidad 
en un sistema democrático  
m  m  m  m  m  
Respeto que los movimientos sociales lleven a cabo 
actividades públicas para expresar sus preocupaciones.  
m  m  m  m  m  
En este país se debe garantizar que la gente pueda participar 
en marchas y protestas.  
m  m  m  m  m  
Las protestas son una amenaza para la estabilidad de nuestro 
país  
m  m  m  m  m  
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Respecto a las protestas y manifestaciones que se llevan a cabo en la vía pública, por 
favor indica cuan frecuentes son cada una de las siguientes situaciones. Para ello utiliza 
la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es nunca, 2 rara vez, 3 a veces, 4 
frecuentemente, y 5 siempre. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
En este país las protestas son disueltas utilizando métodos 
violentos  
m  m  m  m  m  
La policía utiliza la violencia en forma indiscriminada contra 
los manifestantes  
m  m  m  m  m  
Es difícil llevar a cabo protestas en este país ya que éstas son 
inmediatamente atacadas por la policía 
m  m  m  m  m  
Quiénes participan en protestas usualmente son perseguidos 
por la policía y el gobierno 
m  m  m  m  m  
En mi país aquellos que participan en protestas pueden 
terminar heridos debido a la violencia desproporcionada 
utilizada por la policía 
m  m  m  m  m  
Es usual que en este país algunas personas sean arrestadas sin 
mayor justificación que haber participado en una protesta  
m  m  m  m  m  
Cuando una protesta se lleva a cabo su avance es 
inmediatamente impedido por la policía 
m  m  m  m  m  
Uno de los objetivos primordiales de la policía es impedir que 
se desarrollen manifestaciones políticas de cualquier tipo 
m  m  m  m  m  
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Respecto a las movilizaciones sociales y protestas que se llevan a cabo en la vía pública, 
por favor indica tu grado de acuerdo con cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones 
utilizando la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es muy en desacuerdo y 5 muy de 
acuerdo. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
La policía puede utilizar la violencia para disolver cualquier 
tipo de protesta 
m  m  m  m  m  
La policía debe usar la violencia contra todos los participantes 
en una protesta cuando algunos de ellos se vuelve violentos  
m  m  m  m  m  
La policía debe dificultar que cualquier persona lleve a cabo 
protestas en este país  
m  m  m  m  m  
Quiénes participan en protestas deberían ser perseguidos por 
la policía y el gobierno 
m  m  m  m  m  
Si algunas personas son heridas por la policía durante las 
protestas es porque ellas se lo buscan 
m  m  m  m  m  
Es legítimo que la policía detenga a personas durante una 
marcha sin darle explicaciones  
m  m  m  m  m  
Las personas deberían ser arrestadas sin mayor justificación 
por haber participado en una protesta 
m  m  m  m  m  
Cuando una protesta se lleve a cabo su avance debe ser 
inmediatamente impedido por la policía 
m  m  m  m  m  
Uno de los objetivos primordiales de la policía debe ser 
obstaculizar las manifestaciones políticas de cualquier tipo 
m  m  m  m  m  
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Teniendo en consideración lo que la gente de tu país piensa respecto a la presencia de 
movilizaciones sociales y protestas, por favor indica cuan típicas de la opinión de tus 
conciudadanos son cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones.  
Para ello utiliza la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es muy atípica y 5 muy típica. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
La gente de mi país cree que participar en protestas es una acción 
política válida m  m  m  m  m  
Los ciudadanos creen que está bien que se realicen protestas a 
pesar de que no compartan las demandas o exigencias de los 
manifestantes 
m  m  m  m  m  
La gente piensa que es legítimo que se lleven a cabo protestas 
aun cuando éstas interrumpan su vida cotidiana m  m  m  m  m  
Las personas de mi país apoyan las protestas de aquellas 
personas cuyos derechos han sido violados m  m  m  m  m  
Los ciudadanos de mi país creen que quienes participan en 
protestas son solo delincuentes que buscan desestabilizar al país m  m  m  m  m  
Los ciudadanos de mi país piensan que quienes participan de las 
protestas solo buscan alterar el orden público m  m  m  m  m  
La gente de mi país piensa que las protestas son una actividad 
importante en un sistema democrático m  m  m  m  m  
Los ciudadanos de mi país creen que el participar en protestas y 
marchas es un derecho que todos tenemos m  m  m  m  m  
La gente de mi país valora positivamente que los ciudadanos 
expresen sus inquietudes organizando marchas y protestas m  m  m  m  m  
La gente de mi país piensa que las protestas son una actividad 
necesaria en un sistema democrático m  m  m  m  m  
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Teniendo en consideración lo que tú piensas acerca de la presencia de movilizaciones 
sociales y protestas en tu país, por favor indica cuan típicas de tu opinión personal son las 
siguientes afirmaciones (1 muy atípica y 5 muy típica) .  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Creo que participar en protestas es una acción política válida m  m  m  m  m  
Pienso que está bien que se realicen protestas a pesar de no compartir las demandas o 
exigencias de los manifestantes  
m  m  m  m  m  
Valoro que se lleven a cabo protestas aun cuando éstas interrumpan mi vida cotidiana  m  m  m  m  m  
Apoyo las protestas de aquellas personas cuyos derechos han sido violados  m  m  m  m  m  
Creo que aquellos que participan en protestas son solo delincuentes que buscan 
desestabilizar al país  
m  m  m  m  m  
Pienso que aquellos que participan en protestas solo buscan alterar el orden público  m  m  m  m  m  
Las protestas son una actividad relevante en un sistema democrático m  m  m  m  m  
Participar en marchas y protestas es un derecho que todos tenemos m  m  m  m  m  
Valoro positivamente que los ciudadanos expresen sus inquietudes organizando 
marchas y protestas 
m  m  m  m  m  
Creo que las protestas son una actividad necesaria en un sistema democrático m  m  m  m  m  
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Pensando en la policía de tu país, por favor demuestra tu grado de acuerdo con cada una 
de las siguientes afirmaciones. Para ello utiliza la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 
es muy en desacuerdo y 5 muy de acuerdo. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
En el transcurso de una protesta la policía siempre utiliza 
procedimientos que son justos para todos 
m  m  m  m  m  
Durante una protesta la policía siempre explica claramente las 
razones que se encuentran a la base de sus acciones  
m  m  m  m  m  
Mientras se desarrolla una protesta la policía tiene la 
oportunidad de corregir sus decisiones cuando éstas son 
injustas 
m  m  m  m  m  
En general la policía actúa en una protesta basando sus 
decisiones en hechos, no en opiniones personales 
m  m  m  m  m  
 
Por favor demuestra tu grado de acuerdo con cada una de las siguientes 
afirmaciones utilizando para ello la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es muy en 
desacuerdo y 5 muy de acuerdo. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
La gente como yo no tiene nada que decir acerca lo que el 
gobierno hace 
m  m  m  m  m  
No creo que las autoridades de gobierno se preocupen mucho 
acerca de lo que piensa la gente como yo 
m  m  m  m  m  
La gente como yo puede generar cambios sociales m  m  m  m  m  
Si me lo propongo puedo realizar acciones que influyan en el 
modo en que el gobierno toma decisiones 
m  m  m  m  m  
  
306 
 
Por favor evalúa cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones con respecto a las acciones del 
gobierno utilizando para ello la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es ninguna 
atención y 5 mucha atención. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Cuanta atención crees que el gobierno pone a lo que la gente 
piensa cuando decide lo que tiene hacer?  
m  m  m  m  m  
Cuanta atención crees que el gobierno pone a las demandas o 
exigencias de los movimientos sociales cuando decide lo que 
tiene que hacer?  
m  m  m  m  m  
Cuanta atención crees que el gobierno pone a las demandas o 
exigencias de los movimientos sociales cuando estos utilizan 
la violencia?  
m  m  m  m  m  
Cuanta atención crees que el gobierno pone a las demandas o 
exigencias de los movimientos sociales que se expresan de 
forma pacífica?  
m  m  m  m  m  
 
Por favor indica tu grado de confianza hacia las siguientes instituciones políticas 
utilizando para ello la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es ninguna confianza y 5 
mucha confianza. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Los políticos  m  m  m  m  m  
El parlamento  m  m  m  m  m  
El gobierno  m  m  m  m  m  
El sistema judicial  m  m  m  m  m  
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Has participado en marchas, movimientos sociales o protestas durante los últimos 12 
meses?: 
m Si  
m No  
 
Por favor indica cuanto valoras los siguientes grupos o movimientos sociales utilizando 
para ello la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es nada y 5 mucho. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Movimientos sociales de estudiantes  m  m  m  m  m  
Movimientos sociales de apoyo a demandas laborales  m  m  m  m  m  
Movimientos sociales ambientalistas  m  m  m  m  m  
Movimientos sociales de apoyo a los pueblos originarios  m  m  m  m  m  
Movimientos sociales de apoyo a la diversidad sexual  m  m  m  m  m  
Movimientos sociales de apoyo a inmigrantes  m  m  m  m  m  
 
Pensando en la lista de movimientos o grupos que acaba de leer, por favor indique según 
su opinión personal cual es el que usted más valora: 
m Movimientos sociales de estudiantes  
m Movimientos sociales de apoyo a demandas laborales  
m Movimientos sociales ambientalistas  
m Movimientos sociales de apoyo a los pueblos originarios  
m Movimientos sociales de apoyo a la diversidad sexual  
m Movimientos sociales de apoyo a inmigrantes  
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Por favor demuestra tu grado de acuerdo con cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones 
referidas al movimiento que tú seleccionaste como el que más valoras utilizando para ello 
la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es muy en desacuerdo y 5 muy de acuerdo. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Siento un compromiso con el movimiento  m  m  m  m  m  
Me identifico con el movimiento  m  m  m  m  m  
 
¿Cuántos años tienes? 
 
Sexo: 
m Mujer  
m Hombre  
m Otro  
 
¿Cuál es tu nacionalidad?: 
 
¿En qué país vives actualmente?: 
 
Si tienes algún comentario sobre alguna pregunta específica del cuestionario o los temas 
presentes en éste puedes hacerlo en el espacio que se muestra a continuación. Tu opinión 
es importante para nosotros. 
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Por favor, señala si una vez finalizada la investigación quieres recibir un resumen con 
los resultados generales de la misma en tu correo electrónico: 
m Si  
m No  
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Appendix 3: Overview of cross-cultural invariance tests for Chapter 2 Study 1 
 
Table. Goodness-of-fit indices and comparison of models testing measurement invariance for 
government openness. 
 
Note: M0 corresponds to the baseline model without any restricted parameter; M1 to the model 
testing weak invariance; M2 to the model testing strong invariance, M2P to the model testing 
partial strong invariance; M3P to the model testing partial strict invariance; and M4P to the model 
testing the invariance of latent factor (variance). 
  
 
Model 
 
χ2 
 
df 
 
∆ χ2 
 
∆df 
 
CFI 
 
TLI 
 
SRMR 
 
RMSEA 
90% CI for 
RMSEA 
 
Model 
Comparison LL UL 
M0 4.28 4 
  
.99 .99 .01    .01 .00 .10   
M1 5.03 7 0.74 3 1.00 1.00 .02    .00 .00 .06 ∆ χ2 M1-M0 
M2  77.92 10 72.89 3 .82 .79 .10    .17 .13 .20     ∆ χ2 M2-M1 
M2P 5.10 8 0.07 1 1.00 1.01 .02    .00 .00 .05  ∆ χ2 M2P-M1 
M3P 7.19 10 2.09 2 1.00 1.00 .03    .00 .00 .05    ∆ χ2 M3P-M2P 
M4P 14.77 11 7.57 1 .99 .99 .12    .03 .00 .08    ∆ χ2 M4P-M3P 
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Table. Goodness-of-fit indices and comparison of models testing measurement invariance for 
perceived repression. 
  
Model 
  
χ2 
  
df 
  
∆ χ2 
  
∆ df 
  
CFI 
  
TLI 
  
SRMR 
  
RMSEA 
90% CI for 
RMSEA 
  
Model 
Comparison LL UL 
M0 5.97 4 
  
.99 .98 .01 .04 .00 .11   
M1 7.78 7 1.81 3 .99 .99 .02 .02 .00 .08 ∆χ2 M1-M0 
M2  87.54 10 79.75 3 .85 .82 .15 .18 .14 .21 ∆χ2 M2-M1 
M2P 9.81 8 2.02 1 .99 .99 .03 .03 .00 .08 ∆χ2 M2P-M1 
M3P 16.45 10 6.64 2 .98 .98 .04 .05 .01 .09 ∆χ2 M3P-M2P 
 
Note: M0 corresponds to the baseline model without any restricted parameter; M1 to the model 
testing weak invariance; M2 to the model testing strong invariance, M2P to the model testing 
partial strong invariance; and M3P to the model testing partial strict invariance. 
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Table. Goodness-of-fit indices and comparison of models testing measurement invariance for 
legitimacy of protests (original scale). 
  
Model 
  
χ2 
  
df 
  
∆ χ2 
  
∆df 
  
CFI 
  
TLI 
  
SRMR 
  
RMSEA 
90% CI for 
RMSEA 
 
Model 
Comparison LL UL 
M0 4.26 4 
  
.99 .99 .01 .01 .00 .10   
M1 9.87 7 5.61 3 .99 .98 .05 .04 .00 .09 ∆ χ2 M1-M0 
M2  66.73 10 56.85 3 .82 .78 .10 .15 .12 .19 ∆ χ2 M2-M1 
M2P 10.02 8 0.14 1 .99 .99 .05 .03 .00 .08 ∆ χ2 M2P-M1 
M3P 12.32 10 2.29 2 .99 .99 .03 .03 .00 .08 ∆ χ2 M3P-M2P 
M4P 12.60 11 0.27 1 .99 .99 .03 .02 .00 .07 ∆ χ2 M4P-M3P 
M5P 14.06 12 1.46 1 .99 .99 .05 .02 .00 .07 ∆ χ2 M5P-M4P 
 
Note: M0 corresponds to the baseline model without any restricted parameter; M1 to the model 
testing weak invariance; M2 to the model testing strong invariance, M2P to the model testing 
partial strong invariance; M3P to the model testing partial strict invariance; M4P to the model 
testing the invariance of latent factor (variance); and M5P to the model testing the invariance of 
latent factor (mean). 
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Appendix 4: Online questionnaire (English) for Chapter 2 Study 2  
 
Validation of Subjective Political Openness Scale 2 (SPO) 
 
Information and Consent 
 
Dear participant, 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not 
to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
it will involve. Please take the time to read the following information carefully. This 
research is a questionnaire-based study led by researchers at the School of Psychology, 
University of Sussex. It seeks to compare the opinion of young people from different 
cultures (UK and Chile) about social movements and some activities associated to them 
as marches and protests. The main purpose of this study is to validate a scale of 
measurement that analyses people’s opinions about these topics considering those 
individual and contextual factors that could affect the development of these thoughts. We 
hope you will take part in this study, and to do so, you will be asked to give your consent 
to proceed. If you decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without 
giving a reason, till the point that the report of this project is drawn up. 
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Your participation will consist of completing an online questionnaire specially designed 
for this study; it keeps measures of comparability with the instrument used in Chile by 
people of your same age. Your data will be kept confidential, and your answers will not 
be able to link with your contact details at any level. Completing the questionnaire 
should not take you more than 35 minutes. After that, you are welcome to ask questions 
about the project by contacting the researchers. Participation in this study does not 
involve any direct or indirect physical or psychological risk, and you will 
receive (£0.75) as a reward for the time dedicated to this project.  
 
Your involvement will be very valuable in showing the opinions of young British people 
about the social movements, and contrast it with the thoughts of people of your same age 
from another country. The latter will be able to extend the knowledge and understanding 
of this topic considering the cultural differences that may exist about it. The results of this 
study will be used to write academic papers, and will be part of a PhD thesis. No 
identifiable information will be used for any of these purposes. This study has been 
approved by the Sciences & Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee 
(crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk). The project reference number is ER/PS356/5. The University 
of Sussex has insurance in place to cover its legal liabilities in respect of this study. If you 
have any questions or comments regarding the study, please contact Patricio Saavedra 
(P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk), or if you have any concerns about the way in which 
the study has been conducted, please contact John Drury (j.drury@sussex.ac.uk). Thank 
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you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you are willing to take part in 
this study please proceed to give your consent. 
 
I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the 
project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet for 
participants. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to fill out an 
online questionnaire. I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that 
no information that I disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the reports 
on the project, either by the researcher or by any other party.  
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part 
or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project till the point that 
the report is drawn up without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way. 
 
Consent: 
m By ticking this box I give my consent to participate in this study.  
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Thinking about the current government of your country, please indicate your agreement 
with each of the statements below. For this, please use the following scale where 1 is 
strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The government allows people to protest in the street freely  m  m  m  m  m  
This government uses the law to stop protests taking place  m  m  m  m  m  
The government openly threatens all those who takes part in 
protests.  
m  m  m  m  m  
The government restricts political expressions involving 
participation in protests  
m  m  m  m  m  
This government hinders participation in marches and 
protests  
m  m  m  m  m  
The government is against people expressing their discontent 
by participating in protests  
m  m  m  m  m  
This government considers those who participate in protests 
as enemies of the state  
m  m  m  m  m  
Citizens’ participation in protests is considered as a problem 
by this government  
m  m  m  m  m  
Those who participate in protests are labelled as criminals by 
this government  
m  m  m  m  m  
This government considers protests as a threat to its political 
stability  
m  m  m  m  m  
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The opinions that you expressed above are mainly based on....? 
m Your personal experience  
m What you have heard from members of your family  
m What you have heard from your friends  
m What you have seen or heard in the mass media  
 
Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below. For this, please use 
the following scale where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The people always should be able to protest itself in the street 
freely  
m  m  m  m  m  
I positively value the fact that people express their opinion by 
participating in marches or protests.  
m  m  m  m  m  
I think that the protests are a legitimate act of political 
expression.  
m  m  m  m  m  
To maintain order on the streets, the government should 
forbid protest and demonstrations  
m  m  m  m  m  
The government should hinder participation in marches and 
protests  
m  m  m  m  m  
I am against that people express their discontent by 
participating in protests  
m  m  m  m  m  
From my perspective the protests are not legitimate in a 
democratic system  
m  m  m  m  m  
I respect that social movements conduct public activities to 
express their concerns  
m  m  m  m  m  
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The opinions that you expressed above are mainly based on....? 
m Your personal experience  
m What you have heard from members of your family  
m What you have heard from your friends  
m What you have seen or heard in the mass media  
 
Thinking about the protests and demonstrations that are carried out in the streets of the 
UK, please indicate how often are the following situations. For this please use the next 
scale where 1 is never, 2 rarely, 3 sometimes, 4 often, 5 always. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
In this country, the protests are dispersed using violent 
methods  
m  m  m  m  m  
The police uses an indiscriminate violence against the 
protesters  
m  m  m  m  m  
Carrying out protests in this country is difficult because these 
are immediately attacked by the police  
m  m  m  m  m  
To disperse a protest, police officers commonly hit 
demonstrators  
m  m  m  m  m  
In my country, those who participate in protests may end up 
injured by the disproportionate violence used by the police  
m  m  m  m  m  
Usually in this country, some people are arrested without any 
more justification than having participated in a protest  
m  m  m  m  m  
In my country, people are afraid to participate in protests 
because of police behaviour  
m  m  m  m  m  
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The opinions that you expressed above are mainly based on....? 
m Your personal experience  
m What you have heard from members of your family  
m What you have heard from your friends  
m What you have seen or heard in the mass media  
 
Considering your PERSONAL OPINION about the protests and demonstrations that are 
carried out in the street please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below. 
For this, please use the following scale where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The police should use the violence to break up any kind of 
protest  
m  m  m  m  m  
The police have to use force against all participants in a 
protest when some protestors become violent  
m  m  m  m  m  
The police should hit demonstrators to maintain public order  m  m  m  m  m  
The police should disperse any protest to protect private 
property  
m  m  m  m  m  
If some people are injured by the police during protests it is 
their own fault  
m  m  m  m  m  
It is legitimate that the police arrest people during a march 
without explanations  
m  m  m  m  m  
The police force should stop and search any person on a 
protest because ‘If you've got nothing to hide, you’ve got 
nothing to fear’ 
m  m  m  m  m  
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The opinions that you expressed above are mainly based on....? 
m Your personal experience  
m What you have heard from members of your family  
m What you have heard from your friends  
m What you have seen or heard in the mass media  
 
Taking into account WHAT PEOPLE OF YOUR COUNTRY think about the presence 
of social movements and protests, please indicate how typical the following statements 
are of public opinion. For this, use the next scale where 1 is very untypical and 5 very 
typical. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
People of my country think that participating in protests is a 
valid political action  
m  m  m  m  m  
Citizens are of the opinion that carrying out protests is fine 
even when not sharing the protesters’ concerns  
m  m  m  m  m  
People think that taking part in protests is legitimate in spite 
of the fact these can be inconvenient  
m  m  m  m  m  
Citizens of my country believe that those who participate in 
protests are simply criminals whose objective is to destabilise 
the country  
m  m  m  m  m  
For the people of my country, those who participate in protests 
just try to alter the public order  
m  m  m  m  m  
The people of my country think that demonstrations are an 
important activity in a democratic system  
m  m  m  m  m  
The people of my country think that demonstrations are a 
necessary activity in a democratic system 
m  m  m  m  m  
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The opinions that you expressed above are mainly based on....? 
m Your personal experience  
m What you have heard from members of your family  
m What you have heard from your friends  
m What you have seen or heard in the mass media  
 
Continuing with WHAT PEOPLE OF YOUR COUNTRY think about the presence of 
social movements and protests, please indicate how typical the following statements are 
of public opinion. For this, use the next scale where 1 is very untypical and 5 very typical. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Protests are a valid political action  m  m  m  m  m  
Demonstrations are fine even if they are inconvenient  m  m  m  m  m  
Protesters are simply criminals who threaten the stability of 
this country  
m  m  m  m  m  
Demonstrators are threat to public order  m  m  m  m  m  
Protests are an important part of our democratic system  m  m  m  m  m  
Protests are a necessary feature of our democratic system  m  m  m  m  m  
 
The opinions that you expressed above are mainly based on....? 
m Your personal experience  
m What you have heard from members of your family  
m What you have heard from your friends  
m What you have seen or heard in the mass media 
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Taking into account what you think about the presence of social movements and protests 
in your country, please indicate how typical the following statements are of your own 
opinion. For this, use the next scale where 1 is very untypical and 5 very typical. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
I think that participating in protests is a valid political action  m  m  m  m  m  
I value the development of protests in spite of the fact these 
can be inconvenient  
m  m  m  m  m  
Those who participate in protests are simple criminals whose 
objective is to destabilise the country  
m  m  m  m  m  
Those who participate in protests just try to alter the public 
order  
m  m  m  m  m  
Demonstrations are an important activity in a democratic 
system  
m  m  m  m  m  
Participating in marches and protests is a right that all of us 
have  
m  m  m  m  m  
I positively value that citizens express their concerns 
organizing marches and protests  
m  m  m  m  m  
I think that demonstrations are a necessary activity in a 
democratic system  
m  m  m  m  m  
Those who participate in protests are outsiders who know 
nothing about democracy  
m  m  m  m  m  
People who take part in demonstrations just want more rights 
but they need to learn about responsibilities  
m  m  m  m  m  
Protests are just an excuse to commit crimes against the 
private property 
m  m  m  m  m  
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The opinions that you expressed above are mainly based on....? 
m Your personal experience  
m What you have heard from members of your family  
m What you have heard from your friends  
m What you have seen or heard in the mass media 
 
Thinking about the police of your country, please indicate your agreement with each of 
the following statements. For this please use the following scale where 1 is strongly 
disagree and 5 strongly agree. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
In a protest the police always use procedures that are fair for 
everyone  
m  m  m  m  m  
During a protest the police always clearly explain the reasons 
behind their actions  
m  m  m  m  m  
During a protest the police provide opportunity for unfair 
decisions to be corrected  
m  m  m  m  m  
Generally, the police make decisions based in facts, non in 
personal opinions  
m  m  m  m  m  
In a protest the police always use procedures that are fair for 
everyone  
m  m  m  m  m  
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Please, assess each of the following statements about the government actions using the 
following scale where 1 is none attention and 5 a lot of attention. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
How much attention do you feel the government pays to what 
the people think when it decides what to do?  
m  m  m  m  m  
How much attention do you feel the government pays to social 
movements claims, when it decides what to do?  
m  m  m  m  m  
How much attention do you feel the government pays to social 
movements claims, when these use the violence?  
m  m  m  m  m  
How much attention do you feel the government pays to social 
movements claims, when these act peacefully?  
m  m  m  m  m  
 
Please indicate your extent of confidence in these institutions using the following scale 
where 1 is none confidence and 5 a lot of confidence. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The politicians  m  m  m  m  m  
The parliament  m  m  m  m  m  
The government  m  m  m  m  m  
Courts of Justice  m  m  m  m  m  
The police m  m  m  m  m  
The press m  m  m  m  m  
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Now thinking about the British government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing 
its job?  
m 1 Extremely dissatisfied  
m 2  
m 3  
m 4  
m 5 Extremely satisfied  
 
How represented do you feel by the British government? 
m 1 Totally unrepresented  
m 2  
m 3  
m 4  
m 5 Totally represented  
 
Have you participated in marches or protests during the last 12 months? 
m Yes  
m No  
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In a context of a protest (AS A PROTESTER OR JUST AS A BYSTANDER), have you 
experienced some of the followings situations during the last 12 months? Mark all those 
corresponding. 
 Yes 
Been hit by police water cannons  m  
Been hit by police officers  m  
Witnessed police officers hitting demonstrators  m  
Been arrested without a clear explanation by police officers  m  
Witnessed arbitrary arrests  m  
Been exposed to the police tear gas  m  
 
In your opinion, when is the use of physical violence by protesters justified? 
 1 2 3 4 5 
When the police hit protesters without provocation  m  m  m  m  m  
When police officers arrest demonstrators without giving any 
explanation  
m  m  m  m  m  
When police uses water cannons and tear gas against the 
protesters  
m  m  m  m  m  
When the police acts to stop a peaceful protest  m  m  m  m  m  
When police treat protesters as common criminals  m  m  m  m  m  
When police hurt people not directly involved in protests  m  m  m  m  m  
When police officers stop some protesters to check their 
identities and search them  
m  m  m  m  m  
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In your opinion, when is the use of physical violence by the police justified? 
 1 2 3 4 5 
When protesters attack the police officers  m  m  m  m  m  
When some demonstrators participate in looting  m  m  m  m  m  
When police officers think that someone is suspected of 
participating in riots  
m  m  m  m  m  
When police officers think that someone is suspected of being 
part of an anarchist group  
m  m  m  m  m  
When the protesters disrespect police officers  m  m  m  m  m  
When the protesters disobey orders given by police officers  m  m  m  m  m  
When protesters throw stones or other objects at police force  m  m  m  m  m  
When protesters hurt people not directly involved in the 
protests 
m  m  m  m  m  
 
How old are you? 
 
Sex: 
m Female  
m Male  
m Other  
 
What is your nationality? 
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In which country do you live? 
 
Which of these activities best describes what you are doing at the present? 
m Full time work  
m Part time work  
m Not working  
m House person  
m Retired  
m Unemployed  
m Student/full time education  
m Other  
 
Please could you select the option which best represents your total income in the last 12 
months, before any deductions for tax, etc.  
m No income  
m Under £2,500  
m £2,500-£4,999  
m £5,000-£9,999  
m £10,000-£14,999  
m £15,000-£19,999  
m £20,000-£24,999  
m £25,000-£29,999  
m £30,000-£34,999  
m £35,000-£39,999  
m £40,000-£44,999  
m £45,000-£49,999  
m £50,000-£74,999  
m £75,000-£99,999  
m £100,000 or more  
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Do you or any of your immediate family or close friends work for the police service? 
m Yes, me  
m Yes, a family member  
m Yes, a close friend  
m No  
 
How interested would you say you are in politics? 
m Not, at all interested  
m Hardly, interested  
m Quite interested  
m Very interested  
 
How often do you follow politics in the news on television, on the radio, or in the daily 
papers? 
m Never  
m Once or twice a week  
m Several times a week  
m Every day  
 
How often do you talk about politics with..... 
 Never Once or twice a week Several times Every day 
your family?  m  m  m  m  
friends?  m  m  m  m  
co-workers or classmates?  m  m  m  m  
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In the UK, there are different ways of trying to improve things or help prevent things from 
getting worse. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Please, 
mark your answer in the appropriate column for each activity. 
 Yes No 
I contacted a politician, government or local government official  m  m  
I was active in a political party or action group  m  m  
I was active in another organisation or association (different to 
political party or action groups  
m  m  
I wore or displayed a campaign badge/sticker  m  m  
I signed a petition  m  m  
I took part in demonstrations  m  m  
I boycotted certain products  m  m  
I attended a political meeting or rally?  m  m  
I expressed political views on social media  m  m  
I donated money or raised funds for a social or political activity  m  m  
 
In politics people sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right’. Please, indicate where would you 
place yourself on this scale, where 1 means extreme left and 7 means extreme right? 
m 1 Extreme left  
m 2  
m 3  
m 4  
m 5  
m 6  
m 7 Extreme right  
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Appendix 5: Online questionnaire (Spanish) for Chapter 2 Study 2  
 
Segunda Validación Escala Subjective Political Openness 
 
Carta de consentimiento de informado 
 
Usted ha sido invitado a participar en el estudio ‘Subjective Political Openness, 
Protests and Political Attitudes’ a cargo de los investigadores Patricio Saavedra y 
John Drury de la University of Sussex, Reino Unido, y Roberto González Gutiérrez 
de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. El objeto de esta carta es ayudarlo a 
tomar la decisión de participar en la presente investigación. 
 
¿Cuál es el propósito de esta investigación? 
Esta investigación forma parte de un proyecto internacional que busca comparar las 
opiniones que tienen los ciudadanos de dos culturas distintas (Reino Unido y Chile) sobre 
los movimientos sociales y actividades asociadas a estos como son las marchas y 
protestas. Uno de los objetivos fundamentales de esta investigación es validar una escala 
de medición que analiza las opiniones que las personas tienen sobre estas temáticas, de 
tal forma de considerar tanto factores individuales como contextuales que pueden estar 
influyendo en el desarrollo de estas opiniones. Además de lo anterior se busca explorar 
cuales son las posibles relaciones de las opiniones personales sobre el contexto y las 
movilizaciones sociales con variables asociadas a la validación de ciertas estrategias de 
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acción en las mismas marchas, la evaluación del gobierno de turno y el interés por la 
política.  
¿En qué consiste tu participación? 
Tu participación consistirá en contestar un cuestionario (online o en papel y lápiz) 
especialmente diseñado para este estudio, que mantiene medidas de comparabilidad con 
las de los otros países participantes del proyecto de investigación. En el cuestionario se 
te pedirá que indiques tu opinión de la sociedad chilena y la vida en Chile. El tiempo que 
toma contestar el cuestionario completo es aproximadamente 35 minutos.  
¿Cuánto durará tu participación? 
Tu participación total en el proyecto será de 35 minutos, que es el tiempo que demora 
contestar el cuestionario en cualquiera de sus formatos.  
¿Qué riesgos corres al participar? 
Al participar de este estudio no corres ningún riesgo físico ni psicológico, tanto directa 
como indirectamente. 
¿Qué beneficios puede tener tu participación?  
Al contar con una muestra de chilenos como tú, será posible mostrar las opiniones de los 
chilenos sobre los movimientos sociales y compararlas con la de otro país y cultura, lo 
que permitirá enriquecer el conocimiento, análisis y comprensión de este tema 
considerando las diferencias de cada uno de los países participantes en este estudio 
transcultural. Asimismo, entre todos los participantes de este estudio se sortearán dos Gift 
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Cards de $30.000 cada una luego de finalizar la recolección de datos durante Septiembre 
de 2016. 
 
¿Qué pasa con la información y datos que entregue? 
Los investigadores mantendrán CONFIDENCIALIDAD con respecto a cualquier 
información obtenida en este estudio. Así los datos de contacto que el encuestador te 
solicitará al momento de aceptar participar en este proyecto serán solo con el fin de 
enviarte el correo con el link que te dirigirá al cuestionario online. De la misma forma el 
correo electrónico que se solicita en el cuestionario se utilizará solo con el fin de asignar 
las Gift Cards sorteadas como compensación al tiempo invertido en el estudio.  
 
El equipo de investigación a cargo resguardará tus datos recopilados en el cuestionario y 
en la hoja de reclutamiento sellados en una bodega por un espacio de 5 años, luego de los 
cuales serán destruidos de tal forma de impedir su divulgación o mal uso. De todas 
maneras te aseguramos que tu información de contacto no será incluida al momento de 
consignar los archivos de datos para su análisis, siendo tu encuesta identificable 
solamente por un número único que se encuentra asociado a tus respuestas mas no a quién 
lo respondió. Así también se asegura a los participantes que los datos recopilados en este 
estudio solo serán utilizados para los fines de esta investigación específica. 
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¿Es obligación participar? ¿Puedo arrepentirme después de participar?  
Tú NO estás obligado de ninguna manera a participar en este estudio. Si accedes a 
participar, puedes dejar de hacerlo en cualquier momento sin repercusión alguna y sin 
necesidad de justificar tal acción frente al encuestador o al equipo de investigación a cargo 
del proyecto.  
 
¿A quién puedo contactar para saber más de este estudio o si me surgen dudas? 
Si tienes cualquier pregunta acerca de esta investigación, puedes contactar a Patricio 
Saavedra Morales de la University of Sussex. Su email es P.Saavedra-
Morales@sussex.ac.uk Si usted tiene alguna consulta o preocupación respecto a sus 
derechos como participante de este estudio, puede contactar al Comité Ético Científico 
de Ciencias Sociales, Artes y Humanidades. Presidenta: María Elena Gronemeyer. 
Contacto: eticadeinvestigacion@uc.cl 
  
Al hacer click en ‘Aceptar’ estarás indicando que has tenido la oportunidad de leer esta 
declaración de consentimiento informado y ACEPTAS participar en este proyecto. Si, 
por el contrario, no deseas participar, haz click en ‘Rechazar’. 
m Aceptar  
m Rechazar  
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Pensando en el gobierno de tu país, por favor indica tu grado de acuerdo con cada una 
de las siguientes afirmaciones. Para ello utiliza la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 
1 es muy en desacuerdo y 5 muy de acuerdo. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
El gobierno permite que la gente se manifieste libremente en 
las calles.  
m  m  m  m  m  
Este gobierno se ampara en la ley para evitar que las protestas 
tengan lugar.  
m  m  m  m  m  
Este gobierno amenaza abiertamente a quienes participan en 
protestas  
m  m  m  m  m  
El gobierno restringe expresiones políticas que implican la 
participación en protestas.  
m  m  m  m  m  
El gobierno obstaculiza la participación de la gente en 
marchas y protestas  
m  m  m  m  m  
Éste gobierno se opone a que la gente exprese su descontento 
participando en protestas  
m  m  m  m  m  
Este gobierno considera a aquellos que participan en protestas 
son enemigos del Estado  
m  m  m  m  m  
La participación de los ciudadanos en protestas es vista como 
un problema por este gobierno  
m  m  m  m  m  
Quiénes participan en protestas son etiquetados como 
criminales por este gobierno  
m  m  m  m  m  
Este gobierno considera las protestas como una amenaza para 
su estabilidad  
m  m  m  m  m  
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Las opiniones que acabas de expresar más arriba se encuentran basadas principalmente 
en......? 
m Tu experiencia personal 
m Lo que has escuchado en tu familia  
m Lo que has escuchado de tus amigos 
m Lo que has visto o escuchado en los medios de comunicación  
 
Indica tu grado de acuerdo con cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones. Para ello utiliza 
la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es muy en desacuerdo y 5 muy de acuerdo. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
La gente siempre debería poder manifestarse libremente en las 
calles.  
m  m  m  m  m  
Valoro positivamente que la gente exprese su opinión 
participando en marchas o protestas.  
m  m  m  m  m  
Para mí las protestas son acto legítimo de expresión política.  m  m  m  m  m  
Para mantener el orden en las calles el gobierno debería 
prohibir las protestas y manifestaciones  
m  m  m  m  m  
El gobierno debería obstaculizar la participación de la gente 
en marchas y protestas  
m  m  m  m  m  
Estoy en contra de que la gente exprese su descontento 
participando en protestas  
m  m  m  m  m  
Desde mi punto de vista las protestas carecen de legitimidad 
en un sistema democrático  
m  m  m  m  m  
Respeto que los movimientos sociales lleven a cabo 
actividades públicas para expresar sus preocupaciones.  
m  m  m  m  m  
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Las opiniones que acabas de expresar más arriba se encuentran basadas principalmente 
en......? 
m Tu experiencia personal 
m Lo que has escuchado en tu familia  
m Lo que has escuchado de tus amigos 
m Lo que has visto o escuchado en los medios de comunicación  
 
Respecto a las protestas y manifestaciones que se llevan a cabo en las calles de Chile, por 
favor indica cuan frecuentes son cada una de las siguientes situaciones. Para ello utiliza 
la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es nunca, 2 rara vez, 3 a veces, 4 
frecuentemente, y 5 siempre. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
En este país las protestas son disueltas utilizando métodos violentos.  m  m  m  m  m  
La policía utiliza la violencia en forma indiscriminada contra los manifestantes.  m  m  m  m  m  
Es difícil llevar a cabo protestas en este país ya que éstas son inmediatamente atacadas por la 
policía.  
m  m  m  m  m  
Para dispersar las protestas la policía usualmente agrede a los manifestantes  m  m  m  m  m  
En mi país aquellos que participan en protestas pueden terminar heridos debido a la violencia 
desproporcionada utilizada por la policía.  
m  m  m  m  m  
Es usual que en este país algunas personas sean arrestadas sin mayor justificación que haber 
participado en una protesta.  
m  m  m  m  m  
En mi país la gente tiene temor de participar en protestas debido a la conducta de la policía en 
ellas.  
m  m  m  m  m  
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Las opiniones que acabas de expresar más arriba se encuentran basadas principalmente 
en......? 
m Tu experiencia personal 
m Lo que has escuchado en tu familia  
m Lo que has escuchado de tus amigos 
m Lo que has visto o escuchado en los medios de comunicación  
  
Considerando tu OPINIÓN PERSONAL respecto a las movilizaciones sociales y 
protestas que se llevan a cabo en la vía pública, por favor indica tu grado de acuerdo con 
cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones utilizando la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 
1 es muy en desacuerdo y 5 muy de acuerdo. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
La policía debería utilizar la violencia para disolver cualquier tipo de protesta.  m  m  m  m  m  
La policía debe usar la violencia contra todos los participantes en una protesta cuando 
algunos de ellos se vuelve violento.  
m  m  m  m  m  
La policía debería agredir a los manifestantes para mantener el orden público  m  m  m  m  m  
La policía debería dispersar cualquier protesta con tal de proteger la propiedad privada  m  m  m  m  m  
Si algunas personas son heridas por la policía durante las protestas es porque ellas se lo 
buscan.  
m  m  m  m  m  
Es legítimo que la policía detenga a personas durante una marcha sin darle explicaciones.  m  m  m  m  m  
La policía debería detener y registrar a cualquier persona en una protesta ya que ‘quién nada 
hace,nada teme’  
m  m  m  m  m  
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Las opiniones que acabas de expresar más arriba se encuentran basadas principalmente 
en......? 
m Tu experiencia personal 
m Lo que has escuchado en tu familia  
m Lo que has escuchado de tus amigos 
m Lo que has visto o escuchado en los medios de comunicación  
 
Teniendo en consideración LO QUE LA GENTE DE TU PAÍS piensa respecto a la 
presencia de movilizaciones sociales y protestas, por favor indica cuan típicas de la 
opinión de tus conciudadanos son cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones. Para ello 
utiliza la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es muy atípica y 5 muy típica. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
La gente de mi país cree que participar en protestas es una acción política válida.  m  m  m  m  m  
Los ciudadanos creen que está bien que se realicen protestas a pesar de que no compartan 
las demandas o exigencias de los manifestantes.  
m  m  m  m  m  
La gente piensa que es legítimo que se lleven a cabo protestas aun cuando éstas interrumpan 
su vida cotidiana.  
m  m  m  m  m  
Los ciudadanos de mi país creen que quienes participan en protestas son solo delincuentes 
que buscan desestabilizar al país.  
m  m  m  m  m  
Los ciudadanos de mi país piensan que quienes participan de las protestas solo buscan 
alterar el orden público.  
m  m  m  m  m  
La gente de mi país piensa que las protestas son una actividad importante en un sistema 
democrático.  
m  m  m  m  m  
La gente de mi país piensa que las protestas son una actividad necesaria en un sistema 
democrático.  
m  m  m  m  m  
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Las opiniones que acabas de expresar más arriba se encuentran basadas principalmente 
en......? 
m Tu experiencia personal 
m Lo que has escuchado en tu familia  
m Lo que has escuchado de tus amigos 
m Lo que has visto o escuchado en los medios de comunicación  
 
Continuando con LO QUE LA GENTE DE TU PAÍS piensa respecto a la presencia de 
movilizaciones sociales y protestas, por favor indica cuan típicas de la opinión de tus 
conciudadanos son cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones. Para ello utiliza la siguiente 
escala de evaluación donde 1 es muy atípica y 5 muy típica. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Las protestas son una acción política válida  m  m  m  m  m  
Está bien que se lleven a cabo manifestaciones aún cuando 
interrumpan la vida cotidiana  
m  m  m  m  m  
Quiénes participan en protestas son solo delincuentes que 
buscan desestabilizar al país  
m  m  m  m  m  
Quiénes participan en protestas solo buscan alterar el orden 
público  
m  m  m  m  m  
Las protestas son una parte importante de nuestro sistema 
democrático  
m  m  m  m  m  
Las protestas son una característica necesaria de nuestro 
sistema democrático  
m  m  m  m  m  
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Las opiniones que acabas de expresar más arriba se encuentran basadas principalmente 
en......? 
m Tu experiencia personal 
m Lo que has escuchado en tu familia  
m Lo que has escuchado de tus amigos 
m Lo que has visto o escuchado en los medios de comunicación  
 
Teniendo en consideración lo que tú piensas acerca de la presencia de movilizaciones 
sociales y protestas en tu país, por favor indica cuan típicas de tu opinión personal son 
cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones (1 es muy atípica y 5 muy típica). 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Creo que participar en protestas es una acción política válida  m  m  m  m  m  
Valoro que se lleven a cabo protestas aun cuando éstas interrumpan mi vida cotidiana  m  m  m  m  m  
Creo que aquellos que participan en protestas son solo delincuentes que buscan 
desestabilizar al país  
m  m  m  m  m  
Pienso que aquellos que participan en protestas solo buscan alterar el orden público  m  m  m  m  m  
Las protestas son una actividad relevante en un sistema democrático m  m  m  m  m  
Participar en marchas y protestas es un derecho que todos tenemos m  m  m  m  m  
Valoro positivamente que los ciudadanos expresen sus inquietudes organizando marchas y 
protestas  
m  m  m  m  m  
Creo que las protestas son una actividad necesaria en un sistema democrático m  m  m  m  m  
Aquellos que participan en protestas son personas poco comprometidas que no saben nada 
acerca de la democracia 
m  m  m  m  m  
Aquellos que participan en manifestaciones solo quieren más derechos pero necesitan 
aprender sobre responsabilidades  
m  m  m  m  m  
Las protestas son solo una excusa para cometer delitos contra la propiedad privada  m  m  m  m  m  
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Las opiniones que acabas de expresar más arriba se encuentran basadas principalmente 
en......? 
m Tu experiencia personal 
m Lo que has escuchado en tu familia  
m Lo que has escuchado de tus amigos 
m Lo que has visto o escuchado en los medios de comunicación 
 
Pensando en la policía de tu país, por favor demuestra tu grado de acuerdo con cada una 
de las siguientes afirmaciones. Para ello utiliza la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 
es muy en desacuerdo y 5 muy de acuerdo. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
En el transcurso de una protesta la policía siempre utiliza 
procedimientos que son justos para todos 
m  m  m  m  m  
Durante una protesta la policía siempre explica claramente las 
razones que se encuentran a la base de sus acciones  
m  m  m  m  m  
Mientras se desarrolla una protesta la policía tiene la 
oportunidad de corregir sus decisiones cuando éstas son 
injustas  
m  m  m  m  m  
En general la policía actúa en una protesta basando sus 
decisiones en hechos, no en opiniones personales  
m  m  m  m  m  
En el transcurso de una protesta la policía siempre utiliza 
procedimientos que son justos para todos  
m  m  m  m  m  
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Por favor evalúa cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones con respecto a las acciones del 
gobierno utilizando para ello la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es ninguna 
atención y 5 mucha atención. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Cuanta atención crees que el gobierno pone a lo que la gente 
piensa cuando decide lo que tiene hacer?  
m  m  m  m  m  
Cuanta atención crees que el gobierno pone a las demandas o 
exigencias de los movimientos sociales cuando decide lo que 
tiene que hacer?  
m  m  m  m  m  
Cuanta atención crees que el gobierno pone a las demandas o 
exigencias de los movimientos sociales cuando estos utilizan 
la violencia?  
m  m  m  m  m  
Cuanta atención crees que el gobierno pone a las demandas o 
exigencias de los movimientos sociales que se expresan de 
forma pacífica?  
m  m  m  m  m  
 
Por favor indica tu grado de confianza hacia las siguientes instituciones utilizando para 
ello la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es ninguna confianza y 5 mucha confianza. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Los políticos  m  m  m  m  m  
El parlamento  m  m  m  m  m  
El gobierno  m  m  m  m  m  
El sistema judicial  m  m  m  m  m  
La policía  m  m  m  m  m  
La prensa  m  m  m  m  m  
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Ahora pensando en el gobierno de Chile, ¿Cuán satisfecho estás tú con la forma en que 
está realizando su trabajo? 
m 1 Extremadamente insatisfecho  
m 2  
m 3  
m 4  
m 5 Extremadamente satisfecho  
 
¿Cuán representado te sientes por el gobierno chileno? 
m 1 Para nada representado  
m 2  
m 3  
m 4  
m 5 Totalmente representado  
 
Has participado en marchas, movimientos sociales o protestas durante los últimos 12 
meses?: 
m Si  
m No  
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En el transcurso de una protesta (YA SEA COMO PARTICIPANTE O MERO 
ESPECTADOR), ¿has experimentado alguna de las siguientes situaciones que se 
describen a continuación durante los últimos 12 meses? Marca TODAS las que 
correspondan. 
 Si 
Ser alcanzado/a por el carro lanza aguas de la policía  m  
Ser golpeado por la policía  m  
Presenciar agresiones de la policía a los manifestantes  m  
Haber sido arrestado sin que los policías hayan dado una 
explicación clara para ello  
m  
Haber presenciado arrestos arbitrarios  m  
Haber sido expuesto a los gases lacrimógenos de la policía  m  
Ser amenazado por los caballos de la policía  m  
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En tu opinión, ¿Cuándo se justifica el uso de la violencia por parte de los manifestantes? 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Cuando la policía golpea a los manifestantes sin mediar provocación  m  m  m  m  m  
Cuando la policía arresta manifestantes sin otorgar ninguna explicación para ello  m  m  m  m  m  
Cuando la policía utiliza carros lanza aguas y gases lacrimógenos contra los manifestantes  m  m  m  m  m  
Cuando la policía actúa para detener una protesta pacífica  m  m  m  m  m  
Cuando la policía trata a los manifestantes como criminales comunes  m  m  m  m  m  
Cuando la policía daña a la gente que no está directamente involucrada en las protestas  m  m  m  m  m  
Cuando los policías detienen a algunos manifestantes para comprobar sus identidades y 
registrarlos  
m  m  m  m  m  
 
En tu opinión, ¿Cuándo se justifica el uso de la violencia por parte de la policía? 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Cuando los manifestantes atacan a los policías  m  m  m  m  m  
Cuando algunos manifestantes participan en saqueos  m  m  m  m  m  
Cuando los policías sospechan que alguien ha participado en 
desórdenes públicos  
m  m  m  m  m  
Cuando los policías sospechan que alguien es parte un grupo 
anarquista  
m  m  m  m  m  
Cuando los manifestantes le faltan el respeto a los policías  m  m  m  m  m  
Cuando los manifestantes desobedecen las órdenes dadas por 
los policías  
m  m  m  m  m  
Cuando los manifestantes lanzan piedras u otros objetos a la 
policía  
m  m  m  m  m  
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¿Cuántos años tienes? 
 
Sexo: 
m Mujer  
m Hombre  
m Otro  
 
¿Cuál es tu nacionalidad? 
 
¿En qué país vives actualmente? 
 
¿Cuál de las siguientes actividades describe de mejor manera tu situación actual? 
m Trabajo a tiempo completo  
m Trabajo Part time  
m Dueña/o de casa  
m Jubilado  
m Cesante  
m Estudiante a tiempo completo  
m Otro  
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Por favor, indica la opción que mejor representa el ingreso total mensual de tu hogar. Esto 
es, considerando la suma de los ingresos de todas las personas que viven en tu hogar 
después de descuento legales como salud, previsión e impuestos: 
m De 0 a $650.628  
m De $650.629 a $962.926  
m Más de $962.926  
 
¿Cuántas personas viven en tu hogar? 
 
Por favor, indica la opción que mejor representa tu ingreso mensual líquidos, es decir, tu 
ingreso después de descontar salud, previsión u otros impuestos: 
m Sin ingresos  
m Menos de $95.000 líquidos  
m De $95.001 a $175.000 líquidos  
m $175.001 a $200.000 líquidos  
m De $200.001 a $219.000 líquidos  
m De $219.001 a $270.000 líquidos  
m De $270.001 a $330.000 líquidos  
m De $330.001 a $410.000 líquidos  
m De $410.001 a $547.000 líquidos  
m De $547.001 a $875.000 líquidos  
m De $875.001 a $1.000.000 líquidos  
m De $1.000.001 a $2.000.000 líquidos  
m De $2.000.001 a $3.000.000 líquidos  
m Más de $3.000.000 líquidos  
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Tú, alguien de tu familia directa o algún amigo cercano trabajan actualmente en la policía 
(Carabineros)? 
m Si, yo  
m Si, un familiar  
m Si, un amigo cercano  
m No  
 
¿Cuán interesado/a tú dirías estás en la política de tu país? 
m Para nada interesado/a  
m Escasamente interesado/a  
m Muy interesado/a  
m Demasiado interesado/a  
 
¿Con cuanta frecuencia sigues tú las noticias sobre política en la televisión, la radio o en 
los diarios? 
m Nunca  
m Una o dos veces por semana  
m Algunas veces en la semana (más de dos)  
m Todos los días  
 
¿Con cuanta frecuencia hablas de política con..... 
 Nunca Una o dos veces por semana  
Algunas veces 
por semana 
Todos los 
días 
tu familia?  m  m  m  m  
amigos?  m  m  m  m  
compañeros de trabajo o 
universidad  
m  m  m  m  
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En Chile existen diferentes maneras para tratar de mejorar las cosas o de ayudar a prevenir 
que éstas empeoren. ¿Has realizado alguna de las siguientes actividades durante los 
últimos 12 meses? Por favor, marca tu respuesta en la columna apropiada para cada 
actividad. 
 Si No 
He contactado a un político o algún funcionario de gobierno central o local  m  m  
He participado activamente en un partido o grupo político  m  m  
He participado activamente en otra organización o asociación (diferente a 
un partido o grupo político)  
m  m  
He usado una insignia o sticker de campaña  m  m  
He firmado una petición  m  m  
He participado en marchas o manifestaciones  m  m  
He boicoteado ciertos productos  m  m  
He participado en reuniones políticas  m  m  
He expresado opiniones políticas en las redes sociales (Facebook, Twitter 
por ejemplo)  
m  m  
He donado dinero o recaudado fondos para una actividad social o política  m  m  
 
En política la gente a veces habla de ‘izquierdas’ y ‘derechas’. Por favor, indica cual sería 
tu posición en la siguiente escala donde 1 significa extrema izquierda y 7 extrema 
derecha. 
m 1 Extrema izquierda  
m 2  
m 3  
m 4  
m 5  
m 6  
m 7 Extrema derecha  
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Appendix 6: Overview of cross-cultural invariance tests for Chapter 2 Study 2 
 
Table. Goodness-of-fit indices and comparison of models testing measurement invariance for 
government openness. 
 
 
Note: M0 corresponds to the baseline model without any restricted parameter; M1 to the model 
testing weak invariance; M2 to the model testing strong invariance, M2P to the model testing 
partial strong invariance; and M3P to the model testing partial strict invariance. 
  
                  
90% CI for 
RMSEA   
Model χ2 df ∆ χ2 ∆df CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA LL UL Model Comparison 
M0 8.32 4 
  
.99 .98 .01 .05 .00 .11 
 
M1 10.91 7 2.59 3 .99 .99 .01 .04 .00 .08      ∆ χ2 M1-M0 
M2  67.59 10 56.67 3 .92 .91 .07 .12 .10 .16      ∆ χ2 M2-M1 
M2P 12.87 8 1.95 1 .99 .99 .02 .04 .00 .08 ∆ χ2 M2P-M1 
M3P 35.07 10 22.20 2 .96 .96 .06 .08 .05 .11    ∆ χ2 M3P-M2P 
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Table. Goodness-of-fit indices and comparison of models testing measurement invariance for 
perceived repression. 
                  
90% CI for 
RMSEA   
Model χ2 df ∆ χ2 ∆df CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA LL UL 
Model 
Comparison 
M0 8.08 4 
  
.99 .98 .01 .05 .00 .10 
 
M1 10.71 7 2.63 3 .99 .99 .02 .03 .00 .08 ∆ χ2 M1-M0 
M2  20.16 10 9.44 3 .99 .98 .04 .05 .17 .89 ∆ χ2 M2-M1 
M3  26.69 14 15.98 7 .98 .99 .05 .05 .02 .08 ∆ χ2 M3-M2 
M4 55.92 15 29.22 1 .96 .97 .24 .08 .08 .11 ∆ χ2 M4-M3 
 
Note: M0 corresponds to the baseline model without any restricted parameter; M1 to the model 
testing weak invariance; M2 to the model testing strong invariance, M3 to the model testing partial 
strict invariance; and M4 to the model testing the invariance of latent factor (variance). 
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Table. Goodness-of-fit indices and comparison of models testing measurement invariance for 
legitimacy of protests (original scale). 
                  
90% CI for 
RMSEA   
Model χ2 df ∆ χ2 ∆df CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA LL UL 
Model 
Comparison 
M0 14.15 4 
  
.98 .94 .02 .08 .04 .13 
 
M1 19.67 7 5.52 3 .97 .96 .04 .07 .03 .11 ∆ χ2 M1-M0 
M2  61.34 10 41.66 3 .90 .88 .08 .12 .09 .15 ∆ χ2 M2-M1 
M2P 34.48 8 14.81 1 .95 .92 .05 .09 .06 .13 ∆ χ2 M2P-M1 
M3P 38.02 9 3.53 1 .94 .92 .04 .09 .06 .13 ∆ χ2 M3P-M2P 
 
Note: M0 corresponds to the baseline model without any restricted parameter; M1 to the model 
testing weak invariance; M2 to the model testing strong invariance, M2P to the model testing 
partial strong invariance; and M3P to the model testing partial strict invariance. 
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Table. Goodness-of-fit indices and comparison of models testing measurement invariance for 
legitimacy of protests (simplified scale). 
 
 
Note: M0 corresponds to the baseline model without any restricted parameter; M1 to the model 
testing weak invariance; M2 to the model testing strong invariance, M3 to the model testing strict 
invariance; and M3P to the model testing partial strict invariance. 
                  
90% CI for 
RMSEA   
Model χ2 df ∆ χ2 ∆df CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA LL UL 
Model 
Comparison 
M0 7.88 4 
  
.99 .97 .01 .05 .00 .10 
 
M1 15.04 7 7.16 3 .98 .97 .04 .05 .01 .09 ∆ χ2 M1-M0 
M2  24.51 10 9.46 3 .97 .96 .05 .06 .03 .09 ∆ χ2 M2-M1 
M3  75.12 14 60.08 7 .88 .90 .09 .11 .08 .13 ∆ χ2 M3-M2 
M3P 38.77 13 14.26 -1 .95 .95 .07 .07 .04 .10  ∆ χ2M3P-M2 
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Appendix 7: Selected items for Chapter 3 Study 1 
 
Table. Items used to measure government openness. 
Thinking about the current government of your country, please indicate your agreement with each 
of the statements below. 
Government openness 
1. The government restricts political expressions involving participation in protests  
2. This government hinders participation in marches and protests 
3. The government is against people expressing their discontent by participating in protests  
4. Those who participate in protests are labelled as criminals by this government  
 
Table. Items used to measure perceived repression. 
Thinking about the protests and demonstrations that are carried out in the streets of the UK 
(Chile), please indicate how common are the following situations. 
 
  
Perceived repression 
1. The police use indiscriminate violence against protesters  
2. Carrying out protests in this country is difficult because these are immediately attacked by the police 
3. In my country, those who participate in protests may end up injured by the disproportionate violence used by the 
police 
4. To disperse a protest, police officers commonly hit demonstrators 
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Table. Items used to measure perceived legitimacy of protests. 
Taking into account what people of your country think about the presence of social movements 
and protests, please indicate how typical the following statements are of public opinion. 
Perceived legitimacy of protest  
1. People of my country think that participating in protests is a valid political action 
2. Citizens are of the opinion that carrying out protests is fine even when not sharing the protesters’ concerns 
3. People think that taking part in protests is legitimate in spite of the fact these can be inconvenient 
 
Table. Items used to measure support for protesters’ violence against the police. 
In your opinion, when is the use of physical violence by protesters justified? 
Support for protesters’ violence 
1. When police officers arrest demonstrators without giving any explanation 
2. When the police act to stop a peaceful protest 
3. When police treat protesters as common criminals 
4. When police hurt people not directly involved in protests 
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Appendix 8: Online questionnaire for Chapter 3 Study 2 
 
Protests and political contexts 
 
Information and Consent 
 
Dear participant, 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not 
to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
it will involve. Please take the time to read the following information carefully. 
 
This research is a questionnaire-based study led by researchers at the School of 
Psychology, University of Sussex. It seeks to compare the opinion of young people from 
different cultures (UK and Chile) about social movements and some activities associated 
to them as marches and protests. 
 
We hope you will take part in this study, and to do so, you will be asked to give your 
consent to proceed. If you decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw at any time 
and without giving a reason, till the point that the report of this project is drawn up. 
 
Please take into account that if you decide to participate or not in our study, it will have 
no impact on your marks, assessments, or future studies. 
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Your participation will consist of completing a questionnaire specially designed for this 
study; a similar instrument will be used in Chile by people of your same age. Your data 
will be kept confidential, and your answers will not be able to link with your contact 
details at any level. Completing the questionnaire should not take you more than 25 
minutes. After that, you are welcome to ask questions about the project by contacting the 
researchers. 
 
Participation in this study does not involve any direct or indirect physical or 
psychological risk, and you will be able to choose between receiving 2 credits, or 
entering in a prize draw (£50) as a reward for the time dedicated to this project. You 
should bear in mind that your odds of winning the draw are shared with those of the 
other participants (150 more or less). 
 
Your involvement will be very valuable in showing the opinions of young British people 
about the social movements, and contrast it with the thoughts of people of your same age 
from another country. The latter will be able to extend the knowledge and understanding 
of this topic considering the cultural differences that may exist about it. 
 
The results of this study will be used to write academic papers, and will be part of a PhD 
thesis. No identifiable information will be used for any of these purposes. This study has 
been approved by the Sciences & Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee 
(crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk). The project reference number is ER/PS356/7. The University 
of Sussex has insurance in place to cover its legal liabilities in respect of this study. 
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If you have any questions or comments regarding the study, please contact Patricio 
Saavedra (P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk), or if you have any concerns about the way 
in which the study has been conducted, please contact John Drury 
(j.drury@sussex.ac.uk). 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you are willing to take 
part in this study please proceed to give your consent. 
 
Project approval reference: ER/PS356/7 
 
I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the 
project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet for 
participants. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to fill out an 
online questionnaire. 
 
I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information that I 
disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the reports on the project, either 
by the researcher or by any other party. 
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I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part 
or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project till the point that 
the report is drawn up without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way. 
 
    By ticking this box I give my consent to participate in this study. 
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To start, please write a valid Sussex email address (just to allocate the reward): 
 
Please, indicate your current status at University of Sussex:  
m Undergraduate student 
m Master student 
m PhD student 
m None 
 
How old are you? 
 
Sex: 
m Male 
m Female 
m Other 
 
What is your nationality? 
Do you or any of your immediate family or close friends work for the police service? 
m Yes, me 
m Yes, a family member 
m Yes, a close friend 
m No 
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Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below. For this, please use 
the following scale where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
People always should be able to protest in the street freely m  m  m  m  m  
I positively value the fact that people express their opinion by 
participating in marches or protests. m  m  m  m  m  
I think that protests are a legitimate act of political expression. m  m  m  m  m  
I respect that protest campaigns carry out public activities to express 
their concerns m  m  m  m  m  
 
The opinions that you just expressed above are mainly based on…? 
m Your personal experience 
m What you have heard from members of your family 
m What you have heard from your friends 
m What you have seen or heard in the mass media 
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Considering your PERSONAL OPINION about the protests and demonstrations that are 
carried out in the street, please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below. 
For this, please use the following scale where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The police should use violence to break up any 
kind of protest m  m  m  m  m  
The police have to use force against all participants 
in a protest when some protestors become violent m  m  m  m  m  
If some people are injured by the police during 
protests, it is their own fault m  m  m  m  m  
It is legitimate that the police arrest people during a 
march without explanation m  m  m  m  m  
The police force should stop and search any person 
on a protest because ‘If you've got nothing to hide, 
you've got nothing to fear’ 
m  m  m  m  m  
 
The opinions that you just expressed above are mainly based on…? 
m Your personal experience 
m What you have heard from members of your family 
m What you have heard from your friends 
m What you have seen or heard in the mass media 
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Taking into account what you think about the presence of campaigns and protests in your 
country, please indicate how typical the following statements are of your own opinion. 
For this, use the following scale where 1 is very untypical and 5 very typical. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
I think that participating in protests is a valid 
political action m  m  m  m  m  
I value the appearance of protests in spite of the 
fact these can be inconvenient m  m  m  m  m  
Demonstrations are an important activity in a 
democratic system m  m  m  m  m  
I positively value that people express their concerns 
by organizing marches and protests m  m  m  m  m  
 
The opinions that you just expressed above are mainly based on…? 
m Your personal experience 
m What you have heard from members of your family 
m What you have heard from your friends 
m What you have seen or heard in the mass media 
 
How interested would you say you are in politics? 
m Not at all interested 
m A little interested 
m Quite interested 
m Very interested 
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How often do you follow politics in the news on television or on the radio or in the 
daily papers? 
m Never 
m Once or twice a week 
m Several times a week 
m Every day 
 
In the UK, there are different ways of trying to improve things or help prevent things from 
getting worse. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Please, 
mark your answer with an ‘X’ (Yes or No) in the appropriate column for each activity. 
 Yes No 
I contacted a politician, government or local 
government official m  m  
I was active in a political party or campaign group m  m  
I wore or displayed a campaign badge/sticker m  m  
I signed a petition m  m  
I took part in demonstrations m  m  
I boycotted certain products m  m  
I attended a political meeting or rally m  m  
I expressed political views on social media m  m  
I donated money or raised funds for a social or 
political activity m  m  
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Please indicate your confidence in the following institutions using the following scale 
where 1 is no confidence and 5 a lot of confidence. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Politicians m  m  m  m  m  
Parliament m  m  m  m  m  
The government m  m  m  m  m  
The police m  m  m  m  m  
The press m  m  m  m  m  
 
Thinking about the police of your country, please indicate your agreement with each of 
the following statements. For this please use the following scale where 1 is strongly 
disagree and 5 strongly agree. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
In a protest the police always use procedures that 
are fair for everyone m  m  m  m  m  
During a protest the police always clearly explain 
the reasons behind their actions m  m  m  m  m  
During a protest the police provide opportunity for 
unfair decisions to be corrected m  m  m  m  m  
Generally, the police make decisions based on 
facts, not on personal opinions m  m  m  m  m  
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In your opinion, when during a protest is the use of physical violence by protesters 
justified? Please, use the following scale to answer where 1 is never and 5 always. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
When the police hit protesters without provocation m  m  m  m  m  
When police officers arrest demonstrators without 
giving any explanation m  m  m  m  m  
When police hurt people not directly involved in 
protests m  m  m  m  m  
When police treat protesters as common criminals m  m  m  m  m  
 
In your opinion, when is the use of physical violence by the police justified? Please, use 
the following scale to answer where 1 is never and 5 always. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
When protesters attack the police m  m  m  m  m  
When some demonstrators attack shops m  m  m  m  m  
When protesters throw stones or other objects at 
police m  m  m  m  m  
When protesters hurt people not directly involved 
in the protests m  m  m  m  m  
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Now thinking about the British government, how satisfied are you with the way it is 
doing its job? Please, mark your answer using the following scale: 
m 1 Extremely dissatisfied 
m 2 
m 3 
m 4 
m 5 Extremely satisfied 
 
How represented do you feel by the British government? Please, mark with an “X” your 
answer using the following scale: 
m 1 Totally unrepresented 
m 2 
m 3 
m 4 
m 5 Totally represented 
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Condition 1: Facilitated condition. 
Please, read the article presented below, then, answer the questions relate to it in the 
following pages. 
 
 
 
New student demonstrations: Authorities and Police force 
announce special measures 
Many organizations have called for participation in the demonstrations that will take 
place throughout the country to protest against the budget cuts in Higher Education 
announced by the government. 
 
 
London. As a response to the government announcement to cut the budget allocated to 
Higher Education by 5%, many organizations have argued that students and their families 
should express their disagreement with this new policy by participating in marches and 
demonstrations around the country at the end of this week. The government's decision, 
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originally announced a month ago, means a dramatic increase in the cap on university 
tuition fees. Because of this, students could pay up to twice the amount of money they 
currently invest in their education. 
 
Early this week, the Prime Minister met with the Home Secretary to assess the possible 
political situation that the authorities may face because of the demonstrations. After the 
meeting both ministers spoke with the press about the issue. There the PM stated: “The 
cuts were agreed by me, the cabinet and approved by Parliament to save Britain's finances, 
and no further discussion is necessary. However, as a government we understand that 
some people feel concern about decisions like these, and so we have prepared a 
communication campaign to inform the public about the practical implications of this new 
policy. Furthermore, we consider the calls to protest against these agreements as part of 
a democratic system, it is valid that some people want to participate in demonstrations to 
express their opinions. Accordingly, our duty as responsible authorities is to enable 
protests to place in the best way possible, allowing people can move freely throughout 
the streets. Today, I met with the Home Secretary and the Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner to set up a collaborative plan that will facilitate people’s participation in 
the protests.” 
 
At the same time, the Home Secretary said that a series of protests were authorized to go 
ahead, and the police force should assist the protesters’ plans, “The Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner has confirmed that officers received the order to keep constant 
communication with protesters, allowing the protests to take place in the best way 
possible”. 
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During the evening, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner talked with the press about 
the concrete measures that the police will implement during the journey of protests, 
“essentially our measures are related to close the roads around the streets where the 
protests will take place, allowing for protesters to move without problems. Further, the 
police will inform motorists about the diversions and alternatives routes through social 
media”.  
 
The Met Commissioner said that the only police officers around the demonstrations will 
be those in charge of traffic management wearing their traditional uniforms. 
 
Regarding the measures announced by the government, Mark Johnson (one of the main 
Students Union leaders) said that he values the fact that the government had authorized 
protests around the country. Nevertheless, he stressed that demonstrations will take place 
allowing people to express their disagreement with the Higher Education budget cuts and 
how the authorities are doing things “We hope that people's discontent will be heard by 
the government”. 
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Condition 2: Restricted condition. 
Please, read the article presented below, then, answer the questions relate to it in the 
following pages. 
 
 
New student demonstrations: Authorities and Police force 
announce special measures 
Many organizations have called for participation in the demonstrations that will take 
place throughout the country to protest against the budget cuts in Higher Education 
announced by the government. 
 
 
London. As a response to the government announcement to cut the budget allocated to 
Higher Education by 5%, many organizations have argued that students and their families 
should express their disagreement with this new policy by participating in marches and 
demonstrations around the country at the end of this week. The government’s decision, 
originally announced a month ago, means a dramatic increase in the cap on university 
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tuition fees. Because of this, students could pay up to twice the amount of money they 
currently invest in their education.    
 
Early this week, the Prime Minister met with the Home Secretary to assess the possible 
political situation that the authorities may face because of the demonstrations. After the 
meeting both ministers spoke with the press about the issue. There the PM stated: “The 
cuts were agreed by me, the cabinet and approved by Parliament to save Britain’s 
finances, and no further discussion is necessary. Therefore, the calls to protest against 
these agreements just contribute to damaging the public order, security, and stability of 
our country. Today, I met with the Home Secretary and the Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner to set a collaborative plan with the objective to prevent any type of protest 
during the week. In consequence, the police will arrest all those who try to threaten public 
order.” 
 
At the same time, the Home Secretary said that protests will not be authorized. The police 
force will then be able to use all the legal means available to keep the order and maintain 
public safety. “We will not allow people to carry out neither riots nor demonstrations to 
disturb the social peace in Britain”. 
 
During the evening, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner talked with the press about 
the preventive measures that the police will implement throughout the protests, 
“essentially our measures are related to a significant increase of riot police in the main 
cities, allowing for a greater number of patrols around boroughs, and implementing more 
stop and search measures for all those who are involved in a non-authorized protests. If 
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riots take place in the streets, the police force could use baton rounds and horses to take 
control of the situation avoiding damage to public and private property”.  
 
Far removed from the authorities’ view is Mark Johnson’s opinion. As one of the main 
Students Union leaders, he argues that demonstrations will take place regardless of the 
measures announced by the PM. “The Government’s decision to forbid the protests 
instead of hearing what people have to say about the budget cuts is a clear sign of its 
habitual intransigence, the cabinet prefers repression rather than paying attention to the 
citizens’ views”. 
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Condition 3: Control condition. 
Please, read the article presented below, then, answer the questions relate to it in the 
following pages. 
 
New student demonstrations: Authorities and Police force 
announce special measures 
Many organizations have called for participation in the demonstrations that will 
take place throughout the country to protest against the budget cuts in Higher 
Education announced by the government. 
 
 
London. As a response to the government announcement to cut the budget allocated to 
Higher Education by 5%, many organizations have argued that students and their families 
should express their disagreement with this new policy by participating in marches and 
demonstrations around the country at the end of this week. The government’s decision, 
originally announced a month ago, means a dramatic increase in the cap on university 
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tuition fees. Because of this, students could pay up to twice the amount of money they 
currently invest in their education. 
 
Early this week, the Prime Minister met with the Home Secretary to assess the possible 
political situation that the authorities may face because of the demonstrations. After the 
meeting both ministers spoke with the press about the issue. There the PM stated: “The 
cuts were agreed by me, the cabinet and approved by Parliament to save Britain's finances, 
and no further discussion is necessary”. 
 
Regarding the announced protests, Mark Johnson (one of the main Students Union 
leaders) stressed that demonstrations will take place allowing people to express their 
disagreement with the Higher Education budget cuts and how the authorities are doing 
things “We hope that people's discontent will be heard by the government”. 
 
According to the article, to what extent did the authorities try to prevent the protests 
from taking place? 
m 1 None 
m 2 
m 3 
m 4 
m 5 A lot 
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According to the article, what extent do police cooperate with the develop of the 
protests? 
m 1 None 
m 2 
m 3 
m 4 
m 5 A lot 
 
Thinking about the scenario described in the article, please indicate your agreement 
with each of the statements below. For this, please use the following scale where 1 is 
strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The government restricts political expressions 
involving participation in protests m  m  m  m  m  
This government hinders participation in marches 
and protests m  m  m  m  m  
The government is against people expressing their 
discontent by participating in protests m  m  m  m  m  
People’s participation in protests is considered as a 
problem by this government m  m  m  m  m  
Those who participate in protests are labelled as 
criminals by this government m  m  m  m  m  
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Thinking about the scenario described in the article about the protests, please indicate 
how common could be the following situations in it. For this, please use the next scale 
where 1 is never, 2 rarely, 3 sometimes, 4 often, and 5 always. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Protests dispersed using violent methods m  m  m  m  m  
The police using indiscriminate violence against the protesters m  m  m  m  m  
Difficulties in carrying out protests because these are immediately 
attacked by the police m  m  m  m  m  
Police officers hitting demonstrators to disperse a protests. m  m  m  m  m  
Those who participate in protests may end up injured by the 
disproportionate violence used by the police m  m  m  m  m  
People are afraid to participate in protests because of police 
behaviour m  m  m  m  m  
 
Thinking about the scenario described in the article, how typical of the citizens’ opinion 
could be the following statements. For this, use the next scale where 1 is very untypical 
and 5 very typical. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
People think that participating in protests is a valid political action m  m  m  m  m  
People are of the opinion that carrying out protests is fine even 
when not sharing the protesters’ concerns m  m  m  m  m  
People think that taking part in protests is legitimate in spite of the 
fact these can be inconvenient m  m  m  m  m  
People think that demonstrations are an important activity in a 
democratic system m  m  m  m  m  
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Thinking about the scenario described in the article, please evaluate the likelihood of 
suffering each of these situations during a protest. For this, please use the following scale 
where 1 is impossible and 5 guaranteed. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Being injured m  m  m  m  m  
Being killed m  m  m  m  m  
Being arrested m  m  m  m  m  
Being tortured m  m  m  m  m  
Sexually harassed m  m  m  m  m  
 
Thinking about the scenario described in the article, please indicate how important these 
risks would be for you during a protest. For this, please use the following scale where 1 
is unimportant and 5 very important. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Being injured m  m  m  m  m  
Being killed m  m  m  m  m  
Being arrested m  m  m  m  m  
Being tortured m  m  m  m  m  
Sexually harassed m  m  m  m  m  
 
Please, tell us in a couple of lines about what did you read in the article presented 
before. 
  
380 
 
Please indicate your agreement with the follow statement, ‘I identify with the student 
protesters’: 
m 1 Fully disagree 
m 2 
m 3 
m 4 
m 5 Fully agree 
 
Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below. For this, please use 
the following scale where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
I think that student protesters can stop the government policies m  m  m  m  m  
I think that the student protesters can successfully defend their rights m  m  m  m  m  
The student protesters actions can cause social change m  m  m  m  m  
 
How willing would you be to carry out the following actions to support the students’ 
campaign? For this, please use the next scale where 1 is very unwilling and 5 very willing. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
To participate in discussion meetings or forums. m  m  m  m  m  
To sign letters supporting the students claims m  m  m  m  m  
To attend demonstrations or rallies m  m  m  m  m  
To throw stones or bottles to the police m  m  m  m  m  
To confront the police m  m  m  m  m  
To participate in barricades m  m  m  m  m  
To blockade roads m  m  m  m  m  
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How effective do you think are each of the following actions would be to meet the 
students’ objectives? For this, please use the next scale where 1 is very ineffective and 5 
very effective. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
To participate in discussion meetings or forums. m  m  m  m  m  
To sign letters supporting the students claims m  m  m  m  m  
To attend demonstrations or rallies m  m  m  m  m  
To throw stones or bottles to the police m  m  m  m  m  
To confront the police m  m  m  m  m  
To participate in barricades m  m  m  m  m  
To blockade roads m  m  m  m  m  
 
In your opinion, when during a protest is the use of physical violence by protesters 
justified? Please, use the following scale where 1 is never and 5 always. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
When the police hit protesters without provocation m  m  m  m  m  
When police officers arrest demonstrators without giving any explanation m  m  m  m  m  
When police hurt people not directly involved in protests m  m  m  m  m  
When police treat protesters as common criminals m  m  m  m  m  
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In your opinion, when is the use of physical violence by the police justified? Please, use 
the following where 1 is never and 5 always. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
When protesters attack the police 
m  m  m  m  m  
When some demonstrators attack shops 
m  m  m  m  m  
When protesters throw stones or other objects at police 
m  m  m  m  m  
When protesters hurt people not directly involved in the protests m  m  m  m  m  
 
Thinking about the possible behaviour of the police force described in the article, indicate 
your agreement with each of the following statements. For this, please use the following 
scale where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
In a protest the police always use procedures that are fair for everyone m  m  m  m  m  
During a protest the police always clearly explain the reasons behind their 
actions m  m  m  m  m  
During a protest the police provide opportunity for unfair decisions to be 
corrected m  m  m  m  m  
Generally, the police make decisions based on facts, not on personal 
opinions m  m  m  m  m  
 
What kind of reward would you prefer for your participation in this study? 
m 2 credits 
m Enter in a prize draw (£50) 
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Appendix 9: Interview schedule for Chapter 4  
 
Exploring people’s responses to protests 
 
Information and Consent 
 
Dear participant, 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not 
to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
it will involve. Please take the time to read the following information carefully. 
This research is an interview-based study led by researchers at the School of Psychology, 
University of Sussex. It seeks to explore the opinion of young British people about 
protests and the different tactics employed by either protesters and authorities during 
these activities.  
If you decide to take part in this study, you will be asked to give your consent to proceed. 
Nonetheless, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason till the 
point that the report of this project is drawn up (30th May 2018). For the latter, you can 
contact Patricio Saavedra (P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk). 
 
Please take into account that if you decide to participate or not in our study, it will have 
no impact on your marks, assessments, or future studies. 
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Your participation will consist of reading two fictional scenarios about protests in the UK 
and giving an answer to some questions included in a schedule especially elaborated for 
this study. The interview should not take more than 45 minutes of your time and it 
will be recorded to allow the analysis of your answers. Nevertheless, your answers will 
be kept confidential and it will not be able to link them with your contact details at any 
level.  
 
Participation in this study does not involve any direct or indirect physical or 
psychological risk, and you will receive 3 credits as a reward for the time dedicated 
to this project. 
  
Your involvement will be very valuable in showing the opinions of young British people 
about protests and their thoughts about the actions carried out by those who are involved 
in them. The latter will allow to extend our understanding of these topics considering the 
different perspectives people in the UK might have. 
 
The results of this study will be used to write academic papers, and will be part of a PhD 
thesis. No identifiable information will be used for any of these purposes. This study has 
been approved by the Sciences & Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee 
(crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk). The project reference number is ER/PS356/8. The University 
of Sussex has insurance in place to cover its legal liabilities in respect of this study. 
If you have any questions or comments regarding the study, please contact Patricio 
Saavedra (P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk), or if you have any concerns about the way 
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in which the study has been conducted, please contact John Drury 
(j.drury@sussex.ac.uk). 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you are willing to take 
part in this study please proceed to give your consent. 
 
I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the 
project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet for 
participants. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to be 
interviewed by the researchers in charge of the study and I am aware the interview will 
be recorded to analyse my answers by the research team. 
I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information I 
disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the reports on the project, either 
by the researcher or by any other party. 
I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part 
or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project till the point that 
the report is drawn up without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way. 
Name: _________________________________________ 
 
Signature:_______________________________________ 
 
Date: ___________________________________________ 
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 [The aim of the following questions is to know your opinion about protests and how 
people participate in them under different political conditions. During the interview you 
will read a couple of articles describing the circumstances under which a protest was 
planned to take place].  
 
[Now I would like to know your opinion about protests in the UK]. 
 
Introduction to the general topic (protests in the UK): 
- What is your opinion about protests in general? 
- Have you participated in some protest before? About what? 
- What motivated you to participate in protest? 
- How relevant were other people to motivate you for taking part in the protest?  
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[Now, I will present you an article about a protest that could take place in the following 
days]. 
 
Vignette 1: Right to protest is restricted by authorities. 
 
New student demonstrations: Authorities and police 
announce special measures 
Many organizations have called for participation in the demonstrations that will take 
place throughout the country to protest against the budget cuts in Higher Education 
announced by the government. 
 
 
London. As a response to the government announcement to cut the budget allocated to 
Higher Education by 15%, many organizations have argued that students and their 
families should express their disagreement with this new policy by participating in 
marches and demonstrations around the country at the end of this week. The 
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government’s decision, originally announced a month ago, means a dramatic increase in 
the cap on university tuition fees. Because of this, students could pay up to twice the 
amount of money they currently invest in their education. 
 
Early this week, the Prime Minister met with the Home Secretary to assess the possible 
political situation that the authorities may face because of the demonstrations. After the 
meeting both ministers spoke with the press about the issue. There the Prime Minister 
stated: “The cuts were agreed by me, the cabinet and approved by Parliament to save 
Britain’s finances, and no further discussion is necessary. Therefore, the calls to protest 
against these agreements just contribute to damaging public order, and the security and 
stability of our country. Today, I met with the Home Secretary and the Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner to set a collaborative plan with the objective to prevent any type of 
protest during the week. In consequence, the police will arrest all those who try to threaten 
public order by attending the protest”. 
 
At the same time, the Home Secretary said that protests would not be authorized. The 
police would then be able to use every legal means available to keep order and maintain 
public safety. “We will not allow people to carry out either riots or demonstrations to 
disturb the social peace in Britain”. He also announced a significant presence of riot police 
in the main cities, allowing for a greater number of patrols around boroughs, and 
implementing more ‘stop and search’ measures for all those who are involved in a non-
authorized protest. Furthermore, in case riots take place, the Home Secretary said that the 
police could use baton rounds and horses to manage the situation and prevent damage to 
public and private property.  
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The opinion of Mark Johnson is very different to the authorities’ view. As one of the main 
Students Union leaders, he argues that demonstrations will take place regardless of the 
measures announced by the Prime Minister. “The Government’s decision to forbid the 
protests is a clear sign the cabinet prefers repression rather than paying attention to 
citizens’ views. Unfortunately, these measures are supported by ad-hoc laws made to 
hinder participation in protests and therefore to prevent British people expressing their 
opinion freely”. Johnson also complained about the role of the press in relation to the 
protests: “Journalists and the mass media act in behalf of the government and the rich to 
maintain the current system; the students are treated as criminals in the newspapers and 
the television only because we want to demonstrate our disagreement with the new policy. 
We are not rioters, we are not criminals, we are just students fighting for our education”. 
 
- Can you describe briefly the situation you read about in the article? 
-What are your feelings about the situation described in the article? Why? 
- What would be your reasons to participate (or not) in the announced protest? 
- Would you protest because you felt the power to do it? 
- What do you think would be the main obstacles to you participating in the protest? 
- Which factors would encourage your participation in the protest? 
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[Now, I will ask you some questions about the role of the authorities in relation to the 
announced protest]. 
 
The role of the government and the police (authorities): 
- In your opinion, what were the reasons that the authorities carried out the announced 
measures in relation to the protest? 
- Do you think these kinds of measures would affect the protest? How? 
- What would be your reaction to the police measures? Why? 
 
 [The followings are questions about some situations could happen during the protest]. 
 
Justification of the use of violence (by protesters): 
- What would you think if during the protest people hit or throw objects to the police? 
- What would be your reaction if the police attack you? Would do you defend yourself? 
How? 
- What would be your reaction if the police attack other protesters? Would do you defend 
them? Why? How? 
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Legitimacy of protest given by others: 
- Thinking again in the scenario presented in the vignette, do you think people outside of 
the protest would support it? Why (or why not)? 
- Do you believe that the measures announced by the authorities would cause more people 
to support the protest? Why? Why not? 
- Do you believe that people outside protests would support self-defence if the police 
attack protesters? Why? 
 
 
 
[Now, I will present you an article about the same protest as before but under different 
conditions]. 
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Vignette 2: Right to protest is guaranteed by authorities. 
 
New student demonstrations: Authorities and Police 
announce special measures 
Many organizations have called for participation in the demonstrations that will take 
place throughout the country to protest against the budget cuts in Higher Education 
announced by the government. 
 
 
London. As a response to the government announcement to cut the budget allocated to 
Higher Education by 15%, many organizations have argued that students and their 
families should express their disagreement with this new policy by participating in 
marches and demonstrations around the country at the end of this week. The 
government’s decision, originally announced a month ago, means a dramatic increase in 
the cap on university tuition fees. Because of this, students could pay up to twice the 
amount of money they currently invest in their education. 
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Early this week, the Prime Minister met with the Home Secretary to assess the possible 
political situation that the authorities may face because of the demonstrations. After the 
meeting both ministers spoke with the press about the issue. There the Prime Minister 
stated: “The cuts were agreed by me, the cabinet and approved by Parliament to save 
Britain's finances, and no further discussion is necessary. However, as a government we 
understand that some people feel concern about decisions like these, and so we have 
prepared an information campaign to inform the public about the practical implications 
of this new policy. Furthermore, we consider the calls to protest against these agreements 
to be part of a democratic system, and a right guaranteed by law allowing citizens express 
their opinions. Accordingly, our duty as responsible authorities is to enable protests to 
place in the best way possible, allowing people to move freely throughout the streets. 
Today, I met with the Home Secretary and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to set 
up a collaborative plan that will facilitate people’s participation in the protests. 
 
At the same time, the Home Secretary said that a series of protests were authorized to go 
ahead, and the police force should assist the protesters' plans, “The Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner has confirmed that the only police officers around the demonstrations will 
be those in charge of traffic management wearing their traditional uniforms. Furthermore, 
these officers received the order to keep constant communication with protesters, and to 
close the roads around the streets where the protests will take place, allowing for 
protesters to move without problems”. 
Regarding the measures announced by the government, Mark Johnson (one of the main 
Students Union leaders) said that he values the fact that the government had authorized 
protests around the country. “We hope that people's discontent will be heard by the 
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government”, Johnson said. Moreover, he remarked people can attend the protests 
without concerns, because the laws of this country protect people’s right to protest, and 
prevent any police misconduct during demonstrations. Finally, Johnson declared that 
journalists and the press have been very helpful in informing people about the announced 
protest demonstration and how to attend it. 
 
 [The following are questions related to the last article that you read]. 
-Can you describe briefly the situation you read about in the article? 
-What are your feelings about the situation described in the latest article? Why? 
- What would be your reasons to participate (or not) in the announced protest? 
- Would you protest because you felt the power to do it? 
- What do you think would be the main obstacles to you participating in the protest? 
- Which factors would encourage your participation in the protest? 
 
 [Now, I will ask you some questions about the role of the authorities in relation to the 
announced protest]. 
 
The role of the government and the police (authorities): 
- In your opinion, what were the reasons that the authorities carried out the announced 
measures in relation to the protest? 
- Do you think these kinds of measures can affect the protest? How? 
395 
 
- What would be your reaction to the police measures related to the protest? Why? 
 
[The followings are questions about some situations could happen during the protest] 
 
Justification of the use of violence (by protesters): 
- What would you think if during the protest people hit or throw objects to the police? 
- What would be your reaction if people hit the police during the protest? Why? 
 
Legitimacy of protest given by others: 
- Thinking again in the scenario presented in the vignette, do you think people outside of 
the protest would support it? Why (or why not)? 
- Do you believe that the measures announced by the authorities would cause more people 
support the protest? Why? Why not? 
- What would be the reaction of the people outside the protests if protesters hit or throw 
objects to the police? 
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Debriefing 
 
Thank you for taking part in this study. During the interview, you read two articles about 
a student protest that would take place during the following days. Both of the articles 
were specially created for this study with the purpose of describing the occurrence of a 
protest under different political conditions. As you read, one of the articles described a 
scenario where the protest was facilitated by the authorities (the police and 
government), while in the other the same authorities tried to prevent protests. 
 
We are expecting to find differences in people’s attitudes towards protests and towards 
the tactics undertaken by the authorities in relation to the political scenario protesters 
have to cope with. 
 
The political context has been suggested as a possible predictor of participation in 
collective action according to sociological, economic and anthropological accounts. 
However, psychological approaches addressing the influence of political scenario have 
barely developed during recent years. In a previous study, we created and validated a 
measurement scale to assess people’s perceptions of the government and the police 
(facilitating vs preventing protests in the streets). This study is a continuation of such 
research into the influence of political conditions on the attitudes towards collective 
action from a psychological perspective. 
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Appendix 10: Online questionnaire for Chapter 5 Study 1 
 
Attitudes towards protesters’ tactics (student protest in UK) 
 
Information and Consent 
 
Dear participant, 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not 
to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
it will involve. Please take the time to read the following information carefully. 
 
This research is a questionnaire-based study led by researchers at the School of 
Psychology, University of Sussex. It seeks to explore the opinion of English people about 
protests and the different tactics employed by protesters. 
 
If you decide to take part in this study, you will be asked to give your consent to proceed. 
Nonetheless, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason till the 
point that the report of this project is drawn up (31st December 2018). For the latter, you 
can contact Patricio Saavedra (P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk). 
 
Your participation will consist on answering a set of questions about protests and the 
tactics employed by protesters in them. Filling in the questionnaire prepared for this 
project should take about 9 minutes of your time. 
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Participation in this study does not involve any direct or indirect physical or 
psychological risk, and you will receive £0.75 as a reward for the time dedicated to 
this project. 
 
Your involvement will be very valuable in knowing English people’s reasons to support 
(or not) the actions carried out by protesters. The latter will allow to extend our 
understanding of this topic considering the different opinions people in England might 
have. 
 
The results of this study will be used to write academic papers, and will be part of a PhD 
thesis. In addition, de-identified data collected from this study will be stored in the 
University of Sussex Data Repository, therefore, the data may be inspected and analysed 
by other researchers. This study has been approved by the Sciences & Technology Cross-
Schools Research Ethics Committee (crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk). The project reference 
number is ER/PS356/9. The University of Sussex has insurance in place to cover its legal 
liabilities in respect of this study. 
 
If you have any questions or comments regarding the study, please contact Patricio 
Saavedra (P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk), or if you have any concerns about the way 
in which the study has been conducted, please contact John Drury 
(j.drury@sussex.ac.uk). 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you are willing to take 
part in this study please proceed to give your consent. 
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I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the 
project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet for 
participants. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to fill out an 
online questionnaire. 
I understand that any information I provide is confidential and that no information that I 
disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the database of this project, 
either by the researcher or by any other party. 
I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part 
or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project till the point that 
the report is drawn up. I understand that de-identified data collected for this project will 
be stored in the University of Sussex Data Repository and may be accessed and analysed 
by other researchers. 
 
    I give my consent to participate in this study 
 
    I do not give my consent to participate in this study 
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How old are you? 
 
What is your gender? 
m Male  
m Female  
m Other  
 
Which of these activities best describes what you are doing at present? 
m Full time (30+ hrs per/wk)  
m Part-time (8 – 29 hrs per/wk)  
m Part-time (less than 8hrs per/wk)  
m House person  
m Retired  
m Registered unemployed  
m Unemployed but not registered  
m Student/full time education  
m Other  
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There are many kinds of groups in the world: men and women, ethnic and religious 
groups, nationalities, political factions. How much do you support or oppose the ideas 
about groups in general? Next to each statement, select a number from 1 (extremely 
oppose) to 10 (extremely favour) to show your opinion. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
In setting priorities, we must consider all groups  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
We should not push for equality between groups  
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Group equality should be our ideal  
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Superior groups should dominate inferior groups  
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
 
Thinking about the police of your local area, please indicate your agreement with each of 
the statements below (1 strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 neither agree nor disagree, 4 
agree, 5 strongly agree). 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Police protect people’s basic rights  
m  m  m  m  m  
Police are generally honest  
m  m  m  m  m  
Most police officers do their jobs well  m  m  m  m  m  
Police can be trusted to do what’s right  m  m  m  m  m  
 
Do you or any of your immediate family or close friends work for the Police force? 
m Yes, me  
m Yes, a family member  
m Yes, a close friend  
m No  
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Taking into account what you think about the presence of social movements and 
protests in your country, please indicate your agreement with each of the statements 
below (1 strongly disagree, 5 strongly agree). 
 1 2 3 4 5 
I think that participating in protests is a valid political 
action  m  m  m  m  m  
It is fine that people carry out protests even though I do 
not share the protesters’ concerns  m  m  m  m  m  
I value the development of protests in spite of the fact 
these can be inconvenient  m  m  m  m  m  
People have the right to protest anyway they choose  
m  m  m  m  m  
 
Have you participated in marches or protests during the last 12 months? 
m Yes  
m No  
 
How often do you follow politics in the news on television, the radio or in the daily 
papers? 
m Never  
m Once or twice a week  
m Several times a week  
m Everyday  
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How representative do you think your political thoughts are of the English people’s 
opinion? 
m 1 Non representative  
m 2  
m 3  
m 4  
m 5 Very representative  
 
How similar are you to the average English person? 
m 1 None  
m 2  
m 3  
m 4  
m 5 Very similar  
 
How represented do you feel by the British government? 
m 1 Totally unrepresented  
m 2  
m 3  
m 4  
m 5 Totally represented  
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Condition 1: Public opinion legitimises protests 
Please, read the information presented below, then, answer the questions relate to it in 
the following sections. 
 
In November and December 2010, the National Union of Students (NUS) organised a 
series of protests in opposition to the government plans to cut the further education budget 
and increase university fees. During those days, thousands of students participated in 
marches and demonstrations across the country, while others took part in campus 
occupations. Even though the Prime Minister at the time declared that the government 
was committed to supporting peaceful protest, the Metropolitan Police deployed a 
massive number of officers, horses, and riot police units to manage those protests carried 
out through Central London. 
News records from that year demonstrate that most English people thought the students, 
as any other group within the society, had the right to protest and show their discontent 
with the decisions or situations they think are not fair. In line with this, a study recently 
published by the BBC shows that in most of the testimonies collected during those days 
people said things like ‘we are in a democratic country, students can go and protest if they 
want to’ or ‘protests are useful for people to make their voices heard’. Further, the 
following pie chart was included in the article to illustrate English people attitudes 
towards student protests. 
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Condition 2: Public opinion does not legitimise protests 
Please, read the information presented below, then, answer the questions relate to it in the 
following sections. 
 
In November and December 2010, the National Union of Students (NUS) organised a 
series of protests in opposition to the government plans to cut the further education budget 
and increase university fees. During those days, thousands of students participated in 
marches and demonstrations across the country, while others took part in campus 
occupations. Even though the Prime Minister at the time declared that the government 
was committed to supporting peaceful protest, the Metropolitan Police deployed a 
massive number of officers, horses, and riot police units to manage those protests carried 
out through Central London. 
News records from that year demonstrate that most English people thought students had 
no right to disturb people's daily routine with their protests and they should have accepted 
government decisions. In line with this, a study recently published by the BBC shows that 
in most of the testimonies collected during those days people said things like ‘the 
government should restrict protests because they pose a threat to public order’ or ‘protests 
usually go nowhere and are just an excuse for rioting and looting’. Further, the following 
pie chart was included in the article to illustrate English people attitudes towards student 
protests. 
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Condition 3: Public opinion indifferent to protests 
Please, read the information presented below, then, answer the questions relate to it in the 
following sections. 
 
 In November and December 2010, the National Union of Students (NUS) organised a 
series of protests in opposition to the government plans to cut the further education budget 
and increase university fees. During those days, thousands of students participated in 
marches and demonstrations across the country, while others took part in campus 
occupations. Even though the Prime Minister at the time declared that the government 
was committed to supporting peaceful protest, the Metropolitan Police deployed a 
massive number of officers, horses, and riot police units to manage those protests carried 
out through Central London. 
News records from that year demonstrate mostly English people didn’t mind student 
protests and showed no interest in either these or other demonstrations. In line with this, 
a study recently published by the BBC shows that in most of the testimonies collected 
during those days people said things like 'who cares about protests. The only important 
things here are hard work and paying the bills' or 'people should focus their attention on 
solving real problems instead of wasting their time going to protests'. Further, the 
following pie chart was included in the article to illustrate English people attitudes 
towards student protests. 
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According to the information you read about, to what extent did people actively believe 
the students had the right to protest against government decisions? 
m 1 None  
m 2  
m 3  
m 4  
m 5 A lot  
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According to the information you read about, to what extent did people think protests 
are important in a democratic system? 
m 1 None  
m 2  
m 3  
m 4  
m 5 A lot  
 
The footage you are about to watch is of the events that took place during a demonstration 
organised by the NUS in Central London to protest against the issues previously 
described. 
 
Link to the video: https://youtu.be/jz0Z5_h_CtY 
 
Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below in relation to the 
protesters in the video (1 strongly disagree, 5 strongly agree). 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Given the way the protesters are treated by the police, I can 
easily identify with them (the protesters)  m  m  m  m  m  
I share the same beliefs and values with protesters when it 
comes to the way the police should act in protests.  m  m  m  m  m  
I feel solidarity with the protesters  
m  m  m  m  m  
I feel a bond with the protesters  
m  m  m  m  m  
I identified with the protesters  
m  m  m  m  m  
 
  
411 
 
Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below in relation to the 
police officers in the video (1 strongly disagree, 5 strongly agree). 
 1 2 3 4 5 
I identified with the police officers  m  m  m  m  m  
The police officers in the video have the same sense of right 
and wrong as me  m  m  m  m  m  
The police officers in the video stand up for values that are 
important for people like me  m  m  m  m  m  
I support the way the police officers acted in the video  m  m  m  m  m  
 
Considering the police behaviour in the video, please indicate your agreement with each 
of the statements below (1 strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 neither agree nor disagree, 4 
agree, 5 strongly agree). 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Police treated protesters with respect  m  m  m  m  m  
Police treated protesters fairly  m  m  m  m  m  
Police took time to listen to protesters  
m  m  m  m  m  
Police explained their decisions to protesters  
m  m  m  m  m  
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Please indicate the extent you would support the following actions protesters in the 
video might carry out as a reaction to the police behaviour (1 strongly disagree, 5 
strongly agree). 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Pushing the police back  
m  m  m  m  m  
Yelling at the police  
m  m  m  m  m  
Disobeying police orders  
m  m  m  m  m  
Throwing stones or other objects at the police  m  m  m  m  m  
Hitting police officers with bare hands  m  m  m  m  m  
Tackling mounted police officers  m  m  m  m  m  
Throwing petrol bombs at the police  
m  m  m  m  m  
Hitting police officers using weapons (e.g., sticks, baseball 
bats).  m  m  m  m  m  
 
This is the end of the survey. Please, press the bottom below to submit your 
responses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Submit 
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Debriefing 
 
Thank you for taking part in this study. The questionnaire you completed actually is part 
of an experiment which main objective is to know more about the influence of public 
opinion on people’s support for different tactics employed by protesters. The article you 
read was specially created for this study with the purpose of describing one of the three 
possible scenarios the student protests had to face in relation to public audience (people 
given legitimacy, people denying legitimacy, and people indifferent to the protests). 
Moreover, the footage you watched after reading the article is an extract from a longer 
video recorded by an independent news agency during the 2010 student protests in 
London (you can find the complete video at https://youtu.be/jz0Z5_h_CtY). 
 
We are expecting to find differences in the levels of support people might give to 
protesters tactics regarding what other people think about the protests (the article you 
read) and the exposure to police misbehaviour against protesters (the footage you 
watched). 
 
Previous research has suggested that people who don’t participate in protests might 
consider authorities (i.e., the police and the government) behaviour regarding protests to 
support the use of specific tactics by protesters. In addition, perceptions of public opinion 
legitimization of protests have also been suggested as a factor people might take into 
account to support protesters tactics, violent tactics in particular. This experiment is a 
continuation of such research into the influence of different levels of legitimacy given by 
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others to protests on the support for violent tactics in a scenario where authorities act 
against protesters. 
The slight deception in the introductory information to the study given at the start was 
used to get you to respond to the study in an authentic and engaged way, without revealing 
the exact nature of the experiment. This is a standard technique in social psychology 
studies and I hope the deception did not negatively impact you in any way. 
 
We hope you enjoyed participating in this project. Thank you once again for your support 
and cooperation with this research! If you have any questions regarding the study, please 
contact: Patricio Saavedra Morales: P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk or Professor John 
Drury: j.drury@sussex.ac.uk 
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Appendix 11: Online questionnaire for Chapter 5 Study 2 
 
Attitudes towards protesters’ tactics (protest in Catalonia) 
 
Information and Consent 
 
Dear participant, 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not 
to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
it will involve. Please take the time to read the following information carefully. 
 
This research is a questionnaire-based study led by researchers at the School of 
Psychology, University of Sussex. It seeks to explore the opinion of English people about 
protests and the different tactics employed by protesters. 
 
If you decide to take part in this study, you will be asked to give your consent to proceed. 
Nonetheless, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason till the 
point that the report of this project is drawn up (31st December 2018). For the latter, you 
can contact Patricio Saavedra (P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk). 
 
Your participation will consist on answering a set of questions about protests and the 
tactics employed by protesters in them. Filling in the questionnaire prepared for this 
project should take about 9 minutes of your time. 
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Participation in this study does not involve any direct or indirect physical or 
psychological risk, and you will receive £0.75 as a reward for the time dedicated to 
this project. 
 
Your involvement will be very valuable in knowing English people’s reasons to support 
(or not) the actions carried out by protesters. The latter will allow to extend our 
understanding of this topic considering the different opinions people in England might 
have. 
 
The results of this study will be used to write academic papers, and will be part of a PhD 
thesis. In addition, de-identified data collected from this study will be stored in the 
University of Sussex Data Repository, therefore, the data may be inspected and analysed 
by other researchers. This study has been approved by the Sciences & Technology Cross-
Schools Research Ethics Committee (crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk). The project reference 
number is ER/PS356/9. The University of Sussex has insurance in place to cover its legal 
liabilities in respect of this study. 
 
If you have any questions or comments regarding the study, please contact Patricio 
Saavedra (P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk), or if you have any concerns about the way 
in which the study has been conducted, please contact John Drury 
(j.drury@sussex.ac.uk). 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you are willing to take 
part in this study please proceed to give your consent. 
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I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the 
project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet for 
participants. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to fill out an 
online questionnaire. 
 
I understand that any information I provide is confidential and that no information that I 
disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the database of this project, 
either by the researcher or by any other party. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part 
or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project till the point that 
the report is drawn up. I understand that de-identified data collected for this project will 
be stored in the University of Sussex Data Repository and may be accessed and analysed 
by other researchers. 
 
    I give my consent to participate in this study 
 
    I do not give my consent to participate in this study 
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How old are you? 
 
What is your gender? 
m Male  
m Female  
m Other  
 
Which of these activities best describes what you are doing at present? 
m Full time (30+ hrs per/wk)  
m Part-time (8 – 29 hrs per/wk)  
m Part-time (less than 8hrs per/wk)  
m House person  
m Retired  
m Registered unemployed  
m Unemployed but not registered  
m Student/full time education  
m Other  
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There are many kinds of groups in the world: men and women, ethnic and religious 
groups, nationalities, political factions. How much do you support or oppose the ideas 
about groups in general? Next to each statement, select a number from 1 (extremely 
oppose) to 10 (extremely favour) to show your opinion. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
In setting priorities, we must consider all groups  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
We should not push for equality between groups  
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Group equality should be our ideal  
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Superior groups should dominate inferior groups  
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
 
Thinking about the police of your local area, please indicate your agreement with each of 
the statements below (1 strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 neither agree nor disagree, 4 
agree, 5 strongly agree). 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Police protect people’s basic rights  
m  m  m  m  m  
Police are generally honest  
m  m  m  m  m  
Most police officers do their jobs well  m  m  m  m  m  
Police can be trusted to do what’s right  m  m  m  m  m  
 
Do you or any of your immediate family or close friends work for the Police force? 
m Yes, me  
m Yes, a family member  
m Yes, a close friend  
m No  
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Taking into account what you think about the presence of social movements and 
protests in your country, please indicate your agreement with each of the statements 
below (1 strongly disagree, 5 strongly agree). 
 1 2 3 4 5 
I think that participating in protests is a valid political 
action  m  m  m  m  m  
It is fine that people carry out protests even though I do 
not share the protesters’ concerns  m  m  m  m  m  
I value the development of protests in spite of the fact 
these can be inconvenient  m  m  m  m  m  
People have the right to protest anyway they choose  
m  m  m  m  m  
 
Have you participated in marches or protests during the last 12 months? 
m Yes  
m No  
 
How often do you follow politics in the news on television, the radio or in the daily 
papers? 
m Never  
m Once or twice a week  
m Several times a week  
m Everyday  
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How representative do you think your political thoughts are of the English people’s 
opinion? 
m 1 Non representative  
m 2  
m 3  
m 4  
m 5 Very representative  
 
How similar are you to the average English person? 
m 1 None  
m 2  
m 3  
m 4  
m 5 Very similar  
 
How similar are you to the average European person? 
m 1 None  
m 2  
m 3  
m 4  
m 5 Very similar  
 
How much do you know about the situation in Catalonia?  
m 1 None  
m 2  
m 3  
m 4  
m 5 A lot  
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Condition 1: Public opinion legitimises protests 
Please, read the information presented below, then, answer the questions relate to it in the 
following sections. 
 
On the first of October 2017, Catalonia’s pro-independence movement organised a 
referendum to decide the continuity of the region as part of Spain. Even though the 
referendum was declared illegal by Spanish central government and the constitutional 
court, that day thousands of Catalans went to polling stations to cast their ballots. To stop 
the referendum Spanish government confiscated ballot papers; arrested key officials; and 
shut down the connections between polling stations. In addition, riot police units were 
deployed in Catalonia to seize ballot boxes, remove voters from polling stations, and 
maintain public order. 
 
News records on this issue demonstrate that although the international community was 
divided on the issue, most English people thought Catalans had the right to cast their 
ballots and protest against the government measures. In line with this, a study recently 
published by the BBC shows that in most of the testimonies collected during those days 
people said things like ‘Catalans have the right to vote on their own future and protest to 
defend their democratic rights’ or ‘protests are useful for people to make their voices 
heard’. Further, the following pie chart was included in the article to illustrate English 
people’s opinion on the Catalan situation. 
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Condition 2: Public opinion doesn’t legitimise protests 
Please, read the information presented below, then, answer the questions relate to it in the 
following sections. 
 
On the first of October 2017, Catalonia’s pro-independence movement organised a 
referendum to decide the continuity of the region as part of Spain. Even though the 
referendum was declared illegal by Spanish central government and the constitutional 
court, that day thousands of Catalans went to polling stations to cast their ballots. To stop 
the referendum Spanish government confiscated ballot papers; arrested key officials; and 
shut down the connections between polling stations. In addition, riot police units were 
deployed in Catalonia to seize ballot boxes, remove voters from polling stations, and 
maintain public order. 
 
News records on this issue demonstrate that although the international community was 
divided on the issue, most English people thought Catalans had neither right to cast their 
ballots nor protest against the government. Indeed, in England prevailed the idea that 
Catalans should have accepted Spanish government decisions on behalf of the interests 
of the entire country. In line with this, a study recently published by the BBC shows that 
in most of the testimonies collected during those days people said things like ‘Catalans 
should be restricted from voting and protesting, they posed a threat to public order’ or 
‘protests usually go nowhere and are just an excuse for rioting and looting’. Further, the 
following pie chart was included in the article to illustrate English people’s opinion on 
the Catalan situation. 
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Condition 3: Public opinion indifferent to protest 
Please, read the information presented below, then, answer the questions relate to it in the 
following sections. 
 
On the first of October 2017, Catalonia’s pro-independence movement organised a 
referendum to decide the continuity of the region as part of Spain. Even though the 
referendum was declared illegal by Spanish central government and the constitutional 
court, that day thousands of Catalans went to polling stations to cast their ballots. To stop 
the referendum Spanish government confiscated ballot papers; arrested key officials; and 
shut down the connections between polling stations. In addition, riot police units were 
deployed in Catalonia to seize ballot boxes, remove voters from polling stations, and 
maintain public order. 
 
News records on this issue demonstrate that although the international community was 
divided on the issue, most English people showed no interest in the Catalan situation. In 
line with this, a study recently published by the BBC shows that in most of the testimonies 
collected during those days people said things like ‘who cares about what is going on in 
Spain. The only important thing here is hard work and paying the bills’ or ‘people should 
focus their attention on solving English people’s problems instead of wasting their time 
427 
 
in foreign issues’. Further, the following pie chart was included in the article to illustrate 
English people’s opinion on the Catalan situation. 
 
 
 
According to the information you read about, to what extent did people actively believe 
Catalans had the right to vote and protest against government decisions? 
m 1 None  
m 2  
m 3  
m 4  
m 5 A lot  
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According to the information you read about, to what extent did people think protests 
are important in a democratic system? 
m 1 None  
m 2  
m 3  
m 4  
m 5 A lot  
 
The footage you are about to watch is of the events that took place at some polling 
stations during the referendum in Catalonia. 
 
Link to the video: https://youtu.be/APsHNIrS7-s. 
 
Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below in relation to the 
protesters in the video (1 strongly disagree, 5 strongly agree). 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Given the way the protesters are treated by the police, I can 
easily identify with them (the protesters)  m  m  m  m  m  
I share the same beliefs and values with protesters when it 
comes to the way the police should act in protests.  m  m  m  m  m  
I feel solidarity with the protesters  
m  m  m  m  m  
I feel a bond with the protesters  
m  m  m  m  m  
I identified with the protesters  
m  m  m  m  m  
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Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below in relation to the 
police officers in the video (1 strongly disagree, 5 strongly agree). 
 1 2 3 4 5 
I identified with the police officers  m  m  m  m  m  
The police officers in the video have the same sense of right 
and wrong as me  m  m  m  m  m  
The police officers in the video stand up for values that are 
important for people like me  m  m  m  m  m  
I support the way the police officers acted in the video  m  m  m  m  m  
 
Considering the police behaviour in the video, please indicate your agreement with each 
of the statements below (1 strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 neither agree nor disagree, 4 
agree, 5 strongly agree). 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Police treated protesters with respect  m  m  m  m  m  
Police treated protesters fairly  m  m  m  m  m  
Police took time to listen to protesters  
m  m  m  m  m  
Police explained their decisions to protesters  
m  m  m  m  m  
 
  
430 
 
Please indicate the extent you would support the following actions protesters in the 
video might carry out as a reaction to the police behaviour (1 strongly disagree, 5 
strongly agree). 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Pushing the police back  m  m  m  m  m  
Yelling at the police  
m  m  m  m  m  
Disobeying police orders  
m  m  m  m  m  
Throwing stones or other objects at the police  
m  m  m  m  m  
Hitting police officers with bare hands  
m  m  m  m  m  
Tackling mounted police officers  m  m  m  m  m  
Throwing petrol bombs at the police  m  m  m  m  m  
Hitting police officers using weapons (e.g., sticks, baseball 
bats).  m  m  m  m  m  
 
This is the end of the survey. Please, press the bottom below to submit your 
responses. 
 
 
 
 
  
Submit 
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Debriefing 
 
Thank you for taking part in this study. The questionnaire you completed actually is part 
of an experiment which main objective is to know more about the influence of public 
opinion on people’s support for different tactics employed by protesters. The article you 
read was specially created for this study with the purpose of describing one of the three 
possible scenarios the pro-independence movement in Catalonia had to face in relation to 
public audience (people given legitimacy, people denying legitimacy, and people 
indifferent to the referendum and protests). Moreover, the footage you watched after 
reading the article is an extract from a longer compilation of footages about the events 
took place over the Catalonian independence referendum on the first of October 2017 
(you can find the complete video at https://youtu.be/APsHNIrS7-s). 
 
We are expecting to find differences in the levels of support people might give to 
protesters tactics regarding what other people think about the referendum and protests 
(the article you read) and the exposure to police misbehaviour against protesters (the 
footage you watched). 
 
Previous research has suggested that people who don’t participate in protests might 
consider authorities (i.e., the police and the government) behaviour regarding protests to 
support the use of specific tactics by protesters. In addition, perceptions of public opinion 
legitimization of protests have also been suggested as a factor people might take into 
account to support protesters tactics, violent tactics in particular. This experiment is a 
continuation of such research into the influence of different levels of legitimacy given by 
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others to protests on the support for violent tactics in a scenario where authorities act 
against protesters. 
 
The slight deception in the introductory information to the study given at the start was 
used to get you to respond to the study in an authentic and engaged way, without revealing 
the exact nature of the experiment. This is a standard technique in social psychology 
studies and I hope the deception did not negatively impact you in any way. 
 
We hope you enjoyed participating in this project. Thank you once again for your support 
and cooperation with this research! If you have any questions regarding the study, please 
contact: Patricio Saavedra Morales: P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk or Professor John 
Drury: j.drury@sussex.ac.uk 
